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Thesis Abstract 
Rumination has classically been associated with depressive symptoms and is often used as 
a clinical indicator for depression; however, a re-evaluation has recently suggested 
rumination may comprise of two sub-components: adaptive reflection, and maladaptive 
brooding. A separate line of enquiry has used evolutionary thinking to suggest that 
rumination is an adaptive process which facilitates problem solving. To date, there is little 
in the way of empirical support for these claims, nor have there been investigations into 
how the reflection/brooding dichotomy may fit into the adaptive framework. Moreover, no 
comment has been made with regard to the mechanisms through which rumination may 
influence problem solving. Four experiments sought to address these issues and better 
understand rumination in non-clinical populations. The results from study one indicate that 
reflection and brooding are both associated with improved problem solving in social-type 
and risk-reward problem solving, but not in abstract problem solving. In study two, 
reflective rumination was found to be positively associated with working memory capacity, 
whereas brooding and analytical ruminations were associated with slowed responses in a 
Posner attention task and stop signal reaction time task respectively. Study three explored 
the novel observation that brooding was useful in risk-reward scenarios, with results 
indicating that the availability of risk information did not moderate the effects of brooding. 
Finally, study four explores whether differences exist between trait and state rumination 
and if these differences may account for inconsistencies between studies. From these 
results, it is clear that rumination can no longer be treated as a unitary construct. More 
critically, the notion of brooding as a maladaptive force must be reconsidered by the wider 
literature, and it is advised that future research consider the relative balance between 
reflection and brooding in their samples. 
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Thesis Aims and Chapter Summaries 
This thesis aims to investigate a novel hypothesis derived from applying evolutionary theory 
to the development of depression which states that rumination is the critical component 
responsible for depression’s persistence due to its potential role as an adaptive mechanism 
in complex problem solving. In doing so we aim to better understand rumination’s role in 
non-clinical populations, adopting the view that depression is one extreme on an adaptive 
continuum. Thus, depression persists as those affected negatively (i.e. through maladaptive 
rumination) are rarer than those who experience the benefits of adaptive rumination 
associated with normal levels of low mood, and so in terms of genetic fitness, the overall 
benefits of the many outweigh the negative effects of the few. Furthermore, while it has been 
hypothesised that rumination facilitates more effective problem solving, there has been no 
suggestion to our knowledge of the potential mechanisms through which this effect occurs. 
Consequently, we aim to investigate rumination’s association with specific aspects of 
cognition, namely those considered executive functions, as these cognitive processes are 
thought to play some role in problem solving and so are natural candidates through which 
rumination may impact problem solving. As will be discussed, unipolar depression presents 
a serious and growing problem to both individuals and society at large, placing a greater 
burden on health care services as the number of reported cases increases. Beyond the need 
for improving the treatments available to patients in light of evidence suggesting that as little 
as 50% of patients enjoy any benefit from medication (Berman, Narasimhan, & Charney, 
1997) and many experiencing relapse following behavioural treatments (Paykel et al., 2005), 
it is critical that we begin to understand why such a disorder persists within the larger 
population. 
Chapter One first presents the rationale behind applying evolutionary thinking to 
clinical disorder, before detailing how depression may be approached using evolutionary 
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theory in order to explain depressive symptoms and generate novel, testable hypotheses. The 
chapter concludes with details of alternative, though not necessarily conflicting, hypotheses 
which are beyond the scope of investigation in the present thesis, and a discussion of the 
clinical implications of approaching depression from an evolutionary perspective. Chapter 
Two provides an overview of the trait measures used throughout the thesis. Chapter Three 
details an empirical study investigating the relationship between rumination, low mood, and 
problem solving ability as measured by three different problem solving tasks. Ability in 
social-style and risk-reward, but not abstract problem solving tasks, was found to be 
positively related to the adaptive (reflection) and maladaptive (brooding) components of 
rumination. As such, this chapter gives the first indication that ‘maladaptive’ rumination may 
not, in fact, be as maladaptive as initially thought. The potential cognitive mechanisms 
behind these associated improvements are explored in Chapter Four by examining 
associations between rumination and several aspects of executive function which are thought 
to be involved in problem solving, namely working memory capacity, response inhibition, 
and attentional control. Individuals who engaged more frequently in adaptive rumination had 
an associated increase in working memory capacity. Moreover, individuals who engaged 
more frequently in ‘maladaptive’ rumination were found to have slower reaction times in a 
response inhibition task, while individuals engaging more frequently in analytical 
ruminations (a type of adaptive rumination) were slower at endogenously deploying 
attention to invalidly cued trials. For both of these observations, no differences in accuracy 
were found, suggesting that in these individuals adopt a more cautious approach to the task 
in order assure accuracy which complies with the potential hesitation account of brooding 
rumination detailed in Chapter Three. Chapter Five investigates the novel relationship 
between ‘maladaptive’ rumination risk-reward problem solving in greater detail, utilising 
risk-based tasks that vary in the availability of information regarding the risks. Here, no 
17 
 
differences were observed in decision making between the tasks as a function of the 
frequency of rumination, suggesting that the effects of rumination in these types of task are 
not dependent on the availability of risk information. Moreover, nuances in the data point to 
a potential gender difference in the effects of ‘maladaptive’ rumination on risk-reward 
problem solving. Chapter Six presents the final empirical study, detailing a pilot 
investigation of potential differences in the effects of state versus trait rumination. Though 
preliminary, the results suggest that the involvement of state or trait rumination may vary as 
a function of the short or long-term nature of a given problem. Finally, Chapter Seven 
concludes the thesis, discussing the wider implications of rumination reconsidered as a 
broadly adaptive construct. Critically, this challenges currently held conceptions that 
rumination, with particular reference to brooding, is a universally maladaptive construct. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The integration of evolutionary principles into the study of psychological mechanisms and 
behaviours has steadily increased over the past three decades. Indeed, it is now common to 
offer not only proximate (immediate) explanations for a given behaviour but also ultimate 
(evolutionary)  explanations on the persistence of a given behaviour or mechanism within 
the population. However, while such explanations have been applied to a broad range of 
behaviours such as language (e.g. Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Hauser, Chomsky, & Fitch, 
2002; Nowak & Krakauer, 1999) mate selection (e.g. Buss, 1988; Gangestad & Simpson, 
2000) and aggression (e.g. Archer, 2009; Campbell, 1999), attention has only recently been 
brought to the domain of psychiatry. At first, it appears paradoxical to consider any form of 
psychopathology as adaptive, or indeed having adaptive origins; however, the persistence of 
disorders such as unipolar depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia and generalised 
anxiety requires explanation. In spite of the detrimental effects of these disorders on both 
sufferers and their families, they remain within the population and are observed across 
cultures (Draguns & Tanaka-Matsumi, 2003). As such, it is important to ask why the 
capability to develop these disorders remains and why evolution has not selected against this 
capacity, as this may ultimately lead to the development of new research questions which 
may, in turn, inform future treatments (Nesse, 1984). 
1.1 Evolution and Psychopathology 
In recent years, evolutionary explanations for psychopathology have become more 
prevalent. For instance, hypotheses on the adaptive nature of bipolar depression (Sherman, 
2001, 2006, 2012), obsessive compulsive disorder (Abed & de Pauw, 1998; for a review, see 
Feygin, Swain, & Leckman, 2006) and eating disorders (Abed, 1998) have been offered; 
although few have received widespread attention or acceptance. By contrast, unipolar 
depression, generalised anxiety, and schizophrenia have been the subject of extensive 
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theorising and debate with regards to their evolutionary origins. Schizophrenia, for example, 
is a highly heritable condition commonly characterised by auditory hallucinations, 
inappropriate affective response and delusions (Andreasen, 1995), in addition to a broad 
range of neurocognitive deficits (Heinrichs & Zakzanis, 1998), including attentional (e.g. 
Braff, 1993; Cornblatt & Keilp, 1994; Orellana, Slachevsky, Peña, & Pena, 2012; Urbanek 
et al., 2009), working memory (e.g. Lee & Park, 2005; Silver, Feldman, Bilker, & Gur, 2003; 
Stone, Gabrieli, Stebbins, & Sullivan, 1998), language processing (e.g. Bagner, Melinder, & 
Barch, 2003; DeLisi et al., 1997; Faber & Reichstein, 1981; Marini et al., 2008), and motor 
deficits (e.g. Manschreck, Maher, Rucklos, & Vereen, 1982; Sullivan, Shear, Zipursky, 
Sagar, & Pfefferbaum, 1994; Tigges et al., 2000). In spite of this symptom profile, a number 
of theories have been offered on the evolutionary origins of the disorder. Functional theories 
have made associations between schizophrenia and increased creativity, such that 
schizophrenia is the extreme result of sexual selection for creativity in schizotypy (Nettle & 
Clegg, 2006), or have linked schizophrenia with cultural shamanism with schizophrenia 
linked genes propagating as a result of schizophrenic individuals being valued as spiritual 
leaders (Polimeni & Reiss, 2002). Additionally, genetic evidence suggests that 
schizophrenia-linked genes have in fact undergone positive selection and accelerated the 
evolution of schizophrenia (Crespi, Summers, & Dorus, 2007). An evolutionary model of 
schizophrenia is still, however, far from comprehensive and it is, as yet, unclear how such a 
model may inform clinical practice. 
The application of evolutionary thinking to generalised anxiety has more immediate 
implications for clinical practice. It has been hypothesised that anxiety has developed from 
a need for enhanced vigilance in the evolutionary environment (M. Bateson, Brilot, & Nettle, 
2011; Marks & Nesse, 1994), where predators were more abundant, mortality was higher, 
and survival was dependant on proper recognition of potential threats. In such a scenario, it 
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would be better to be more vigilant and perceive more threats where there were none (i.e. 
false alarms) than to become lax and fail to recognise a potentially fatal threat. This ‘smoke 
detector principle’ (Nesse, 2001) suggests that the energetic costs of false alarms are 
outweighed by the energetic costs of fatal encounters; thus in such an environment, it is more 
advantageous to flee in any scenario than face the possible consequences. Over successive 
generations, the perceptual bias for danger would become more extreme as individuals in 
possession of this genotype successfully reproduce. Moreover, as our environment has 
changed, predators are no longer a prominent threat, and therefore high levels of vigilance 
are no longer required and where it remains, it manifests as anxiety.  Such a model may give 
insight into when anxiety may be adaptive and, as such, may help to shape treatment plans 
on a patient-by-patient basis (Nesse, 2001). 
The evolutionary approach advocates the view of psychopathology as a continuum, 
such that a given psychopathology is the manifestation of the extreme upper tail of a 
normal distribution of a given trait, in line with genetic variation and expression within the 
population (Crow, 1997). Not only does adopting this view go some way towards 
explaining why any given psychopathology persists in the population by suggesting that 
psychopathological expression follows a normal distribution (and does not, therefore, 
impact fitness in the majority), it also challenges current clinical practices. For example, it 
is common for patients to be prescribed medication in response to seeking psychological 
help, with as many as one-in-five adults receiving psychiatric medication in the United 
States in 2010 (World Health Organization, 2011). However, under the continuum view, it 
is possible that a significant proportion of these prescriptions are in fact for adaptive levels 
of a given trait. For example, some individuals receiving medical treatment for anxiety 
may, in fact, be experiencing an adaptive response to their environment, such that there is a 
tangible threat to them within their environment. Indeed, one may then predict that levels 
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of anxiety vary as a function of threat probability, which is supported by epidemiological 
data examining levels of anxiety in relation to mortality threats (e.g. Breslau, Schultz, & 
Peterson, 1995; Lahti et al., 2010; Najman et al., 2010). Further support for the continuum 
approach stems from observations that mortality is lower in individuals who experience 
moderate levels of anxiety compared to those who experience low levels of anxiety (Lee, 
Wadsworth, & Hotopf, 2006). Moreover, in patient samples, individuals with comorbid 
anxiety disorders have lower mortality rates than patients without a comorbid anxiety 
diagnosis (Mykletun et al., 2009), indicating that anxiety may have some protective 
properties, even at the clinical level. It is important to note that while at some level a 
psychopathology may be adaptive from an evolutionary perspective, the experienced 
distress in and of itself warrants some form of address. What is currently unknown, 
however, is the long term consequence of suppressing a potentially adaptive response with 
medication (Nesse & Berridge, 1997), although evolutionary analyses suggest some 
medications negatively impact upon other adaptive processes over time (Andrews, 
Thomson, Amstadter, & Neale, 2012). Prolonged elevation of post-synaptic serotonin 
levels as a result of chronic antidepressant use, for example, can revert neurons to a 
functionally immature state, thereby impacting neural processing (Kobayashi et al., 2010). 
Thus, it is plausible that suppressing potentially adaptive responses in the short term may 
lead to greater and more enduring negative consequences because the causes of the 
adaptive response are not addressed. 
In sum, as has been shown in the field of anxiety, applying evolutionary principles 
to the study of psychopathology allows for the development of novel hypotheses in the 
investigation of psychopathology. Moreover, in advocating a continuum approach to 
psychopathology, evolutionary hypotheses may be investigated at the sub-clinical level, with 
a view to assessing whether a given characteristic is adaptive at low levels of expression or 
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whether it is detrimental to some degree at all levels of expression. In adopting this approach, 
it is possible to apply an empirical framework in which to test these hypotheses. By assessing 
individuals who fall on different points of a continuum, it is possible to identify common 
characteristics between the clinical and non-clinical manifestations of a given disorder and 
in turn, assess the qualitative differences between them. Ultimately, it may then be possible 
to discern the potential adaptive value of a psychopathology, relative to the level of 
expression, which is not traditionally possible when assessing differences using an extreme 
groups approach (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005). As noted, evidence 
associating schizotypy, creativity, and mating success (Nettle & Clegg, 2006), in addition to 
evidence of enhanced threat detection in elevated levels of anxiety (Doty, Japee, Ingvar, & 
Ungerleider, 2013; Muris et al., 2000; Richards, Hadwin, Benson, Wenger, & Donnelly, 
2011; for a review, see Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014) demonstrate how 
evolutionary theory can generate empirical hypotheses and move beyond ‘just so’ stories, an 
approach the studies delineated here will take. 
In spite of moving toward a more rigorous empirical framework, the study of 
evolutionary psychopathology remains largely populated by theoretical debate, particularly 
when considering unipolar depression. Given the potential benefits of adopting an 
evolutionary approach to psychopathology, this is especially concerning as recent estimates 
of disease burden rank depression second behind ischaemic heart disease in terms of 
Disability-Adjusted Life Years (DALYs), a measure of life years lost and years spent living 
with disability as a result of disease (Murray & Lopez, 1997). Moreover, epidemiological 
data from the United States suggests that the prevalence of depression is increasing year on 
year (Conway, Compton, Stinson, & Grant, 2006). Thus, it is clear that depression represents 
a persistent and growing problem that requires immediate address. The remainder of this 
chapter will outline evidence for the evolutionary basis of depression before presenting 
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evidence for an evolutionary model of depression emphasising rumination as a critical 
component of adaptation by facilitating enhanced analytical abilities. Finally, alternative 
theories will be discussed before highlighting the potential clinical impact of investigating 
evolutionary hypotheses of depression. 
1.2 Unipolar Depression: Neurochemistry and Rumination 
Unipolar depression is an affective mood disorder characterized by low mood, changes to 
both eating and sleeping patterns, anhedonia (the inability to enjoy pleasurable activities) 
and recurring thoughts of death or suicide (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Changes in neurochemistry have been implicated in the genesis and maintenance of 
depressive episodes (e.g. Coppen, 1967), with such changes informing pharmacological 
treatments of depression. One mechanism of action for such treatments is primarily focussed 
on inhibition of serotonin reuptake at synapses throughout the brain (Vaswani, Linda, & 
Ramesh, 2003), with a view to enhancing serotonin’s mood enhancing properties through 
prolonged exposure to elevated post-synaptic serotonin levels. Critically, however, 
alleviation of symptoms is not immediate (Katz, Koslow, & Frazer, 1996; Stassen, Angst, & 
Delini-Stula, 1999), taking six weeks on average for neurochemical changes to take effect 
(Frazer & Benmansour, 2001). This suggests that acute levels of serotonin may not play a 
causal role in the manifestation of depression, but may instead serve as a clinical indicator. 
This assumption is further supported by evidence of associations between selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) and attempted suicide (Fergusson et al., 2005; Healy & 
Whitaker, 2003; Möller et al., 2008), in addition to evidence of medication-resistant 
depression affecting as much as 50% of those receiving treatment for depression (Berman et 
al., 1997). Indeed, SSRIs have been shown to up-regulate neurogenesis within the atrophied 
hippocampi of depression patients (Schmidt & Duman, 2007; Warner-Schmidt & Duman, 
2006), and it is this process which explains the lag between beginning antidepressant 
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treatment and symptom alleviation. It is, therefore, apparent that other factors are involved 
in the onset and continuation of depressive episodes. 
Stressful life events (SLEs) are often reported as preceding episodes of depression 
(e.g. Brown, 1998; Horesh, Klomek, & Apter, 2008; Pine, Cohen, Johnson, & Brook, 2002) 
and are widely accepted as causal factors, having been shown to interact with epigenetics in 
predicting vulnerability to, and development of, depression (Caspi et al., 2003). Specifically, 
chronic exposure to the stress hormone cortisol is thought to inhibit serotonin transport by 
decreasing serotonin receptor sensitivity; however, polymorphism in the serotonin transport 
gene 5-HTT moderates the impact of cortisol, resulting in variability in susceptibility to 
depression within the population (Caspi et al., 2003). It is of note that while SLEs are strong 
predictors of depression onset, they are not as strongly associated with duration and 
maintenance of a given episode (Horesh et al., 2008), nor to our knowledge are 
polymorphisms; thus, while an SLE may trigger a depressive episode, its duration is subject 
to a further factor: rumination. 
Rumination has been defined as a thought-style characterised by repetitive and 
passive thinking on negative emotions and is a core symptom of depression, predicting 
episode severity, duration, and subsequent onset of new depressive episodes (Martin & 
Tesser, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000), and has been found to be elevated in both partially 
and fully remitted depression patients (Riso et al., 2003). Moreover, rumination is associated 
with treatment-resistant variants of depression, with higher levels of rumination associated 
with a reduced probability of achieving remission (Jones, Siegle, & Thase, 2008) and more 
residual symptoms following treatment (Schmaling, Dimidjian, Katon, & Sullivan, 2002). 
As such, it is clear that rumination is a critical factor when considering a patient’s long-term 
outcome and response to treatment; however, current practice often overlooks the impact of 
rumination and instead focuses on biological interventions, coping strategies, or a 
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combination of both. Before examining rumination itself in more detail, the development of 
the rumination hypothesis of the evolution of depression will be discussed. 
1.3 The Evolution of Depression and the Rumination Hypothesis 
Depression and its associated disorders have classically been approached as purely 
pathological under the disease model of medicine, despite a growing body of evidence to 
suggest the contrary. Again, it is important to state from the outset that in arguing for an 
adaptive function of depression, it is in no way argued that the suffering experienced by such 
patients is diminished or trivialised. Rather, the suffering in and of itself warrants treatment. 
The adaptive significance of bodily responses that are commonly viewed as unpleasant is 
now well documented. For example, fever is an immunological response to bacterial 
pathogens, intended to elevate body temperature to a point in which pathogens cannot 
survive (Blatteis, 2003). Another example concerns pregnancy sickness, which is thought to 
be a means of preventing ingestion of potentially toxic foods that may harm or prove fatal 
to an unborn child (Cardwell, 2012; Profet, 1992). Though these examples concern 
physiological responses, it is not unreasonable to assume that psychological mechanisms 
may have developed in a similar manner.  
Further evidence for a potential evolutionary origin for depression comes from 
research into genetics that may underpin psychological disorder. Links between 
polymorphism in serotonin transporter gene 5-HTT and vulnerability to depression are now 
well supported (e.g. Caspi et al., 2003; Wilhelm et al., 2006; for meta-analyses, see Clarke, 
Flint, Attwood, & Munafo, 2010; Karg, Burmeister, Shedden, & Sen, 2011; however, for 
alternative views, see Risch et al., 2009) with evidence from twin and familial studies also 
supporting a strong genetic component (Sullivan, Neale, & Kendler, 2000). From an 
evolutionary perspective, it is difficult to reconcile the heritability of depression 
(approximately 40%-66%; de Geus & Middeldorp, 2013) with the consistent observations 
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of negative outcomes in patients, without considering a possible adaptive mechanism. 
Specifically, evolutionary theory predicts that common genetic polymorphisms that 
negatively impact fitness are likely candidates for elimination through natural selection 
(Homberg & Lesch, 2011). Thus, over the course of our evolutionary history, natural 
selection should have acted against 5-HTT polymorphism were it purely disease-linked and 
conveyed no adaptive advantage. A recent study examining fecundity of patients with a 
variety of psychiatric disorders (including depression) and their unaffected siblings found 
that only male depression patients suffered from a reduction in fecundity, with female 
patients remaining unaffected. Further to this, siblings of patients were found to have 
increased fecundity, which suggests the genes associated with depression are not negatively 
impacting reproductive success, and may, in fact, be facilitating reproduction in siblings 
(Power et al., 2013). Moreover, the prevalence rate of depression in the population exceeds 
the minimum 1% which would suggest that a disorder is attributable to a genetic mutation 
(Huxley, Mayr, Osmond, & Hoffer, 1964). Indeed, conservative estimates of prevalence and 
mutation rates in depression suggest that depression is observed in the population at 100 
times the spontaneous mutation rate estimated for humans (Edwards, 1974; Longley, 2001). 
Thus, it is argued that depression, or the genetic material associated with depression, must 
have undergone some form of selection, otherwise, it would be observed at far lower rates 
in the general population. 
Finally, it is also important to consider epigenetics, a phenomenon by which gene 
expression is modified through exposure to and interaction with the environment. Zhao, 
Goldberg, Bremner, and Vaccarino (2013) demonstrated a link between DNA methylation 
(an epigenetic biomarker) variation and variation in depressive symptoms in monozygotic 
twins. Crucially, this finding was independent of both shared genetic and environmental 
factors, demonstrating that unique, individual-environmental interactions contributed to 
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depressive symptoms at the genetic level. Moreover, 5-HTT polymorphism was found not 
to influence the association between DNA methylation and depressive symptoms. This and 
previous studies (e.g. Mill & Petronis, 2007; Schroeder, Krebs, Bleich, & Frieling, 2010) 
suggest that individuals are capable of developing depression irrespective of their genotype. 
As such, the capacity to develop depression under certain environmental conditions may 
also be indicative of adaptation. It is worth noting that epigenetic changes are heritable 
(Petronis, 2010) and may propagate depression in environments where it may be adaptive. 
Heritable epigenetic changes result in adaptation by increasing phenotypic variability in 
response to fluctuating environments, rather than directly influencing the average phenotype. 
Specifically, it is not the trait itself that is affected, but rather the propensity to vary 
phenotypically, such that a given genotype may result in a variety of phenotypes depending 
on environmental input (Feinberg & Irizarry, 2010). 
Evolutionary accounts of depression have undergone numerous iterations in the last 
three decades and have ranged from mechanisms of population regulation via goal 
disengagement (Klinger, 1975) to plea-for-help mechanisms like those observed in crying 
infants (Lummaa, Vuorisalo, Barr, & Lehtonen, 1998). Critically, these theories have either 
failed to account for how such a trait may be inherited (disengagement theory) or have failed 
to explain the adaptive function of all symptoms of depression (plea-for-help theories). More 
recently, it has been suggested that depression is an adaptive response to significant 
environmental changes that may render previously safe behaviours dangerous to the 
individual (Welling, 2003). Under this framework, it is argued that depressive symptoms 
represent valid reactions to sudden changes in circumstances. For example, loss of appetite 
may serve as a protective factor when the environmental change results in uncertain food 
sources, such that new food sources may be potentially harmful. Similarly, a reduction in 
libido results in a decline in sexual activity, which may reduce the risk of predation and 
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nutritional demands associated with increased metabolic activity. Such examples provide 
clear short-term solutions to problems posed by a changing environment; however, 
behaviours such as avoiding reproduction do not benefit evolutionary fitness in the long-
term. Thus, behaviours such as these must serve to facilitate the development of a long-term 
solution.  
The analytical rumination hypothesis (Andrews & Thomson, 2009) posits that the 
withdrawal from behaviours such as reproduction and regular feeding allows for focussing 
solely on the immediate environmental challenges, with resources dedicated to cognitive 
processing ultimately manifesting in prolonged rumination. It is thought that, through 
rumination, previously safe behaviours are analysed with respect to the new environment in 
order to assess their viability. Once new behavioural strategies are developed, rumination 
discontinues and the depressive episode alleviates. Therefore, the rumination hypothesis 
predicts that individuals experiencing lower levels of mood will benefit from enhanced 
analytical abilities as a consequence of elevated levels of rumination.  
1.4 Depression in the Modern Environment: Testing the Rumination Hypothesis 
One common problem with evolutionary theories pertains to their empirical investigation. 
Indeed, the modern environment is quite different to that of our evolutionary ancestors, such 
that many of the environmental problems they were confronted with do not necessarily apply 
today. Thus, it becomes difficult to assess a potential adaptation because the current 
environment may be incongruent with that in which the mechanism evolved. For example, 
as noted, it has been hypothesised that anxiety disorders stem from a need for elevated 
vigilance due to constant predatory threat (Bateson et al., 2011; Marks & Nesse, 1994); 
however, predators no longer pose the threat they once did. As such, it is challenging to test 
hypervigilance to predatory threat in the modern environment. With reference to depression, 
the changes in environment experienced by our ancestors may be incongruent with what is 
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considered an environmental change now. Competition for food sources, for example, has 
dramatically reduced, such that food availability rarely fluctuates and thus, assessing food 
source viability is no longer required. By contrast, modern examples of environmental 
change may include voluntary immigration to a new culture, or acculturation (Lassetter & 
Callister, 2009; Rasmussen, Crager, Baser, Chu, & Gany, 2012) or even winning the lottery 
(Nisslé & Bschor, 2002); all of which have been associated with depression onset. 
It is evident that modern environmental challenges differ from those of our 
evolutionary ancestors; however, the rumination hypothesis generates testable predictions 
outside of the evolutionary environment. Specifically, though the environmental triggers 
may differ, an improvement in analytical ability should be observable in individuals 
experiencing a depressive episode when given problem solving tasks unrelated to the 
environmental trigger. To date, however, there have been few empirical studies examining 
this prediction. Early evidence in support of the hypothesis is derived from Hokanson, Sacco, 
Blumberg, and Landrum's (1980) investigation into interpersonal behaviours of depressed 
individuals when participating in a modified Prisoner’s Dilemma paradigm. Under the 
modified paradigm, participants were placed into either a ‘high power’ or ‘low power’ 
position, such that participants in the high power position would be able to view the low 
power position participant’s decision prior to making their own. As such, participants in the 
high power position were given the opportunity to maximise their points total on each trial 
by calculating which decision would benefit them most based on their partner’s decision. It 
was found that depressed participants scored significantly more than their healthy 
counterparts in each condition, suggesting that depressed participants were better able to 
analyse the current scenario in order to maximise goal-related output. More recently, Surbey 
(2011) reports similar findings, and though these are interpreted in terms of self-deception 
and co-operation, the pattern of behaviour remains the same.  
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The relationship between problem solving and depression has now begun to be 
detailed more extensively (e.g. Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992; 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2002), and lends further support to the rumination hypothesis. For 
instance, Anderson, Goddard, and Powell (2011) examined the predictive power of problem 
solving ability on subsequent episodes of depression. Over a three-month period, Anderson 
and colleagues found that problem solving ability significantly predicted the onset of 
depressive episodes, such that those who were less able to effectively solve problems were 
more likely to subsequently experience a depressive episode. Critically, this association held 
not only for abstract problem solving but also for real-life problem solving, suggesting that 
an inability to successfully navigate individual environmental challenges is associated with 
depression onset. With regard to the rumination hypothesis, it follows that being unable to 
solve a particular problem initially results in increased demand for cognitive resources. 
Rumination should, therefore, increase in order to address the problem, with the increasing 
cognitive demand resulting in behavioural changes manifesting as depressive symptoms. 
These symptoms then persist because individuals who are still unable to solve the immediate 
problem continue to dedicate resources to solution generation. This contrasts with 
participants who were better able to solve problems, thereby requiring fewer resources 
dedicated to cognitive processing and thus having no adaptive need for depressive episodes. 
Empirical studies that explicitly investigate the relationship between rumination, 
mood, and problem solving outside of a social context are few, and so, at present, 
generalisations based on the available data are difficult. Nevertheless, preliminary evidence 
would appear to support a model in which depression facilitates rumination for the purposes 
of solving complex problems. In spite of sparse empirical data, contradictory evidence has 
been offered that challenges the notion of rumination, and therefore depression, being 
adaptive at all. A number of studies have begun to report negative relationships between 
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rumination and problem solving ability, particularly in dysphoric and clinically depressed 
individuals (e.g. Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Kao, Dritschel, & Astell, 2006; Raes et al., 2005). 
However, there is now a growing body of evidence that suggests that these results are not 
incompatible with the evolutionary model and may themselves be explained in terms of 
evolutionary principles, namely that of cliff-edged fitness. 
1.5 Cliff-Edged Fitness and the Manifestation of Rumination 
The principle of cliff-edged fitness purports that expression of a particular trait increases 
fitness exponentially until a point, after which, increased expression is in fact associated with 
decreases in fitness (Nesse, 2004). For example, uric acid has been shown to protect against 
oxidative tissue damage in humans (Ames, Cathcart, Schwiers, & Hochstein, 1981; Becker, 
1993). Thus, increased levels of uric acid result in decreased oxidative stress, which may 
ultimately decrease the likelihood of developing cancer (Dröge, 2002; Valko et al., 2007) 
and cardiovascular diseases (Cai & Harrison, 2000; Stocker & Keaney, 2004). However, 
elevated levels of uric acid have been linked with the development of gout through uric acid 
crystallisation around joints (Choi, Mount, & Reginato, 2005; Terkeltaub, 2003). While the 
evolutionary advantages of resistance to developing cancer and cardiovascular disease are 
clear, the consequences of supernormal uric acid levels are as important. Considering that 
the precipitation of uric acid crystals around joints results in acute arthritis, this consequently 
inhibits movement. With a reduction in movement comes an increased risk of predation due 
to an inability to evade threats as effectively. Moreover, limited movement may impact upon 
male mating strategies, with males being unable to maintain larger territories and thus access 
to more resources and potential mates. As such, increasing longevity through resistance to 
life-threatening illnesses increases fitness by extending the reproductive lifespan; however, 
fitness is then inhibited when levels of uric acid become excessive and potentially result in 
fewer mating opportunities and increased risk of predation. 
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Cliff-edged fitness may help explain the somewhat contradictory findings of 
rumination having negative associations with problem solving abilities. Indeed, the notion 
of two forms of rumination, adaptive and maladaptive, has begun to be explored in the 
literature. Specifically, adaptive rumination has been defined as more reflective in nature 
(Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003) and is 
rooted in a concrete and experiential style of thinking (e.g. Watkins, 2008; Watkins & 
Moulds, 2005) which is associated with better problem solving ability. Moreover, these 
improvements occur when rumination is goal-oriented (Ciarocco, Vohs, & Baumeister, 
2010). Maladaptive rumination, by contrast, is characterised by a brooding thought style 
(Joormann et al., 2006; Treynor et al., 2003) which focuses on abstract thoughts (Watkins, 
2008) and is not as goal-oriented as adaptive rumination (that is, rumination which in some 
way benefits an individual’s evolutionary fitness). For example, Watkins and Moulds (2005) 
demonstrated in a depressed sample that realigning rumination to a more concrete and 
experiential mode resulted in enhanced performance on a social problem solving task. 
However, participants who maintained abstract ruminative styles were significantly worse 
at solving social problems. Similarly, Ciarocco et al. (2010) found performance 
improvements in a creativity task when ruminative thoughts were goal-oriented, especially 
following a perceived failure. Although evidence is only preliminary at present, these studies 
suggest that there is a point at which rumination changes from being adaptive to being 
maladaptive (see Table 1.1) for a summary of differences between these concepts); however, 
the nature of this transition has yet to be investigated. Henceforth, adaptive and maladaptive 
rumination shall be referred to as reflection and brooding respectively. 
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Table 1.1: Characteristics of adaptive (reflection) and maladpative (brooding) 
rumination as described by the literature 
Adaptive Rumination (Reflection) Maladaptive Rumination (Brooding) 
- Goal oriented - Self-focussed 
- Concrete thoughts - Abstract 
- Experiential - Perseverative 
- Solution generation - Self-critical 
- Active - Negative 
 - Passive 
 
One potential mechanism of action for rumination’s impact on problem solving is 
through inner speech. Indeed, rumination is thought to have some verbal quality (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2004), and the use of inner speech has been implicated in the problem solving 
process (e.g. Rohrkemper, 1986; Williams, Bowler, & Jarrold, 2012; Winsler & Naglieri, 
2003), with problem solving itself being dependent on language ability to some extent 
(Baldo et al., 2005). Moreover, inner speech has been associated with increased self-
awareness (Morin & Michaud, 2007),  which Morin (2005) suggests is also associated with 
increased self-reflection, and may assist with personal problem solving. The link between 
rumination and inner speech has received little attention in the literature thus far; however, 
there is evidence which suggests that rumination is highly correlated with hallucination 
proneness in both healthy (Jones & Fernyhough, 2009) and clinical populations (Hartley, 
Haddock, Vasconcelos e Sa, Emsley, & Barrowclough, 2014). Moreover, Jones and 
Fernyhough (2009) purport that ruminations may form the raw material for auditory verbal 
hallucinations (AVHs) given their verbal nature, conforming with models of AVHs which 
propose that they are the result of errors in source-monitoring of inner speech, as well as 
34 
 
abnormalities in the transition from condensed to expanded inner speech (Jones & 
Fernyhough, 2007). Whether condensed and expanded inner speech relate differentially to 
reflective and brooding rumination, and whether they have differential impacts on problem 
solving is currently unknown; however, this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Of particular note is the relative dearth of empirical studies examining the apparent 
dichotomous nature of rumination. Indeed as discussed, rumination is largely viewed of as a 
negative construct; however, this is predominantly derived from studies with clinical 
populations, whose ruminations may be dysfunctional as a result of their disorder. Moreover, 
and perhaps more critically, these studies have all assumed rumination to be a unitary 
construct and have investigated it as such. Thus, any negative effects which may be 
associated with a specific type of rumination may be attributed to rumination overall. 
Without fully understanding the individual effects of each ruminative sub-type, it is 
premature to assume that all rumination is maladaptive, and so it is imperative that the 
relative contributions of each ruminative sub-type are accounted for, as this may have 
important clinical ramifications. 
1.6 Clinical Implications 
As noted, there are concerns over the clinical efficacy of SSRIs for the majority of depression 
patients in the long term, but also due to the lag between the beginning of this treatment and 
experiencing any potential symptom release. Moreover, brooding processes may impede 
behavioural treatments for depression. Rumination has been associated with poorer 
outcomes following treatment, including the reduced probability of achieving remission 
(Jones et al., 2008) and more post-treatment residual symptoms (Schmaling et al., 2002). 
Additionally, high levels of rumination have been found to interact with treatment measures, 
diminishing the effectiveness of treatment. For example, Ciesla and Roberts (2002) found in 
a clinical sample that levels of rumination predicted change in depressive symptoms over 
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the course of treatment, such that higher levels of rumination predicted smaller changes in 
symptoms and thus, lower treatment effectiveness. Moreover, high levels of rumination have 
been found to impede the effectiveness of neurostimulation interventions (Loo, 2014). Aside 
from pharmacological interventions, one common treatment for depression is cognitive 
behavioural therapy (CBT), which typically seeks to address negative thoughts in 
depression, although delivery is highly heterogeneous. While CBT has achieved some 
success in the acute treatment of depression (Hollon & Ponniah, 2010), its long-term efficacy 
has been questioned. For instance, of patients receiving CBT, one third experience relapse 
within 68 weeks (Paykel et al., 1999), with the beneficial effects of CBT diminishing for all 
patients within three and a half years (Paykel et al., 2005). While it is true that CBT as a 
treatment approach has undergone substantial changes in recent years, there are still 
questions as to whether it is effective for long-term remission, with follow-up studies 
reporting mixed results (e.g. Andersson et al., 2013; Wagner, Horn, & Maercker, 2014) 
Brooding may play a key role in these diminishing effects, such that traditional CBT may be 
unable to modify the content of thought due to the dysfunctional thought process of 
rumination. 
The distinction between thought content and process is subtle but important. 
Specifically, content refers to the subject of the thought itself, which is typically negative in 
depression. In CBT, it is thought that by replacing negative thought content with positive 
thought content, symptoms may be reduced. By contrast, thought processes refer to styles of 
thinking (e.g. abstract analytical). Here, we postulate that maladaptive rumination maintains 
negative thought content (e.g. depressogenic problems) at the forefront of consciousness by 
framing current negative thoughts in an abstract manner. As maladaptive rumination is not 
as goal-oriented (i.e. focussed on solution generation), this creates a feedback loop in which 
the triggering problem remains salient due to failure to generate and implement a solution. 
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Thus, the triggering problem persists and rumination continues. Traditional CBT is 
consequently impeded from accessing the content of thought as cognitive resources are 
increasingly dedicated to the triggering problem, creating resistance to changes in thought 
content as attention is concentrated solely on the triggering problem. 
From this model, it is possible to derive hypotheses grounded in evolutionary theory 
that are empirically testable. First, in assuming that rumination is adaptive at certain levels 
of expression for all individuals, beyond which rumination becomes destructive, it is 
predicted that in severe clinical depression attenuation of rumination will result in greater 
CBT adherence and improved long-term efficacy. This would be achieved by reducing the 
allocation of cognitive resources to depressogenic content and, therefore, allowing CBT to 
address the content directly and effectively. Preliminary evidence provides support for this 
hypothesis. For example, clinical trials of rumination-focussed CBT (RF-CBT), a form of 
CBT which seeks to address ruminative thought processes specifically, have shown 
significant improvement on outcome measures in depressed patients (Watkins et al., 2007), 
in addition to similar improvements when compared to treatment as usual (Watkins et al., 
2011). Although sample sizes are small, these studies provide promising evidence that 
treating rumination is critical to long-term recovery and relapse prevention. Second, in 
assuming that rumination results in increasing dedication of cognitive resources to a given 
problem, it is predicted that with increasing levels of depression, and therefore rumination, 
is an associated increased difficulty in attentional shifting from task-relevant information. 
Additionally, as attentional shifting becomes more difficult, distraction-based treatment 
strategies will become less effective. Again, preliminary evidence has been shown to support 
this hypothesis, with increases in depressed affect associated with increased attentional 
demands and reduced distractibility (Andrews et al., 2007; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013) in 
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addition to evidence of associations between rumination and negative information bias in 
attentional shifts (Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007). 
Aside from highlighting the importance of rumination in depression and its impact 
on treatment, evolutionary theory still has much to contribute to clinical practice. As noted, 
the distinction between adaptive and maladaptive rumination in depression has only just 
begun to be investigated and as such, further research should seek to affirm this distinction. 
Moreover, in doing so, efforts should be made to profile the transition from adaptive to 
maladaptive rumination. By understanding the transition between adaptive and maladaptive 
rumination in depression, clinicians may then be better able to assess their patients with 
regard to treatment viability on a case-by-case basis. Specifically, based on a patient’s level 
of expression with regards to rumination, a clinician may determine whether a patient should 
first undergo treatment to attenuate rumination or is able to start standard treatment 
protocols. It is hoped that in adopting such a strategy, more patients will experience long-
term benefits of treatment and that delivery of treatment will be made more efficient, as only 
suitable candidates will be assigned to appropriate treatments. 
Finally, it is hoped that research in to the adaptive, goal oriented nature of rumination 
and depression will stimulate the development of new treatment paradigms. For treatment-
resistant depression, the use of neurostimulation techniques, such as transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), has become more 
commonplace; however, results remain mixed with regard to patient outcome (Kalu, Sexton, 
Loo, & Ebmeier, 2012; Wani, Trevino, Marnell, & Husain, 2013; Wassermann & Lisanby, 
2001) and the evidence base with respect to its efficacy remains unclear (Miniussi et al., 
2008). This, however, may be due to the interactive effects of rumination. As noted, higher 
levels of rumination (though no distinction was made between reflection and brooding) have 
been associated with the diminished effectiveness of tDCS in depression (Loo, 2014), thus 
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negative results reported elsewhere may also be related to higher levels of rumination. 
Evidence that rumination may interact with treatments at the neural level suggests that neural 
activity in high ruminators differs from that of low ruminators. As such, a potential avenue 
for investigation is discerning the neural activity associated with varying levels of 
rumination. Further to this, it may be possible to characterise activity profiles of adaptive 
and maladaptive ruminators. In identifying differences in neural activity between adaptive 
and maladaptive ruminators, it may then be possible to modulate activity specific to 
maladaptive rumination in an attempt to revert to a more adaptive form. In doing so, 
neurostimulation may form an effective adjunctive therapy alongside CBT. Further to this, 
activity profiles may be of diagnostic use in determining how well a patient may respond to 
given treatment program. As a result, patients may be prescribed different treatment 
programs on the basis of their neural activity. 
1.7 Alternative Hypotheses 
Although we argue that there is substantial evidence in support of the analytical rumination 
hypothesis, it is important to consider and evaluate alternative explanations for the 
persistence of depression. In recent years, alternative explanations have broadly fallen into 
two categories: immunological enhancement and social risk aversion. Both approaches will 
be considered in turn. Moreover, it is important to remember that although these offer 
alternative viewpoints on the evolutionary adaptiveness of depression, they are not 
necessarily incompatible with the rumination hypothesis. Indeed, given the complexities of 
evolution, it is likely that any one adaptation will exhibit benefits across multiple domains. 
1.7.1 Immunological Enhancement Hypothesis 
The most recent formulation of potential fitness benefits in depression concerns alterations 
in immunological responses. Specifically, it is argued that depression not only facilitates the 
combating of new and existing infections at the cellular level, but also halts the spread of 
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disease at the behavioural level through mechanisms such as social withdrawal (Anders, 
Tanaka, & Kinney, 2013). The development of this explanation originates in the observation 
of a persistent inflammatory response in depression (Dowlati et al., 2010) in conjunction 
with evidence that suggests the risk of developing depression increases following sickness 
(Dantzer, 2009; Wichers et al., 2006). It is hypothesised that the link between the immune 
response and depression is mediated by proinflammatory cytokines, which have been shown 
to modulate serotonin and dopamine levels (Capuron et al., 2003). This hypothesis serves as 
an extension of the Pathogen Host Defense hypothesis (Raison & Miller, 2013), which posits 
many of the same fitness benefits as the immunological enhancement hypothesis, but also 
suggests that depressive alleles did not co-evolve with immunological alleles, but are in fact 
one in the same with those alleles. To date, the immunological hypothesis is the only 
hypothesis that tries to account for the novel observations of persistent inflammatory 
responses in individuals with depression. What is not clear, however, is how these 
hypotheses can account for the development of depressive episodes following non-
immunological events. As noted, the rumination hypothesis may be compatible with this 
hypothesis, such that ruminative states emerged from aversion behaviours in response to 
potential contamination, given the potential role of the immune system in depression. Here, 
it may be hypothesised that higher levels of rumination are associated with an enhanced 
disgust response to contamination stimuli; a hypothesis that, to the authors' knowledge, has 
yet to be investigated. 
1.7.2 Social Risk Hypothesis 
The Social Risk Hypothesis (SRH) posits that depressive episodes, in fact, serve to reduce 
the likelihood of exclusion from the social group (Dunn, Whelton, & Sharpe, 2012). As such, 
the withdrawal behaviours exhibited in depression are thought to represent the adoption of a 
risk-averse social strategy in order to avoid ostracism from the social group. Specifically, 
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when entering a depressive episode, depressed individuals become cognitively 
hypersensitive in social situations which reduce socially risky (i.e. confident, acquisitive) 
behaviours. Moreover, expression of submissive behaviours that diminish threat increases, 
in addition to comfort-seeking behaviours that elicit social support from close and caring 
others. At present, there is limited evidence in support of the theory. Badcock and Allen 
(2003, 2007) investigated risk-aversion strategies in depressed individuals, anxious 
individuals, and healthy controls and found some support for the theory. However, in their 
series of small studies, Badcock and Allen (2007) were unable to identify distinct differences 
in aversion strategies between depressed and anxious individuals. Moreover, clinically 
depressed individuals did not act as predicted. Specifically, depressed participants were more 
likely to be averse to attachment situations when the hypothesis suggests they will be less 
averse due to seeking social aid. Maladaptive brooding rumination may account for 
depressed participants’ aversion to, rather than seeking of, attachment, as rumination was 
not measured. Indeed, reflection and brooding may moderate the relationship between 
depression and social-risk aversion; however, this association has yet to be investigated. 
Social-risk may in fact pose a unique social problem that requires careful navigation, and 
thus, rumination, particularly reflection may aid in analysing the scenario. As such, social-
risk may be thought of as a specific complex problem to be solved, and may be explained 
more broadly by the analytical rumination hypothesis. 
1.8 Conclusion  
In sum, although the precise adaptive benefit afforded by depression and low mood is still a 
matter of debate, there is mounting evidence in support of the adaptive origin of depression. 
Indeed, evidence from studies examining the change in the prevalence of depression in 
Western cultures (Compton, Conway, Stinson, & Grant, 2006; Jorm, Patten, Brugha, 
Mojtabi, 2017; Kessler et al., 2005) suggest a pattern of exponential growth in prevalence 
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rates above the mutation rate which, combined with a multitude of gene-association studies, 
evidence of high heritability, and a greater understanding of epigenetic transmission, indicate 
a role for depression beyond the purely pathological. At present, it would appear that the 
analytical rumination hypothesis provides the most comprehensive account of depression in 
an evolutionary context and details how depression may progress to a pathological state. 
Although the rumination hypothesis does not account for observations of immunological 
enhancement in depressed individuals, it is not incompatible with hypotheses seeking to 
explain this phenomenon and serves to highlight that the rumination hypothesis may in fact 
permeate other purported adaptations, such as risk aversion. Indeed, it is likely that a 
complex disorder such as depression manifests multiple, interrelated adaptations. 
As noted, there is some experimental support for the analytical rumination 
hypothesis; however, there are few studies that directly examine the link between problem 
solving and rumination, and those that have rarely make reference to the proposed sub-
components of brooding and reflection. Thus, Chapter Three seeks to investigate the 
association between rumination, both broadly as a unified concept and as a function of its 
sub-components, and problem solving using tasks from multiple problem solving domains. 
In assuming that the principle of cliff-edged fitness applies to rumination, it is likely that the 
ruminations observed in patients are predominantly of the brooding-type, contributing to 
their inability to solve problems effectively. By contrast, goal oriented instances of 
rumination may occur more frequently in healthy non-clinical populations who do not 
exhibit difficulties with problem solving, and so the proceeding empirical chapters detail 
investigations in such populations. Critically, in treating rumination as a dichotomous 
construct, it is not assumed that reflection or brooding are unique to a specific population. 
Indeed, it is possible that the relative expression of both reflection and brooding differs 
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between patient groups and healthy controls. Although other adaptive theories of low mood 
and depression have been discussed, they are beyond the scope of the present thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Brief introduction to trait measures used throughout the thesis 
In the following sections, the trait measures used throughout the thesis shall be detailed. 
Internal consistencies for each measure is detailed in each empirical chapter respectively. 
Additional measures whose use are restricted to single chapters are detailed in the 
appropriate chapter. Unless otherwise stated, all measures were administered pre- and post-
testing and were completed in pen-and-paper format. 
2.1 Beck depression inventory (BDI) 
The BDI (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a 21-item self-report measure designed to assess 
levels of depression and has been used extensively in mood research, often as the standard 
by which other depression measures are evaluated (Spielberger, Ritterband, Reheiser, & 
Brunner, 2003). The measure itself has repeatedly shown high concurrent validities with 
other clinician and self-report measures (r = .7; Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988) and moderate 
to high test-retest reliability (r = .48-.86). The version used throughout the thesis differed 
only in the removal of one item (item nine, Suicidal Thoughts) as the measure was not 
used for diagnostic purposes and it was thought the content might cause undue distress in 
some participants. For each item, participants could give one of four responses associated 
with a score of 0-3, with higher scores corresponding to increasing symptom severity. As 
one item had been removed, the maximum possible score was 60. The following values are 
proposed as different specifiers of severity (adjusted for the removal of one item): 0-10 to 
indicate minimal or no depression; 11-16, mild depression; 17-25, moderate depression; 
and 26-60, severe depression. 
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2.2 Ruminative response scale (RRS) 
The RRS is a 22-item self-report measure which forms part of the larger Response Styles 
Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), and measures ruminative responses to 
low or depressed mood. Given the theorised link between rumination and low mood based 
on the evolutionary literature (see Chapter One), and given that the majority of the 
rumination literature utilise the measure, the RRS was deemed the most appropriate 
measure of rumination, both from a theoretical perspective and as a means to maximise 
comparability with the larger literature. Example items include “How frequently do you 
think about how alone you feel” and “How frequently do you think ‘What am I doing to 
deserve this?’”. The RRS reports moderate test-retest reliability (r = .67; Treynor et al., 
2003). Additionally, the RRS is comprised of two sub-scales which measure the frequency 
of reflective and brooding ruminations respectively. The reflection sub-scale is comprised 
of items 7, 11, 12, 20, and 21 from the overall RRS. The brooding sub-scale is comprised 
of items 5, 10, 13, 15, and 16 of the overall RRS. Test-retest reliability for these subscales 
has been reported to be moderate to high (r = .35 - .74; Hasegawa, Koda, Hattori, Kondo, 
& Kawaguchi, 2013). For all scales, participants gave responses on a Likert scale ranging 
in scores from 1 (Almost never) to 4 (Almost always), corresponding to the increasing 
frequency of which participants experienced the thought detailed by each statement. For 
the overall RRS, the maximum possible score is 88. For the two sub-scales, the maximum 
possible score is 20 for each. 
2.3 Analytical rumination questionnaire (ARQ) 
The ARQ (Barbic, Durisko, & Andrews, 2014) is a 20-item questionnaire designed to 
measure the frequency of analytical type ruminations. Example items include ‘I tried to 
figure out the best option for dealing with my dilemma’ and ‘I tried to find a goal or 
purpose that was meaningful to me’. Participants gave responses on a Likert scale ranging 
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in scores from 1 (None of the time) to 5 (All of the time). The maximum score for the ARQ 
is 100, with larger scores being indicative of individuals being more analytical in their 
ruminations. Given its relative infancy, the ARQ has yet to undergo rigorous test-retest 
validation through use in other studies; however, the authors’ initial analysis seems to 
suggest the measure has high test-retest reliability (r = .81). The ARQ was chosen as it is 
purported to measure analytical ruminations specifically, and so, given the theoretical 
background presented in Chapter One, it would appear to be most appropriate for the aims 
of the thesis. Furthermore, it is critical that new measures be assessed for their validity, and 
thus, where appropriate, associations between the ARQ and other measures are made with 
reference to the original paper 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Chapter Three: Rumination is positively associated with problem solving in social 
and risk-based tasks, but not in abstract problem-solving tasks. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter One, the construct of rumination has begun to be reconceptualised 
in terms of reflective (adaptive) and brooding (maladaptive) processes, although many 
studies continue to treat rumination as a unitary construct. To date, studies investigating 
these proposed sub-components specifically are far from conclusive; however, the 
available evidence supports their existence. For example, Siegle and colleagues, (Siegle, 
Moore, & Thase, 2004), using the RRS, found in a community clinical sample that both 
reflection and brooding sub-scales positively correlated with depression severity; however, 
brooding showed much stronger correlations than reflection in patients as compared to 
healthy controls. Similarly, Whitmer & Gotlib (2011), subjecting the RRS to factor 
analysis, demonstrated this distinction in never depressed and formerly depressed 
individuals; although in their sample, currently depressed individuals failed to show a clear 
distinction between reflection and brooding (see also, Joormann et al., 2006). Importantly, 
such evidence allows for two inferences to be made: 1) rumination may not be a unitary 
process as originally thought, and 2) rumination may comprise a continuum within an 
individual, with rumination becoming maladaptive at extreme levels as brooding exerts a 
greater influence over reflection. Here it is suggested that elevated levels of rumination (as 
measured by the RRS) comprise a balance between reflective and brooding ruminations. In 
non-clinical populations reflective rumination, relative to brooding rumination, is more 
apparent; however, as rumination approaches pathological levels, the balance between 
reflection and brooding shifts, such that brooding becomes more apparent. 
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In spite of evidence suggesting the existence of reflective and brooding 
ruminations, the specific adaptive benefits of rumination remain debated. Indeed, reflection 
has been associated with greater chance of recovery from depressive episodes (Arditte & 
Joormann, 2011), lower levels of depression longitudinally (Eisma et al., 2015; Treynor et 
al., 2003), and as a potentially protective factor against addictive relapse in individuals 
with substance use problems (Adrian, McCarty, King, McCauley, & Stoep, 2014; Willem, 
Bijttebier, Claes, & Raes, 2011); yet the potential behavioural benefits remain poorly 
understood. The analytical rumination hypothesis (Andrews & Thomson, 2009) posits that 
rumination is the core process responsible for the evolution of depression, such that 
depression evolved as a mechanism to facilitate ruminative states. Under this framework, 
rumination allows for the focussing of cognitive resources on problems in the individual’s 
environment with a view to generating solutions to these problems. As such, it has been 
hypothesised that individuals who engage in more frequent ruminations will, in turn, 
perform better in problem solving tasks than those who ruminate less frequently. To date, 
direct evidence for this hypothesis is limited, with only one study demonstrating that low 
mood induced by task feedback improves performance (Au, Chan, Wang, & Vertinsky, 
2003). Indirect evidence has been taken from experiments examining the effects of mood 
on social interactions (Hertel, Neuhof, Theuer, & Kerr, 2000; Hokanson et al., 1980). 
Critically, however, these studies took no measure of rumination, and so the validity of 
these findings with respect to the analytical rumination hypothesis is diminished. 
Incorporating the reflection and brooding dichotomy, it is hypothesised that analytical 
rumination is associated with reflective rumination, and thus, is more adaptive in nature. 
Previous research has predominantly examined clinical populations with respect to 
rumination, resulting in the maladaptive profile of rumination. However, by relying solely 
on clinical data, the possibility that rumination manifests as a continuum and may have 
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distinct qualities in healthy individuals as compared to patients is ignored. Indeed, the 
medical dichotomy model (i.e. the presence or absence of a given disorder) has begun to be 
eschewed in favour of a continuum model in the field of psychosis research (Berna et al., 
2017; Garrison et al., 2017; Oestreich et al., 2015, 2016; Shevlin, McElroy, Bentall, 
Reininghaus, & Murphy, 2017) , with a view to elucidating the aetiology of psychosis. In 
adopting a continuum approach, one may begin to investigate the existence of a transition 
from non-pathological to pathological levels of a given trait. With respect to rumination, 
adopting a continuum approach allows for the examination of the relative balance of 
reflective (i.e. adaptive) and brooding (i.e. maladaptive) rumination within an individual. 
Moreover, the relative balance of these ruminations and their associations with mood 
levels can be examined. Documenting changes in this relative balance may have potential 
clinical benefits, such that early recognition of maladaptive ruminations may lead to earlier 
interventions.  
In the present study, therefore, it was hypothesised that individuals with higher 
levels of low mood, but without diagnoses of depression or other psychological disorders, 
would engage more frequently in reflective rumination and therefore benefit from 
enhanced performance in problem solving tasks. As predicted the relationship between low 
mood and task performance would be mediated by levels of reflective rumination. 
Additionally, it was predicted that reflection and brooding would be related to task 
performance differentially, such that reflection would correlate positively while brooding 
would correlate negatively. Finally, given the high co-morbidity of mood and anxiety 
disorders (Kessler et al., 2003; Wittchen & Jacobi, 2005), levels of anxiety were assessed 
in order to investigate the relationship between anxiety and problem solving ability. 
Anxious ruminations were also measured in order to investigate whether these have a 
unique relationship with problem solving ability. Typically, anxious ruminations (often 
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conceptualised as worry) are comprised of thoughts which are pertinent to the self and 
others and may impact upon the ability to function (e.g. health; Wright, Hurt, Gorniak, & 
Brown, 2015), and as such, the position in the adaptive-maladaptive dichotomy is as yet 
unclear. 
As problem solving may encompass a large variety of tasks, three were selected, 
each assessing problem solving in distinct domains. The modified prisoner’s dilemma 
procedure (Hokanson et al., 1980) was chosen as a means for examining social problem 
solving ability. The modified Iowa gambling task (Cauffman et al., 2010) was selected in 
order to assess problem solving under conditions of ambiguous risks and rewards with 
implicit probability learning. These two tasks together also simulate evolutionarily relevant 
problems: social negotiation and resource gathering under uncertainty respectively. As the 
final task, Raven’s advanced progressive matrices were administered. In contrast to the 
other two tasks, Raven’s assesses abstract, non-verbal reasoning ability. Thus, if reflective 
rumination correlates positively with performance across all tasks, it may then be inferred 
that increases in reflective rumination are associated with general increases in problem 
solving ability. However, if differential relationships are observed, then reflective 
rumination may be only positively related to problem solving in specific domains. 
Additionally, if negative correlations are observed between problem solving ability and 
brooding rumination, then this suggests that brooding rumination may inhibit problem 
solving ability. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the student and staff bodies of Durham University. All 
participants identified as native English speakers through self-report and were included in 
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the study if they self-reported no personal or familial history of psychological or 
neurological disorder, in addition to not currently taking medications of any kind. The final 
sample comprised of 11 males and 30 females with a mean age of 21.2 years (S.D.: 5.3 
years). Participants were reimbursed with either course credit or a £5 voucher for an online 
retailer. The study protocol was approved by the Durham University Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee. 
3.2.2 Measures 
3.2.2.1 Beck depression inventory (BDI) 
The 20-item BDI (as reported in Chapter Two, p. 43) reported acceptable internal 
consistency at both T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s α: .771 and .780 respectively). 
3.2.2.2 Ruminative response scale (RRS) 
The full 22-item RRS (as reported in Chapter Two, p. 44) reported an acceptable internal 
consistency at T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s α: .941 and .918 respectively). Internal consistencies 
for both brooding and reflection subscales were acceptable at T1 (Cronbach’s α: .862 and 
.861, respectively) and T2 (Cronbach’s α: .861 and .872 respectively). 
3.2.2.3 Hospital anxiety and depression scale – anxiety subscale (HADS-A) 
The HADS-A is a seven-item subscale of the 14-item HADS (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
which measures levels of anxiety experienced by the participant. Participants gave 
responses on a Likert scale ranging in scores from 0 to 3, with larger numbers associated 
with a greater intensity of anxiety associated with a given statement. Participants scoring 0-
7 are considered normal; 8-10, borderline abnormal; 11-21, abnormal. The maximum 
possible score for the scale was 21. The HADS-A reported acceptable internal consistency 
at T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s α: .803 and .764, respectively). 
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3.2.2.4 Distressing thoughts questionnaire ruminative thoughts subscale (DTQ-R) 
The DTQ-R is a five-item subscale of the DTQ (D. A. Clark & de Silva, 1985) designed to 
assess the frequency with which participants experience anxious ruminative thoughts using 
a nine-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Never) to 9 (Daily). The maximum possible score 
for the scale was 45. Internal consistency was acceptable for the DTQ-R at T1 (Cronbach’s 
α: .718), however at T2 internal consistency was noticeably lower (Cronbach’s α: .305). 
3.2.3 Tasks 
All tasks were presented on a 15.6 inch monitor at 1920x1080 resolution, with a refresh 
rate of 60Hz, with screen brightness set to maximum. The monitor was placed at a distance 
of 57cm, such that 1cm equates to one degree visual angle. Participants were also asked to 
use a chin rest during the course of the task battery. All tasks were programmed in Matlab 
version 2012b using the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 extensions (Brainard, 1997; 
Pelli, 1997). Participants completed the task battery in a darkened room. 
3.2.3.1 Modified prisoner’s dilemma procedure (mPDP) 
A computerized version of the mPDP, as described by Hokanson et al. (1980), was 
developed and administered. The modified procedure requires participants to compete with 
an opponent over a number of trials in a series of defect/co-operate decisions in an effort to 
accumulate the largest number of points. Additionally, unlike the classic paradigm in 
which both participants simultaneously make their decision, the modified paradigm assigns 
each participant to either a ‘high’ or ‘low’ power position. Participants in the ‘low’ power 
position make their decision as in the classic paradigm before moving on to the next trial. 
In contrast, participants in the ‘high’ power position are informed of their opponent’s 
decision before making their own, thus providing them with greater control over the 
outcome of the interaction. For the present study, participants were always competing 
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against the computer and were always assigned to the ‘high’ power position. Individual 
participant score, opponent (computer) score, and overall task score (computed as 
participant score minus computer score) were recorded. 
3.2.3.2 Modified Iowa gambling task (mIGT) 
The mIGT administered to participants was exactly the same as that described by 
Cauffman et al. (2010). In the classic IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 
1994), participants are informed that they are to try and accumulate as much money as 
possible. To do so, they are required to draw cards from one of four decks of cards on each 
trial which will result in them either gaining or losing money, or neither. Critically, each 
deck of cards has a different probability of paying out or punishing the player, such that 
two decks overall are associated with net losses and two decks are associated with net 
gains. Thus, the game assesses the ability of participants to learn implicit rules associated 
with each deck and therefore make risk-reward decisions. In the classic version, 
participants are allowed to freely choose which deck to take cards from on each trial, and 
as such it is possible for them to ignore any given deck. By contrast, the mIGT preselects 
the deck in play for a given trial. By removing the free choice element, it is possible to 
remove potential confounding effects that may be imparted by individual differences in 
search strategy. Additionally, this allows for the analysis of play/pass patterns across each 
deck, thereby removing the possibility that participants may differentially ignore certain 
decks (Peters & Slovic, 2000). For each trial participants were given four seconds to make 
a decision to either play the selected deck or pass and move on to the next trial. Decks A 
and B were considered ‘bad’ decks, such that their average payout would result in a net 
loss overall. For deck A, payouts and losses were equally likely to occur; however losses 
were always much greater than payouts. For deck B, payouts occurred more frequently 
than losses (e.g. nine out of ten trials would be a payout); however, losses would be so 
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large that there would again be a net loss. Decks C and D were conceptualized as ‘good’ 
decks, such that their average payout would result in a net gain overall. For deck C, 
payouts would occur 50% of the time, with losses occurring 25% of the time and no 
changes in score occurring the remaining 25% of the time. With this deck, the losses, 
though still fairly high, occur infrequently enough to outweigh the value of the payouts. 
Finally, deck D follows the same payout and loss frequency pattern as deck B; however, 
the losses have been reduced in size, such that overall, deck D results in a net gain overall. 
In contrast to Cauffman et al. (2010), participants completed only one block of trials in 
order to limit the effect of prolonged learning and maximise novelty. Total number of 
plays (by deck and overall), total number of passes (by deck and overall), final monetary 
total, and response time were recorded. Play counts were then used to compute percentage 
good plays (that is, percentage of plays which occurred on ‘good’ decks) and percentage 
bad plays (percentage of play decisions on ‘bad’ decks) for each participant. Finally, a net 
performance measures was calculated by subtracting percentage bad plays from percentage 
good plays. 
3.2.3.3 Raven’s advanced progressive matrices (RAPM) 
The RAPM (Raven, Court, & Raven, 1994) is a measure of nonverbal analytical reasoning 
which has been used extensively with a variety of target populations. Participants are 
presented with a series of spatial patterns in which each item in a sequence changes 
according to a particular rule. In each sequence of spatial patterns one item is missing and 
participants are required to select one item from a selection of eight possible answers to 
complete the sequence. Participants were presented with the 12-item set in order to 
familiarise themselves with the task before being presented with the full 36-item set. 
Completion time and number of correctly completed sequences were recorded. 
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3.2.4 Procedure 
Recruitment was conducted primarily through the use of online advertisements within the 
University and through word of mouth. Prior to arrival, participants were contacted to 
confirm that they did not meet any of the exclusion criteria. Testing was conducted in two 
labs across two campuses of the University. Before beginning the testing session, all 
participants were provided with written and verbal explanations of what would happen 
during the testing session and given assurances regarding confidentiality of participation. 
Finally, all participants gave full written consent. 
Participants first completed the initial set of questionnaires before completing either 
the mPDP followed by the mIGT, or the mIGT followed by the mPDP. Half of the 
participants completed the first order, while the other half completed the second order. 
Participants were allocated to these initial task orders randomly. For all participants, the 
final task of the test battery was always the RAPM. This precaution was taken due to 
evidence suggesting that completion of the RAPM may result in a reduction in mood 
(Andrews et al., 2007) which may, therefore, confound interpretation of the results of the 
other tasks. Following completion of the task battery, participants completed a second set 
of questionnaires before being debriefed and compensated for their time. 
3.2.5 Data analysis 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 
version 20.0). All responses given to self-report measures at T1 and T2 were subjected to 
paired samples t-tests to validate the robustness of the self-report measures in addition to 
investigating whether completing the task battery resulted in observable changes in mood, 
anxiety, and rumination. Descriptive statistics for the questionnaire measures are given in 
Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for each questionnaire variable under investigation 
 Mean S.D. 
BDI 7.7 4.6 
RRS 42.01 12.91 
RRS-R 9.74 4 
RRS-B 9.35 3.9 
DTQ-R 19.09 7.37 
HADS-A 6.35 3.61 
Note: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-R = 
Reflection subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-B = Brooding subscale of the 
Ruminative Response Scale, DTQ-R = Rumination subscale of the Distressing Thoughts 
Questionnaire, HADS-A = Anxiety subscale of the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale 
 
For the mPDP, self, computer, and overall task score were correlated with each 
questionnaire measure and associated subscales. For the mIGT, initial analysis concerned 
correlations between these same questionnaire measures and play and pass percentages for 
each deck within the game. Following Cauffman and colleagues (Cauffman et al., 2010), 
play counts within high-risk decks (A and B) and low-risk decks (C and D) were then 
summed. These values were used to calculate a play percentage for both high and low-risk 
decks, defined as the percentage of good plays (e.g. how often a participant chose to play 
when presented with a low-risk deck) and percentage bad plays (e.g. how often a 
participant chose to play when presented with a high risk deck). A net task score was then 
calculated by subtracting the percentage of bad plays from the percentage of good plays. 
These variables were then correlated with the questionnaire measures. Finally, total RAPM 
score and response time were correlated with questionnaire measures. 
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In order to further investigate the effects of low mood and rumination on problem 
solving abilities as predicted by the analytical rumination hypothesis, simple mediation 
analyses were conducted using ordinary least squares path analysis. Regression models 
were computed for each model using mediator variables as predictors for the outcome 
variable, controlling for BDI scores, as suggested by (Baron & Kenny, 1986). For each 
task, the effect of BDI scores on each outcome measure was investigated using rumination 
scores as a mediator. The PROCESS macro, as detailed by Hayes (2013), was 
implemented to conduct this analysis. 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1 Comparison of T1 and T2 self-report measures 
No comparison reached significance, all t(40)<1.847, p>.072. For subsequent analyses, T1 
and T2 scores on each self-report measure were averaged to give an overall score for each 
participant. 
3.3.2 mPDP analysis 
3.3.2.1 Relationship between mPDP scores and self-report measures 
Descriptive statistics for each outcome variable are given in Table 3.2. Significant positive 
correlations were observed between individual participant scores with BDI (r(41) = .308, p 
= .025) and RRS (r(41) = .345, p = .0135) scores as predicted. This relationship extended 
to both the reflective (rs(41) = .296, p = .03) and brooding (rs(41) = .309, p = .025) 
rumination subscales. Overall task score was also significantly and positively associated 
with both BDI (r(41) = .368, p = .009) and DTQ-R (r(41) = .288, p = .034) scores. 
Additionally, opponent (computer) scores were significantly and negatively associated 
with DTQ-R scores only, r(41) = -.273, p = .0425,. Scores from the HADS-A showed no 
significant associations with any task measure (see Table 3.3 for correlation values). 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for each mPDP outcome variable 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Individual score 159.6 25.2 110 – 218 
Opponent score 26.49 115.49 -198 – 254 
Task score 133.17 120.31 -130 - 352 
 
3.3.3 mIGT analysis 
3.3.3.1 Relationship between individual play/pass patterns and self-report measures 
Correlations for pass percentage are identical to those reported for play percentages, save 
for inversion of the relationship (i.e. positive to negative, negative to positive. See Table 
3.5 for full correlation values). Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.4. As 
predicted, BDI scores were significantly negatively related to the frequency with which 
participants took cards from deck B (infrequent, but high losses; r(41) = -.471, p = .001), 
suggesting that individuals with lower mood were more sensitive to the risks of Deck B. 
This relationship was also observed for both overall RRS scores (r(41) = -.319, p = .0225) 
and RRS-B scores (rs(41) = -.289, p = .035), but not RRS-R scores. Finally, HADS-A 
scores were also significantly negatively related to the frequency of which participants 
took cards from Deck B (r(40) = -.293, p = .033), suggesting that highly anxious 
individuals were more sensitive to the risks of deck B. Additionally, a significant positive 
relationship was observed between HADS-A scores and the frequency of which 
participants took cards from deck C (payout 50% of the time, overall net profit; rs(40) = 
.311, p = .0255), such that individuals with higher levels of anxiety took cards more often 
from Deck C. This relationship was not observed with any other measure. 
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Table 3.3: Zero-order correlations between each mPDP outcome and scores on self-report 
measures 
  =  Non-parametric, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, ^ = p<.005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Individual 
    score 
-         
2. Opponent  
     score 
-.086 -        
3. Task score .292* -.978^ -       
4. BDI .308* -.317   
.368** 
-      
5. RRS .345* -.110 .178   .472** -     
6. RRS-R .296* -.061 .129 .246 .902^ -    
7. RRS-B .309* -.028 .075 .377** .874^ .749^ -   
8. DTQ-R .125 -.273* .288* .295* .501^ .359* .389** -  
9. HADS-A .188 -.132 .167 .529^ .481^ .126 .392** .557^ - 
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics for play and pass percentages of each deck from the mIGT 
 Mean S.D. 
Deck A Play 64.02  
19.26 
Deck A Pass 35.98 
Deck B Play 76.11  
15.86 
Deck B Pass 23.89 
Deck C Play 71.59  
22.09 
Deck C Pass 28.41 
Deck D Play 84.76  
14.04 
Deck D Pass 15.24 
 Note: Standard deviations are given for play and pass pairs for each deck 
  
3.3.3.2 Task percentage analysis 
3.3.3.2.1 Relationship between task percentage measures and self-report measures 
Descriptive statistics for each task percentage variable are given in Table 3.6. As predicted, 
both BDI (r(40) = -.299, p = .0305) and rumination scores (r(40) = -.301, p = .0295) were 
significantly negatively correlated with percentage of bad plays, suggesting that 
individuals lower in mood or who more frequently engaged in rumination are less likely to 
accept cards from decks A or B. Moreover, both scores were significantly positively 
correlated with net task score (BDI: r(40) = .401, p = .005; RRS: r(40) = .265, p = .049), 
suggesting that individuals who were lower in mood or more frequently ruminated were 
also better at the task. Examining both the reflection and brooding subscales also revealed 
significant negative correlations (reflection: rs(40) = -.285, p = .0375; brooding: rs(40) = -
.27, p = .046) with percentage of bad plays. 
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Table 3.6: Descriptive statistics for task percentage variables calculated for the mIGT 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Percentage good 
plays 
 
77.42 
 
14.41 
 
38 – 100 
Percentage bad 
plays 
 
71.06 
 
12.44 
 
42.03 – 92.75 
 
Net task score 
 
6.36 
 
19.27 
 
-53.17 – 53.97 
 
Contrary to predictions, the percentage of good plays did not correlate significantly 
with any rumination measure. However, as predicted, BDI scores correlated significantly 
positively with percentage of good plays (rs(40) = .293, p = .0385), suggesting that those 
experiencing lower levels of mood were more likely to accept cards from decks C or D. 
See Table 3.6 for a full list of correlation values. 
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Table 3.7: Zero-order correlations between each mIGT task percentage outcome and 
scores on self-report measures 
  =  Non-parametric, * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, ^ = p<.005 
 
3.3.4 RAPM analysis 
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 3.8. No significant correlations between 
performance and self-report measures were observed.  
 
 
 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 
1. Percentage 
    good  plays 
-         
2. Percentage 
    bad plays 
.074 -        
3. Net task  
    score 
.74^ -.664^ -       
4. BDI .293* -.299* .401^ -      
5. RRS -.012 -.301* .265* .472^ -     
6. RRS-R -.171 -.285* .028 .246 .902^ -    
7. RRS-B -.029 -.27* .162 .377** .874^ .749^ -   
8. DTQ-R .06  .08 .043 .295* .501^ .359* .389** -  
9. HADS-A .364* -.16 .372** .529 .481^ .126 .392** .557^ - 
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Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics for RAPM outcome variables 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Total items correct 20.07 6.34 3 – 32 
Session time (minutes) 18.34 6.2 7 – 34  
 
3.3.5 Mediation analyses 
3.3.5.1 mPDP mediation analysis 
As can be seen from Table 3.9 and Figure 3.1, levels of rumination positively predicted 
individual scores such that individuals who more frequently ruminated were predicted to 
achieve greater individual scores (b = 0.502); however, this term did not achieve 
significance (p = .138). A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect 
effect of low mood on individual scores (ab = 0.665) based on 10,000 bootstrap samples 
was entirely above zero (0.006 to 1.93).  However, the direct effect of low mood on 
individual scores was found to be non-significant (c’ = 1.02, p = .281), suggesting that low 
mood can only have an effect on individual scores through rumination. 
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Table 3.9: Model coefficients for the proposed mediation model for low mood, rumination 
and individual scores from the mPDP 
 Consequent 
M (RRS)  Y (Individual Score) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (BDI) 
 
a 1.325 0.396 .0018 c’ 1.02 0.93 .281 
M (RRS) 
 
 --- --- --- b 0.502 0.33 .138 
Constant 
 
i1 31.818 3.54 <.001 i2 130.722 12.855 <.001 
  R2 = .223  R2 = .382 
  F(1,39) = 11.187, p = .0018  F(2,38) = 3.25, p = .0498 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examining the effect of low mood on opponent (computer) scores using anxious 
ruminations as a mediator (see Table 3.10 and Figure 3.2), neither low mood (c’ = -6.491, 
p = .11) or anxious ruminations (b = -3.075, p = .221) predicted opponent (computer) 
Figure 3.1: Simple mediation model detailing the direct and indirect effects of low mood on 
individual PDP scores, using rumination as a mediator. 
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scores. Additionally, calculating bootstrapped confidence intervals for the indirect effect of 
low mood on opponent’s (computer) score (ab = -1.4524) revealed the inclusion of zero (-
6.053 to 0.303), suggesting there is also no indirect effect of low mood on opponent 
(computer) scores. 
 
Table 3.10: Model coefficients for the proposed mediation model for low mood, anxious 
rumination and opponent (computer) scores from the mPDP 
 Consequent 
M (DTQ-R)  Y (Opponent Score) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (BDI) 
 
a 0.472 0.472 .061 c’ -6.491 3.961 .11 
M (DTQ-R) 
 
 --- --- --- b -3.075 2.473 .221 
Constant 
 
i1 15.45 2.19 <.001 i2 135.12 51.034 .012 
  R2 = .295  R2 = .368 
  F(1,39) = 3.716, p = .061  F(2,38) = 2.975, p = .063 
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Finally, examining the effect of low mood on overall task score using RRS scores 
as a mediator (see Table 3.11 and Figure 3.3), rumination did not significantly predict 
overall task score when accounting for level of low mood (b = 0.048, p = .976). Moreover, 
bias corrected bootstrap confidence intervals revealed no indirect effect of low mood on 
overall task score (ab = 0.0634, CIs = -4.144 to 3.875); however, the direct effect of low 
mood on overall task score returned significance (c’ = 9.564), suggesting that low mood 
has a direct influence on overall task scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Simple mediation model detailing the direct and indirect effects of 
low mood on opponent PDP scores, using anxious rumination as a mediator. 
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Table 3.11: Model coefficients for the proposed mediation model for low mood, rumination 
and overall task scores from the mPDP 
 Consequent 
M (RRS)  Y (Overall Task Score) 
Antecedent  Coeff. SE p  Coeff. SE p 
X (BDI) 
 
a 1.325 0.396 .0018 c’ 9.564 4.472 .039 
M (RRS) 
 
 --- --- --- b 0.048 1.594 .976 
Constant 
 
i1 31.818 3.54 <.001 i2 130.722 12.855 <.001 
  R2 = .223  R2 = .136 
  F(1,39) = 11.187, p = .0018  F(2,38) = 2.983, p = .0626 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Simple mediation model detailing the direct and indirect effects of 
low mood on overall PDP scores, using rumination as a mediator. 
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3.3.5.2 mIGT mediation analysis 
Across all mIGT measures, no significant mediation models were computed (all p > .05), 
suggesting that all previously observed mIGT correlations occur in the absence of a 
mediating variable. 
3.4 Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate whether engaging more frequently in self-reported, 
trait reflective rumination was associated with improved problem solving ability in a group 
of individuals without diagnoses of depression or other psychological disorders. Our 
results suggest that there is indeed a positive relationship between the frequency of 
reflective trait rumination and the ability to effectively solve problems, as predicted. 
Moreover, the relationship between low mood and problem solving is mediated by a 
combination of both reflective and brooding rumination; however whether or not 
mediation occurs appears to be dependent on the task used. Finally, our results suggest that 
all different aspects of rumination may carry potential adaptive benefits under different 
circumstances at non-pathological levels. 
First, as expected, individuals with lower levels of mood were found to engage 
more frequently in rumination, which is in line with reports from previous studies (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1999; Szasz, 2009; Treynor et al., 2003; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003), 
although these studies make no distinction between reflective (adaptive/constructive) and 
brooding (maladaptive/unconstructive) rumination. Within the mPDP, elevated levels of 
rumination were associated with increased individual scores on the task. This supports the 
literature suggesting that increased levels of depression are associated with more selfish 
strategies (e.g. defection) in social bargaining type games (Hokanson et al., 1980; Surbey, 
2011). When considering the scoring system of the mPDP, low opponent (computer) 
scores are achieved by subtracting points from the opponent (computer). As such, in the 
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context of the game, these choices may be viewed as punishing the opponent. Decreased 
opponent (computer) scores were associated with anxious ruminations only, such that the 
more frequently one engages in anxious type ruminations, the lower the score of the 
opponent (computer) in the mPDP. Taken together, these findings suggest that different 
aspects of rumination facilitate different strategies for effectively completing mPDP. 
Specifically, reflective rumination is associated with better performance through actions 
taken on the self (e.g. giving oneself more points), whereas anxious ruminations are 
associated with better performance through actions taken against external sources (e.g. 
punishing an opponent). 
Second, both low mood and rumination were associated with better overall 
performance on the mIGT. Individuals with lower mood were significantly more likely to 
make good plays (i.e. take cards from either deck C or D; plays which result in net 
monetary gains overall), significantly less likely to make bad plays (i.e. take cards from 
deck A or B; plays which result in net monetary losses overall), and had higher overall task 
scores, consistent with previous studies reporting associations between depression and 
risk-averse decision making (e.g. Chou, Lee, & Ho, 2007; González-Ortega, Echeburúa, 
Corral, Polo-López, & Alberich, 2013; Juhasz et al., 2010; Yuen & Lee, 2003). Extending 
previous studies, our results suggest that in addition to making fewer riskier decisions, 
individuals with lower levels of mood also made advantageous decisions more frequently. 
Moreover, to the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study that documents a direct 
relationship between risk-aversion, rumination and improved performance on a gambling 
task. It is suggested that increases in the frequency of rumination correspond with increases 
in risk sensitivity, such that frequent ruminators detect risks more effectively as evidenced 
by a reduction in bad plays during the mIGT. Thus, frequent ruminators perform more ably 
as a result of experiencing fewer punishments. 
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These findings expand on Nettle's (2009) theoretical model of the adaptive function 
of low mood. In this model, low mood is hypothesized to attenuate risky decisions as the 
potential emotional rewards do not outweigh the potential emotional consequences of 
failure, whereas the reverse is true for those in elevated and severely depressed mood 
states. Indeed, the present study demonstrates that lower levels of mood are associated with 
fewer bad plays and an increased frequency of good plays, and thus better performance 
overall. Additionally, more frequent rumination (both reflective and brooding) is 
associated with decreased frequency of bad plays and better performance overall. As such, 
it would appear that rumination has an additional attenuating effect on risky decisions. 
Moreover, low mood, in addition to attenuating risky decisions, appears to promote good, 
safe decisions. 
Multiple mediation analyses yielded mixed support for the analytical rumination 
hypothesis. For the mPDP, consistent with our predictions, the relationship between low 
mood and task performance was mediated by rumination; however this held for individual 
scores only; that is, points participants awarded themselves, separate from the opponent’s 
(computer’s) score and overall task score. Additionally, no significant mediation models 
were computed for any measure taken from the mIGT, suggesting that all observed effects 
of mood and rumination on performance in the mIGT are direct. One possible explanation 
for these findings may be that when the self is a critical factor in problem resolution, 
rumination mediates the effect of low mood on problem solving through reflective 
processes. As such, one would not observe mediation effects in tasks such as the mIGT, as 
the self has no conceptual component in the task. At present, however, this is speculative. 
In line with our predictions, differential relationships were observed for both 
reflection and brooding sub-scales of the RRS with different task measures. Contrary to 
these initial predictions, however, was the observation that these sub-scales did not show 
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inverse relationships with various task measures. Indeed, across all correlations, brooding 
was not associated with poorer performance or poor decision making in the mIGT. Instead, 
brooding was in fact associated with better choices in the mIGT, negatively correlating 
with the frequency with which participants took cards from deck B (one of the ‘bad’ 
decks). Furthermore, this relationship was not observed with the reflection sub-scale. This 
particularly novel finding challenges the currently held belief that the brooding component 
of rumination is completely maladaptive, and may have particular benefits in non-clinical 
populations. It is possible that brooding in healthy populations may promote hesitation in 
the face of risky decisions, thereby promoting decision making which favours safer, more 
certain outcomes. Without replication, however, this remains speculative.  
Of particular note is the absence of any observable effects within the RAPM, even 
when performance was shown to be enhanced in both the mPDP and mIGT for individuals 
who more frequently ruminate. Raven’s matrices are considered to be one of the best 
measures of non-verbal analytical reasoning ability (Carroll, 1993), and so, following the 
analytical rumination hypothesis, one would anticipate improved performance for the 
RAPM in those with elevated levels of reflective rumination. One potential explanation for 
this absence may be due to the evolutionary relevance of the RAPM. Specifically, 
enhanced problem solving ability may only be detectable in tasks in which some element 
relates to a problem that may have been encountered in our evolutionary past. With respect 
to the present study, the mPDP and mIGT may conceivably possess such elements. Though 
completely computerised, the mPDP asks participants to monitor responses given by the 
opponent (computer) in response to their own decisions over time and serves as an 
analogue to social interactions. The mIGT requires participants to monitor risk and 
probabilities of reward, and though this task is conceptualised with respect to financial 
rewards and losses, the basic process of risk-reward analysis is similar to that used by 
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hunter-gatherers when obtaining resources. By contrast, the RAPM has no immediate real-
world analogue given its abstract nature. Indeed, the concept of evolved relevance in tasks 
and the potential performance benefits they elicit has recently begun to be investigated, 
with studies demonstrating evolutionary relevance effects in visual processing (Jackson & 
Calvillo, 2013), memory (Nairne, Pandeirada, Gregory, & Van Arsdall, 2009) and 
attention (New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007). Thus, the present study contributes to this 
growing literature, highlighting the need to consider tasks carefully when investigating 
evolutionary hypotheses. 
One potential limitation of the present study pertains to the power of the mediation 
analyses, such that the analyses themselves are underpowered based on the suggestions of 
Baron and Kenny (1986). Moreover, on the basis of their suggestions it may be argued that 
the analyses themselves are inappropriate due to the absence in two of the three models of 
a direct effect entirely. However, there are two objections to this critique. First, as 
described by MacKinnon, Fairchild, and Fritz (2007), Baron and Kenny’s first requirement 
that a significant relationship between variable X (the independent variable) and variable Y 
(the outcome variable) exists results in a marked reduction in power, particularly when 
determining if complete mediation is taking place as one must confirm the complete 
absence of an effect without committing a Type II error. Indeed, as demonstrated by Fritz 
and Mackinnon (2007), the required sample size for calculating the mediation path of small 
effect size is approximately 21000 participants, which for most studies is unfeasible. While 
the theoretical value in many cases of the X-Y relationship is not disputed, the ability to 
evidence this relationship before conducting mediation analyses may prohibit the 
investigation of real mediation effects due to insufficient power. Further to this, the 
assumption that there must be an X-Y relationship to begin with may also be flawed. As 
Zhao, Lynch, and Chen (2010) suggest, mathematically the zero-order effect of X on Y is 
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equivalent to the combination of the indirect and direct path. This is particularly important 
if it is considered that the indirect and direct paths may exert different effects. For 
example, the direct effect of X on Y may be positive in nature, whereas the indirect effect 
of X on Y through mediator M may be negative. Thus, combining the two pathways to 
calculate the total effect results in zero, and so it may erroneously be concluded that effects 
do not exist. This highlights the importance of fully investigating mediation models in 
cases where zero-order effects would suggest there are none. 
Finally, understanding the potential functional benefits of low mood and 
rumination may help inform clinical practice. By further clarifying the role of rumination 
in non-clinical populations, we gain an understanding of the effects of rumination when it 
is non-pathological. As such, it is possible to more effectively identify problem 
ruminations in patients. Additionally, under the analytical rumination hypothesis, by 
identifying rumination as the principal adaptation of low mood, clinicians can become 
more focussed in their treatment of depression. Specifically, if brooding rumination, at 
pathological levels, is responsible for the majority of depressive symptoms (see Joormann 
et al., 2006; Siegle et al., 2004; Treynor et al., 2003, for evidence of association) then 
clinicians should concentrate on addressing elevated levels of maladaptive rumination. 
Indeed, preliminary evidence suggests that targeting rumination specifically with 
behavioural therapies results in better prognosis and reduced probability of relapse at 
follow up (Watkins, Mullan et al., 2011; Watkins, Scott et al., 2007). Whether levels of 
adaptive rumination remain elevated post-treatment as compared to maladaptive 
rumination, or whether rumination more generally is attenuated is not clear. Moreover, 
how adaptive rumination may contribute to recovery remains unknown and should be 
addressed in future studies. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
In sum, the present study is the first to the author’s knowledge to document a direct 
relationship between rumination and problem solving ability in two different types of 
problem solving task. Furthermore, the results suggest that rumination is only adaptive in 
tasks that involve some form of real world analogues in contrast to abstract tasks. This 
contributes to an emerging literature on the concept of evolutionary relevance in task 
selection when investigating the adaptive nature of cognitive traits. Finally, it is suggested 
that determining the adaptive importance of rumination can help inform clinical practice, 
by allowing clinicians to become more focussed in their treatments. Considering the 
present study’s findings, it is critical that future studies investigate how adaptive 
components of rumination can impact clinical outcome. 
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Chapter Four: Rumination and executive function: Associations between ruminative 
styles, working memory, attention, and response inhibition. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The precise relationship between rumination, including its sub-components reflection and 
brooding, and problem solving ability in a non-clinical population was investigated in the 
study reported in Chapter Three. In conflict with previous findings, found that rumination 
was in fact positively related to problem solving ability in two types of problem solving 
task. Furthermore, each component of rumination contributed differentially to each type of 
task. Specifically, reflective rumination was positively associated with better performance 
in a modified prisoner’s dilemma task (for emulating social interactions; see Hokanson, 
Sacco, Blumberg, & Landrum, 1980) and a modified Iowa gambling task (for assessing 
risk-reward problem solving; see Cauffman et al., 2010). Contrary to predictions, rather 
than exhibiting negative relationships with performance in these tasks, brooding 
rumination was in fact positively related to performance in these tasks, which has led us to 
suggest a re-evaluation of the adaptive/maladaptive dichotomy in favour of a balanced 
model of rumination. 
In spite of evidence for the positive effects of rumination has begun to emerge (see 
Chapter Three; Hubbard, Faso, Krawczyk, & Rypma, 2015), the potential mechanisms 
through which rumination may improve problem solving remain largely unknown. 
Problem solving ability itself is not thought of as a unitary process but the result of an 
interaction of more fundamental processes (Kendler & Kendler, 1962). If this concept is 
accepted, likely candidates for these fundamental processes may be found within the 
domain of executive functioning. Executive function comprises a suite of general-purpose 
mechanisms which govern cognitive processes at the most fundamental level (A Miyake et 
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al., 2000) and is most commonly associated with prefrontal cortical structures (Banich, 
2009; Funahashi, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001; however, see also Alvarez & Emory, 
2006). Of these processes, three consistently emerge in the literature as critical components 
of executive function: inhibition and task switching (e.g. Burgess, 2000; Miyake et al., 
2000; Sergeant, Geurts, & Oosterlaan, 2002), working memory (e.g. Baddeley, Sala, 
Robbins, & Baddeley, 1996; Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra, & Pulkkinen, 2003; McCabe, 
Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010), and attentional control (e.g. Diamond, 
2013; Fassbender et al., 2004; Kane & Engle, 2002). 
Though problem solving has been theorised to engage higher-order cognitive 
processes such as executive functions (Barbey & Barsalou, 2009), there have been few 
empirical studies investigating the potential relationship. Lv (2015), for example, reported 
an association between problem solving ability and both working memory capacity and 
inhibition. Specifically, working memory capacity was positively related to the ability to 
process problem information efficiently, whereas inhibition exhibited contradictory 
relationships over the course of two experiments, being both negatively and positively 
related to ability. Furthermore, Vandermorris, Sheldon, Winocur, and Moscovitch (2013) 
observed a positive relationship between composite executive function scores and ability to 
solve both well- and ill-defined problems; however, the specific components contributing 
to the association were not identified and as such, it is uncertain as to whether this 
association is driven by a single or multiple components. From these studies alone, it is 
clear that the relationship between executive function and problem solving ability is 
complex and may be subject to influence from other cognitive factors. 
As with the rumination and problem solving literature, many of the inferences 
made regarding rumination and aspects of executive function are derived from clinical 
studies involving patient groups, or take no account of the independent effects of reflection 
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and brooding. Based on these studies, rumination has been thought to impair executive 
function (e.g. Connolly et al., 2014; Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011; Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2008; Philippot & Brutoux, 2008; Watkins & Brown, 2002; Whitmer & Banich, 
2007), aligning with the maladaptive view of rumination. However, in addition to not 
considering the sub-components of rumination, these studies have commonly assumed that 
any change in a facet of executive function is detrimental, paying little attention to the idea 
that these changes may serve a functional purpose. For example, Altamirano, Miyake, and 
Whitmer (2010) suggest that ruminators exhibiting difficulties in task switching may, in 
fact, be demonstrating improvements in goal maintenance instead. As such, when given a 
task, they are more able to focus on the original goals, and may, in turn, be more resistant 
to task distracters. 
In order to investigate whether there are differential relationships between the 
ruminative sub-components reflection and brooding, and the three commonly cited 
components of executive function (inhibition and task switching, working memory, and 
attentional control) in a clinically healthy sample, the present study administered three 
tasks, each designed to measure one of these components. Participants completed a 
forward digit span task, with a staircase procedure implemented, adapted from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 2008), in order to measure working memory 
capacity; a variable stop signal reaction time (SSRT) task in order to measure response 
inhibition; and an exogenous/endogenous attentional cueing task (Posner, 1980) in order to 
assess attentional control. Based on the study reported in Chapter Three it is predicted that 
if problem solving ability is indeed related to executive functioning then the frequency of 
these ruminations should be associated with enhanced performance in these tasks. In 
addition to administering the RRS to measure rumination, the recently developed 
Analytical Rumination Questionnaire (ARQ; Barbic, Durisko, & Andrews, 2014) was also 
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completed by participants. This measure has been designed specifically to measure levels 
of analytical-type ruminations and is hypothesised to be most closely associated with 
problem solving. Furthermore, levels of analytical rumination are thought to be closely 
related to levels of reflective rumination and as such, the correlation between ARQ scores 
and reflective rumination scores will be investigated. 
4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the student body of Durham University. All participants 
reported no personal history of psychological or neurological disorder and indicated that 
they had not been taking in the past six months any medications that may affect the central 
nervous system. The final sample comprised six males and 37 females, with a mean age of 
23.14 years (S.D.: 7.09 years).  Participants were reimbursed with either course credit or a 
£5 voucher for an online retailer. The study protocol was approved by the Durham 
University Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
4.2.2 Measures 
4.2.2.1 Beck depression inventory (BDI) 
The 20-item BDI reported acceptable internal consistency at both T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s 
α: .83 and .84 respectively). 
4.2.2.2 Ruminative response scale (RRS) 
The full RRS reported an acceptable internal consistency at T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s α: .892 
and .899 respectively). Internal consistencies for both brooding and reflection subscales 
were acceptable at T1 (Cronbach’s α: .786 and .772, respectively) and T2 (Cronbach’s α: 
.805 and .752 respectively). 
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4.2.2.3 Analytical rumination questionnaire 
The full ARQ (as reported in Chapter Two, pp. 44-45) reported acceptable internal 
consistencies at T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s α: .952 and .934 respectively). 
4.2.3 Tasks 
All tasks were presented on a 15.6 inch monitor at 1920x1080 resolution, with a refresh 
rate of 60Hz, with screen brightness set to maximum. The monitor was placed at a distance 
of 57cm, such that 1cm equates to one degree visual angle. Participants were also asked to 
use a chin rest during the course of the task battery. All tasks were programmed in Matlab 
version 2012b using the Psychophysics Toolbox version 3 extensions (Brainard, 1997; 
Pelli, 1997). Participants completed the task battery in a darkened room. 
4.2.3.1 Digit span task 
A computerized adaptation of the digit span task as detailed in the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 2008) was administered. For the present study, only the 
forward digit span procedure was used, requiring participants to remember a sequence of 
digits presented to them in the exact order they are presented. Additionally, a staircase 
function was implemented, such that the number of digits the participants were required to 
recall varied as a consequence of each individual participant’s performance. For every 
three sequences of n-digits recalled correctly, the total number of digits in the sequence 
increased by one. Conversely, for every three sequences of n-digits participants did not 
recall correctly, the total number of digits in the sequence was reduced by one. Each time 
the number of digits changed, the correct/incorrect count returned to zero for the purposes 
of determining when the next change in the number of digits would occur. The task would 
continue until the participant had recorded five reversals in the change of the number of 
digits, with reversals defined as an increase then decrease in the number of digits, or a 
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decrease then increase in the number of digits. The total number of sequences recalled 
correctly and the total number of sequences recalled incorrectly were recorded. Using the 
raw data, digit span thresholds (where performance is estimated to remain at 50% 
accuracy) were calculated for each participant. 
4.2.3.2 Posner attentional cuing task 
The Posner attention task, as described by Posner (1980), was administered to participants. 
Three boxes were presented on a gray background (one central and one each on the left and 
right periphery, sized 2.5° x 2.5° visual angle), with participants being asked to fixate on 
the central box. Between the start of the trial and presentation of a cue, there was a variable 
delay between 250ms and 1000ms, followed immediately an endogenous cue or exogenous 
cue depending on which block of trials the participant was currently completing. 
Endogenous cues were presented as an arrow pointing to either the left or right periphery, 
whereas exogenous cues were presented as the outline of one of the peripheral boxes 
becoming thicker. Cues were presented for 200ms. Following the presentation of the cue, 
one of the peripheral boxes would fill in to become a solid square (see Figure 4.1 for an 
example sequence of events). All delays were determined at random on each trial, for both 
central and peripheral cues. Variable delays were also used in order to reduce the 
probability of habituation to a stable delay. Additionally, by using variable delays between 
cue onset and stimulus onset, participants must maintain attentional focus throughout the 
task. Moreover, the delay range was chosen in order to capture the range of values 
typically used in the Posner paradigm (e.g. Hayward & Ristic, 2015; Milliken, Lupianez, 
Roberts, & Stevanovski, 2003; Olk, Tsankova, Petca, & Wilhelm, 2014). Participants were 
then required to press one of two keys on a keyboard based on which of the peripheral 
boxes becomes a solid square (i.e., the target). On 80% of trials, the presented cues were 
indicative of which box would become the target (valid trials), with the remaining 20% of 
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trials being classified as invalid, such that the presented cue was not indicative of which of 
the peripheral boxes would become the target. Participants completed six blocks of 40 
trials, with half of the blocks containing endogenous cues and the remaining half 
containing exogenous cues. Block order was determined randomly for each participant 
prior to beginning the task. Accuracy and response time to each type of trial was recorded. 
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Figure 4.1: Schematic of two example trials from the Posner attentional cueing task. Trial 
sequence a) details an endogenously cued trial, whereas trial sequence b) details an 
exogenously cued trial. 
 
4.2.3.3 Stop signal reaction time task (SSRT) 
The SSRT task is designed to measure a participant’s ability to inhibit a previously 
engaged motor response. At the beginning of each trial, participants were asked to fixate 
a) 
b) 250ms – 1000ms delay 
250ms – 1000ms delay 
250ms – 1000ms delay 
250ms – 1000ms delay 
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on a central circle on a white background. After a variable delay (between 250ms and 
500ms), a green square (rgb value: 0, 255, 0; sized 2.5° x 2.5° visual angle) was presented 
in the centre of the screen. On go trials, the square remained green, whereas on no-go trials 
the square became red (rgb value: 255, 0, 0; see Figure 4.2 for an example event sequence). 
Participants were instructed to press the spacebar as quickly as possible in response to the 
green square, and when the red square appeared they were to do nothing. Thus, on trials 
where the square changed colour, participants would have to inhibit their go response. The 
delay between the presentation of the stop signal after the go signal was adjusted 
dynamically based on the performance of the participant. On completion of successful stop 
trials, the stop signal delay (SSD) was increased by 50ms, and on unsuccessful stop trials, 
the SSD was reduced by 50ms. This tracking procedure, as detailed by Levitt (1971), is 
designed to promote a 50% inhibition failure rate which allows for the estimation of the 
SSRT. Participants completed six blocks of trials, each consisting of 48 trials. Half of the 
blocks had a distribution of 50% go trials and 50% no-go trials, with the remaining blocks 
of trials consisting of 75% go trials and 25% no-go trials. Block order was determined 
randomly prior the beginning of the task. Accuracy and response times were recorded and 
used to calculate the SSRT for each participant. 
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Figure 4.2: Schematic of go (upper path) and no-go (lower path) trials for the stop signal 
reaction time task 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
Recruitment was conducted primarily through the use of online advertisements within the 
University and through word of mouth. Prior to arrival, participants were contacted to 
confirm that they did not meet any of the exclusion criteria. Testing was conducted in two 
labs across two campuses of the University. Before beginning the testing session, all 
participants were provided with written and verbal explanations of what would happen 
during the testing session and given assurances regarding confidentiality of participation. 
Finally, all participants gave full written consent. 
Participants first completed the BDI, RRS, and ARQ, administered in a random 
order before completing the task battery. Tasks were administered in a random order to 
each participant. The order of tasks was determined prior to the experimental session. After 
250ms – 500ms delay 
Variable delay 
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completing the task battery, participants completed the BDI, RRS, and ARQ for a second 
time, again in a random order, before being debriefed and compensated for their time. 
4.2.5 Data analysis 
All responses given to self-report measures at T1 and T2 were subjected to paired samples 
t-tests to validate the robustness of the self-report measures in addition to investigating 
whether completing the task battery resulted in observable changes in mood, anxiety, and 
rumination. Descriptive statistics for the questionnaire measures are given in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the questionnaire variables under investigation 
 Mean S.D. 
BDI 8.37 5.37 
RRS 40.66 9.46 
RRS-R 8.72 2.87 
RRS-B 9.73 2.87 
ARQ 63.76 15.85 
Note: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-R = 
Reflection subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-B = Brooding subscale of the 
Ruminative Response Scale, ARQ = Analytical Rumination Questionnaire 
 
Results from each questionnaire measure were taken and correlated with each 
outcome variable for each task. Due to absent data (computer error), seven participants 
were excluded from all aspects of the digit span analysis. All analyses were conducted 
using the total number of digit sequences recalled correctly,  
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For the SSRT task analysis, two methods were used to calculate the SSRT for each 
participant. Method one used the mean go-signal reaction time for each participant whereas 
method two used the median go-signal reaction time (as suggested for use with staircase 
designs; Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003). The average delay in 
signal onset for each participant was then subtracted from these values to calculate an 
estimate of the SSRT. 
 
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Comparison of T1 and T2 self-report measures 
No comparison reached significance, all t(40)<1.15, p>.257. For subsequent analyses, T1 
and T2 scores on each self-report measure were averaged to give an overall score for each 
participant. 
4.3.2 Digit span analysis 
4.3.2.1 Relationship between digit span outcome and self-report measures 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for each outcome variable from the Digit Span task 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Total Sequences 
Correct 
 
27.61 
 
 
 
 
5.62 
 
19 – 40 
Total Sequences 
Incorrect 
 
16.22 
 
 
 
 
3.67 
 
8 – 26 
Threshold Value 7.06 1.39 5 - 11 
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Descriptive statistics for each digit span measure are given in Table 4.2. No significant 
correlations were observed between any digit span outcome variable and overall RRS, 
BDI, or ARQ scores. Similarly, no significant correlations were observed with the 
brooding subscale of the RRS (RRS-B).  Significant positive correlations were observed 
between the reflection subscale of the RRS (RRS-R) and the total number of digit 
sequences recalled correctly, r(36)=.310, p = .0325,  and the calculated digit span 
threshold, rs(36)=.283, p = .047, as predicted (see Figure 4.3a and 4.3b respectively). 
 
4.3.3 Posner attentional cueing task analysis 
4.3.3.1 Relationship between cueing task outcome and self-report measures 
Descriptive statistics for response times for each trial type is given in Table 4.3. As with 
the digit span analysis, BDI, ARQ, and overall RRS scores showed no significant 
associations were observed with any outcome variables from the Posner attentional cueing 
Figure 4.3: Scatterplots depicting the relationship between reflective rumination scores 
and digit span outcome measures. a) Total number of sequences recalled correctly b) 
Individual digit span threshold values 
a) b) 
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task. However, there was a significant positive relationship between RRS-B scores and 
reaction times for correct responses on invalidly cued trials, rs(39)= .343, p = .016, and 
within these trials specifically the relationship was observed for endogenously cued trials 
only, rs(39)= .365, p = .011 (see Figure 4.4a and 4.4b for a comparison of the relationships 
between brooding, and endogenously and exogenously cued trials respectively). 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for all reaction time variables taken from the Posner 
Attentional Cuing task 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Correct Endogenous .319 .739 .23 - .61 
Incorrect Endogenous .082 .140 0 - .75 
Correct Exogenous .324 .081 .23 - .64 
Incorrect Exogenous .076 .076 0 - .24 
Correct Valid .309 .072 .22 - .55 
Incorrect Valid .082 .156 0 - .75 
Correct Invalid .378 .086 .27 - .71 
Incorrect Invalid .076 .071 0 - .24 
Correct Valid Endogenous .307 .072 .21 - .58 
Incorrect Valid Endogenous .077 .160 0 - .75 
Correct Invalid Endogenous .371 .096 .26 - .73 
Incorrect Invalid Endogenous .043 .069 0 - .29 
Correct Valid Exogenous .311 .081 .20 - .62 
Incorrect Valid Exogenous .012 .042 0 - .19 
Correct Invalid Exogenous .386 .091 .26 - .75 
Incorrect Invalid Exogenous .073 .075 0 - .24 
 Note: All values given in milliseconds (ms). 
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In order to investigate whether the relationship between RRS-B scores and reaction 
times for correct responses to invalidly cued trials overall was driven by the relationship 
between RRS-B scores and reaction times for invalid endogenous trials, a partial 
correlation controlling for invalid endogenous reaction times was conducted. After 
controlling for invalid endogenous reaction times, the relationship between RRS-B scores 
and reaction times to invalidly cued trials returned non-signficance, rs(39)= -.095, p = .569. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Scatterplots depicting the relationship between brooding rumination scores 
and reaction times for correct responses to a) invalidly cued endogenous trials, and b) 
invalidly cued exogenous trials in the Posner attentional cueing task 
 
a) b) 
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4.3.4 SSRT analysis 
4.3.4.1 Relationship between SSRT and self-report measures 
 
Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for both SSRT calculation methods 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Mean Method 50/50 .129 .202 -.41 – .65  
Mean Method 75/25 .175 .238 -.35 – 1.02  
Median Method 50/50 .096 .217 -.47 – .61 
Median Method 75/25 .138 .259 -.36 – 1.03 
Note: All values given in milliseconds (ms) 
 
No significant associations were observed between any calculated SSRT for either 50/50 
trials (50% go signal, 50% no-go signal) or 75/25 trials (75% go signal, 25% no-go signal) 
and BDI scores, overall RRS scores, or the RRS sub-scales. ARQ scores were significantly 
positively associated with both mean and median calculation method SSRTs for 50/50 
trials (mean method: r(40)=.285, p = ..0375; median method: r(40)=.319, p = .0225) and 
for 75/25 trials (mean method: rs(40)=.299, p = ..0305; median method: rs(40)=.330, p = 
.019). 
4.4 Discussion 
The present study aimed to investigate whether the frequency of rumination, and the nature 
of these ruminations, was related to any improvements in the executive functions working 
memory, attentional control, and response inhibition, in a group of individuals without 
diagnoses of depression or other psychological disorders. The results suggest that there is 
mixed evidence for rumination’s relationship with executive functioning, and consistent 
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with the findings of Chapter Three, it appears that the subcomponents of rumination are 
differentially involved. 
Although no relationship was observed with overall RRS scores and any digit span 
measure, a significant positive relationship emerged between RRS-R scores and both total 
number of sequences recalled correctly and the overall threshold value. As such, 
individuals who engaged more frequently in reflective ruminations recalled more digit 
sequences correctly and had higher thresholds at which their performance dropped to 50% 
accuracy. This suggests that highly reflective individuals have an associated increase in 
working memory capacity. As noted, working memory capacity has been associated with 
problem solving ability (Lv, 2015) and so the association between reflective rumination 
and working memory may go someway to explaining the relationship between reflective 
rumination and problem solving ability. Reflection has been shown to form a part of active 
problem solving (Hasegawa et al., 2016), with reflective ruminations typically concerning 
the analysis of an encountered problem. Such analysis normally requires the manipulation 
of multiple units of information, and so reflectors require greater working memory 
capacity in order to effectively process this information, given that they are more likely to 
engage in analytical thinking. What is unclear, however, is whether reflectors naturally 
possess greater working memory capacity, or whether working memory capacity increases 
as a result of repeated engagement in reflective rumination. Critically, the present sample 
was without any indication of clinical diagnoses, present or historical, and thus extends 
current knowledge on the nature of the relationship between rumination and working 
memory. Specifically, these results contrast with observations from healthy controls in 
clinical studies (Connolly et al., 2014; Joormann et al., 2011) which report no such 
associations, and highlights the importance of fully investigating each component of 
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rumiation individually given their apparent independent contributions to different cognitive 
functions (see Chapter Three). 
Contrary to predictions, no association was observed between any measure of 
rumination and improved reaction times or accuracy on the Posner attentional cueing task. 
Rather, a significant positive association emerged between RRS-B scores and reaction 
times for correct responses on invalidly cued trials overall, with further analysis indicating 
that this was driven by a significant positive relationship between RRS-B scores and 
reaction times to invalid endogenous cues, indicating that on these trials individuals who 
engaged in more frequent brooding ruminations were slower in giving a correct response. 
To the author’s knowledge, this finding is somewhat novel with respect to the attention 
literature and is the first to demonstrate slowed reaction times in association with brooding 
rumination. Returning to the data, brooding exhibited no associations with accuracy in the 
task (all ps > .214). Thus, differences in accuracy cannot explain any differences observed 
in reaction times.  
There are two potential explanations for these observations. First, individuals who 
more frequently engage in brooding rumination may find it more difficult to disengage 
their attention from the initial cue on invalid trials. In the present version of the Posner 
attention task, across all blocks 80% of the cues presented were valid, such that the box 
indicated by the cue would become the target, with the remaining cues not being indicative 
of the eventual target. As such, invalid cues are relatively rare and so it is easier to assume 
that a presented cue will be indicative of the target, thus participants learn to associate the 
target with the presented cue. With respect to individuals who display high frequency 
brooding behaviours, it is possible that once they become reliant on the common valid 
cues, they find it difficult to disengage from the cued location on invalid trials and require 
extra time to make a correct response as a result. Prior research has alluded to potential 
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problems in task switching among high frequency ruminators (Altamirano et al., 2010; 
Whitmer & Banich, 2007) which may explain the delay in correct responses given to 
invalid cues by brooders. An alternative explanation concerns brooding’s potential role as 
a hesitation mechanism in order to avoid making risky decisions (Chapter Three). As 
noted, valid trials are far more common than invalid trials; however, upon the discovery of 
invalid trials, brooders may become more hesitant to react as quickly as before, resulting in 
a delay in reaction times. Indeed, adaptive response switching may depend on hesitancy as 
a result of brooding, such that individuals who display high frequency brooding behaviours 
may be more hesitant to switch responses in the face of infrequent events (i.e. invalid 
trials) as these may be anomalous events and as such, there may be no adaptive benefit in 
changing a response, or response pattern. 
The significant positive association between SSRTs and ARQ scores also ran 
contrary to our predictions. Larger SSRTs are indicative of participants requiring more 
time to inhibit an initiated response, and are therefore associated with poorer performance 
on the task. Thus, within the present sample, individuals who more frequently engaged in 
analytical-type ruminations were manifested poorer performance overall in the SSRT task. 
Given the relative infancy of the ARQ as a measure, explanations for this observation are 
speculative. Previous research has found associations between slowed SSRTs and levels of 
depression in patients (Bora, Harrison, Yücel, & Pantelis, 2013) and remitted individuals 
(Aker, Bø, Harmer, Stiles, & Landrø, 2016) and as such, given rumination’s close 
association with depression, the present results may give an indication as to why some 
depressed individuals, specifically those who frequently engage in analytical-type 
ruminations, have difficulty in inhibiting responses in cognitive tasks. Difficulties in 
response inhibition in cognitive tasks may be indicative of more general inhibition 
difficulties impacting emotion regulation which may perpetuate depressive symtpoms and 
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thus, rumination (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). As such, delays in inhibition may be a 
mechanism through which analytical ruminations perpetuate themselves following 
anomalous results of behaviour in order to dedicate cognitive resources to understanding 
why such an outcome occurred. The ‘oddball effect’ or orienting account of inhibitory 
control (Notebaert et al., 2009), states that, during response-inhibition tasks delays in 
response inhibition occur following either an infrequent error or an infrequent correct 
response. The infrequent nature of either the error or correct response (depending on the 
experimental set-up) is thought to capture attention, causing a deviation in attention from 
the task and ultimately resulting in inhibition delays as individuals reorient themselves to 
the task. Indeed, numerous studies have now detailed post-error slowing following rare 
errors in inhibition tasks (Houtman, Castellar, & Notebaert, 2012; Jonker, Seli, Cheyne, & 
Smilek, 2013; Notebaert & Verguts, 2011) which generalises across tasks (Wang, Pan, 
Tan, Liu, & Chen, 2016), suggesting that this may be a general rather than a task-specific 
mechanism. 
A conflict monitoring account (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) 
offers an alternative explanation for delays in inhibition. Here, it is the errors which are 
important, as opposed to whether an error or correct response is infrequent, and as such 
delays occur following an error as the cognitive control systems adapt in order to reduce 
the frequency of errors. Thus, in the context of the stop-signal task, once an error occurs 
go-responses are delayed as participants try to ensure their response to the following trial is 
accurate. With respect to analytical ruminators, the positive relationship between levels of 
analytical rumination and SSRTs may be indicative of this more cautious approach to the 
task. This compliments previous work which suggests ruminators may be more hesitant in 
risk-reward scenarios (see Chapter Three) in order to mitigate the risk of potential negative 
consequences by effectively processing task-relevant information. Thus, there is a response 
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time tradeoff, such that analytical ruminators take longer to respond more accurately, 
thereby avoiding any risks. In the present study, the frequency of stop-signals was 
manipulated in such a way that infrequent correct responses were rare. As such, it is not 
possible to directly compare the orienting account and conflict monitoring accounts with 
the available data. 
Finally. to the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to utilise the ARQ to 
examine associations between scores on this questionnaire and behavioural measures. 
Consistent with Barbic et al. (2014), ARQ scores were strongly and positively associated 
with RRS-Reflection scores and showed no significant correlation with BDI scores. 
However, significant positive correlations were also observed with RRS-Brooding, which 
suggests that brooding may have a role in analytical ruminations consistent with evidence 
of brooding’s association with improved performance in risk-based tasks. The absence of a 
relationship between ARQ and BDI scores suggest that the ARQ captures a unique aspect 
of rumination which is independent of depressive symptoms. Indeed whereas the RRS (and 
consequently RRS-R and RRS-B) asks individuals to report their ruminations in response 
to depressed mood, the ARQ is more general in its enquiry, asking participants to report 
their ruminations in response to problems more generally. Although the RRS-R and RRS-
B measure some aspect of depressive response, the relationships with ARQ scores may 
indicate that they measure some shared aspect of analytical rumination which may be 
involved in depressive symptoms, although not with depression directly.  
A potential limitation concerns the use of the Posner attentional cueing task. As 
noted, the results from this task ran contrary to predictions which may be a consequence of 
the relatively short nature of the task. When considering the role of attention in a problem 
solving framework, it is arguable that complex problems are not likely to be solved in a 
rapid fashion. Rather, effective solutions are more likely to be arrived at following 
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sustained analysis (Andrews & Thomson, 2009), and thus, differences between high and 
low frequency ruminators may become more apparent under conditions of sustained 
attention. As such, while the present results are not necessarily incompatible with this 
view, future work should investigate the association between rumination and ability to 
maintain sustained attention. Moreover, these studies should also vary working memory 
load where appropriate, due to the present data indicating a link between rumination and 
working memory ability in addition to a number of studies suggesting a link between 
working memory and attentional processes (e.g. Fruchtman-Steinbok & Kessler, 2016; 
Saito & Miyake, 2004; Shulman & Greenberg, 1971). 
4.5 Conclusion 
The present study indicates that both reflective and brooding rumination are related to 
executive functioning in ways which may explain the positive relationships with problem 
solving ability observed previously. Furthermore, analytical ruminations, as specifically 
measured by the ARQ, appear to be independent of depressive symptoms, further 
indicating the need to treat rumination as a multi-component construct. Taken together, the 
results suggest that the conclusion of the wider literature that rumination negatively 
impacts executive functioning is premature, and that such relationships must be considered 
with respect to potential function. Future studies should seek to employ paradigms 
requiring sustained attentional effort in order to determine whether rumination’s 
relationship with attention varies as a function of the time spent on task. 
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Chapter Five: Rumination and risk-reward decision making: Associations in the face 
of explicit and implicit risks 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Rumination has classically been associated with a number of cognitive and behavioural 
deficits. As noted in Chapters Three and Four, several studies have linked rumination with 
both poorer problem solving abilities (e.g. Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Kao, Dritschel, & 
Astell, 2006; O’Mahen, Boyd, & Gashe, 2015; Sanders & Lam, 2010; Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2002; Yoon & Joormann, 2012) and executive dysfunction (Arditte & Joormann, 
2011; Connolly et al., 2014; Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007; Philippot & Brutoux, 
2008; Watkins & Brown, 2002; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Although these observations 
predominantly concern patient populations, evidence is now emerging that suggests that 
these relationships also exist in healthy populations but are more complex. As 
demonstrated in Chapters Three and Four, rumination has been associated with improved 
problem solving in social-style and risk-reward type tasks, with each sub-component of 
rumination contributing differentially to these tasks. Additionally, the relationship between 
rumination and core components of executive function (namely working memory, 
attentional control, and response inhibition) reflect the need to fully investigate healthy 
populations as the results run contrary to most clinical observations, indicating that 
rumination is associated with improvements (e.g. increased working memory capacity) or 
different behavioural strategies (delays in attentional control and response inhibition, with 
no impact on accuracy) as opposed to deficits in performance as seen in patients. 
In light of the novel findings from Chapter Three that brooding is associated with 
risk-reward problem solving in non-clinical samples, one remaining question concerns the 
relationship between rumination and decision making under risk in the absence of disorder. 
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Current knowledge has been informed largely by investigations using atypical samples, as 
with the larger problem solving literature, and suggests that rumination negatively impacts 
the efficacy of decisions made under conditions of risk. Atlas and Peterson (1990), for 
example, found in problem gamblers that rumination was associated with an increase in the 
amount of money wagered following a loss. Moreover, rumination was also associated 
with less successful wagers overall. More recently, de Lisle, Dowling, and Sabura Allen 
(2014) found that rumination positively correlated with self-reported gambling severity 
such that individuals who ruminated more frequently reported greater levels of problem-
gambling. However, as demonstrated in Chapter Three, individuals who are clinically 
healthy show no such deficits in risk-reward type tasks and, in fact, perform better at a 
modified Iowa gambling task when engaging more frequently in rumination. Furthermore, 
reflection and brooding were found to relate differentially to play and pass strategies on 
each deck (for a full description of the task see Chapter Three and Cauffman et al., 2010). 
Again, this not only emphasises the need to investigate beyond the scope of clinical 
populations but also indicates that rumination is not a unitary process and that each 
component may relate to behavioural performance differentially. 
To date, the empirical and theoretical literature pertaining to the potential 
advantages of rumination under conditions of risk remains relatively sparse; however, the 
available empirical evidence complements existing theory on the adaptive nature of low 
mood in facilitating problem solving. The relationship between low mood and rumination, 
and how they may interact at a potentially adaptive level, is well established (see Chapter 
One) and as such, it is feasible that rumination may function as the adaptive mechanism in 
functional accounts of low mood. With respect to low mood and risk, only one theory has 
been formulated to the author’s knowledge. Nettle (2009) proposes that low mood is an 
adaptation to limit risky decisions, reasoning that individuals who are moderately low in 
99 
 
mood should avoid risks because the emotional consequences of failure (e.g. gambling and 
losing) do not outweigh the potential benefits of success (e.g. gambling and winning). 
Conversely, individuals with ‘normal’ levels of mood and individuals who are depressed 
should take more risks than those who a low in mood.  For individuals with ‘normal’ levels 
of mood, the consequences of failure are not as emotionally damaging compared to those 
with moderately low levels of mood. Importantly, individuals with ‘normal’ levels of mood 
are more emotionally resilient, and thus they are able to experience failure and continue as 
normal. Depressed individuals, on the other hand, are able to endure failure due to their 
conception that their situation cannot deteriorate further. As such, the consequences of 
failure are diminished resulting in the rewards outweighing the risks. In this model 
ascending the low mood continuum from non-depressed through low mood to depression, 
a U-shaped curve should emerge with respect to the frequency of risks taken. 
At present, there is a dearth of direct empirical evidence supporting Nettle's (2009) 
model with only one study explicitly examining the relationship between depression, risky 
decision making, and attitudes towards risk to our knowledge. Garcia-Retamero, Okan, and 
Maldonado (2015) found that individuals classified as depressed (though they did not carry 
a formal clinical diagnosis) were less likely to make risky decisions than their non-
depressed counterparts. Moreover, depressed individuals were less likely to recommend 
risky decisions to others, indicating a general risk aversion as opposed to self-focussed 
aversion. Furthermore, as demonstrated by in Chapter Three, levels of depression as 
measured by the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
Erbaugh, 1961) in a non-clinical sample were associated with avoiding high risk decisions 
in a modified Iowa Gambling Task (mIGT, see Chapter Three for a full description), 
further supporting the model. It is important to note that neither of these studies included 
patients in their samples, and as such, the most extreme manifestations of low mood were 
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excluded. Consequently, it is unclear as to whether the pattern of risk-related decisions 
follows the U-shaped distribution as suggested by Nettle (2009). 
As noted in Chapter Three, rumination may serve as the mechanism by which risky 
decisions are attenuated in individuals with low mood. Indeed, the association between 
increased frequency of rumination and fewer risky decisions made in a gambling task 
parallels that of the association with low mood. Moreover, the relationship between 
rumination and risky decision making may be delineated further by examining the 
reflection and brooding sub-components individually. As predicted reflection correlated 
negatively with risky decision making, but, contrary to predictions, so did brooding. 
Further to this, brooding exhibited a unique relationship with decision making associated 
with one of the ‘bad’ decks in the modified Iowa gambling task. Recall that one of the two 
‘bad’ decks produces infrequent-yet-large losses, whereas the other produces frequent-yet-
small losses. In spite of both decks resulting in the same net loss over a period of ten trials, 
only high frequency of brooding rumination was associated with avoiding cards from the 
frequent-yet-small deck. One potential explanation for this finding may be that increases in 
the frequency of brooding rumination are associated with an increased sensitivity to 
negative outcomes, thereby allowing frequent brooding ruminators to discern the negative 
nature of the frequent-yet-small losses deck which may not be as apparent as the 
infrequent-yet-large losses deck. At present, however, this remains speculative owing to an 
absence of studies investigating this. 
One final factor that must be considered concerns the availability of information 
regarding the probability of a positive or negative outcome when engaging in risky 
decision making. Indeed, when making real world decisions there are often times where 
the probabilities of success and failure are not explicitly known and as such, they must be 
inferred. Specifically, with respect to the mIGT, participants are required to calculate the 
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relative risks of each deck for themselves based on their experiences with each deck. As 
such, one may engage in implicit learning in order to determine which decks are more 
favourable, a phenomenon which has been observed in the classic IGT (e.g. Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997;  Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; 
Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst, & Bechara, 2007; Jollant et al., 2016). Conversely, there are 
some scenarios in which the risks are known and as such the probabilities of positive and 
negative outcomes are explicit. Whether rumination affects decision making with implicit 
and explicit risks differentially is currently unknown. Moreover, the literature on 
rumination and learning is currently sparse and so it is difficult to formulate predictions 
with respect to these effects. 
The aims of the present study are twofold. First, to extend the findings of Chapter 
Three by investigating the relationship between rumination and decision making under 
conditions of risk by using two different gambling tasks in which the available information 
regarding the consequences of a decision differ. Specifically, in one task (the mIGT) the 
probability of winning or losing on each trial must be learnt implicitly, whereas in a second 
task (Game of Dice Task, GoDT; Brand et al., 2005) the probabilities of winning or losing 
on each trial are explicitly given. Second, to determine the specificity of the association 
between rumination and variations in risk-based decision making. As noted in Chapter 
Three, there is a growing literature that suggests that when investigating evolutionarily 
relevant hypotheses, it is important to employ tasks that are in some way analogous to 
evolutionary problems encountered by our ancestors. Gambling tasks are appropriate in a 
modern context as they typically concern the accumulation of currency (either hypothetical 
or real), which may be considered a modern equivalent of resource gathering. Thus, by 
also administering a task that does not have an evolutionary equivalent, one may determine 
the specificity of the adaptive mechanism in question. Here, the Stoplight task (Chein et 
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al., 2011) will also be administered as a measure of risk-based decision making that 
critically does not have an analogous evolutionary component. Moreover, the Stoplight 
task has no explicit or implicit rules regarding the probabilities of positive or negative 
outcomes and therefore measures an individual’s propensity to engage in risky decisions. 
From an adaptive/goal directed perspective, two predictions can be made depending on the 
specificity of rumination’s potential effect. First, if rumination is associated with making 
fewer risky decisions generally, then this association should be observed across all tasks. 
However, if the mechanism is domain specific, associations may only be observed in tasks 
with potential evolutionary relevance (e.g. the gambling tasks). 
5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the student body of Durham University. All participants 
reported no personal history of psychological or neurological disorder and indicated that 
they had not been taking any medications in the past six months that may affect the central 
nervous system. Three participants were removed from the analysis owing to BDI scores 
falling three standard deviations away from the mean. In accordance with the 
recommendation of the Ethics Committee, all participants were provided with materials 
detailing the services available both within the University and from independent 
organisations which provide support to individuals experiencing distress, with participants 
encouraged to contact them and their General Practitioner if appropriate. The final sample 
comprised 12 males and 28 females, with a mean age of 21.08 years (S.D.: 2.67 years).  
Participants were reimbursed with either course credit or a £5 voucher for an online 
retailer. The study protocol was approved by the Durham University Department of 
Psychology Ethics Committee. 
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5.2.2 Measures 
5.2.2.1 Beck depression inventory (BDI) 
The 20-item BDI reported acceptable internal consistency at both T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s 
α: .922 and .891 respectively). 
5.2.2.2 Ruminative response scale (RRS) 
The full RRS reported an acceptable internal consistency at T1 and T2 (Cronbach’s α: 
..896 and .89 respectively). Internal consistencies for both brooding and reflection 
subscales were acceptable at T1 (Cronbach’s α: .711 and .8, respectively) and T2 
(Cronbach’s α: .718 and .831 respectively). 
5.2.2.3 Analytical rumination questionnaire 
Internal consistencies for the ARQ at T1 and T2 were acceptable (Cronbach’s α: .922 and 
.853 respectively). 
5.2.3 Tasks 
5.2.3.1 Modified Iowa gambling task (mIGT) 
The mIGT, as described by Cauffman et al. (2010), was administered. Please see Chapter 
Three (pp. 52-53), for a full description of the task and calculation of outcome measures. 
5.2.3.2 Game of dice task 
The GoDT (Brand et al., 2005) is a computerised gambling task in which participants are 
asked to attempt to win as much money as possible by betting on the possible outcomes of 
a single die roll. On each trial, participants may choose the total number of outcomes they 
wish to bet on and the combination of numbers for that bet (see Figure 5.1 for 
combinations). The potential gains and losses are determined by the number of outcomes 
wagered on, such that the fewer numbers selected the larger the gain or loss will be. 
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Conversely, by betting on more numbers, the gains and losses become smaller. This 
reflects the probability of success and failure and emulates situations of high risk plus high 
reward and low risk plus low reward. Unlike the mIGT, the probability of each outcome 
can be reasoned easily based on the ratio of occurrence (1:6, 2:6, 3:6, and 4:6), resulting in 
explicitly known risks that are quantifiable. Participants are informed of how much money 
they have won or lost after each trial. For the purposes of analysis, trials where participants 
bet on only one or two numbers were classified as risky and disadvantageous. Trials where 
participants bet on three or four numbers were classified as non-risky and advantageous. 
The task was administered using the default settings, resulting in 12 trials overall. Given 
that no implicit rules regarding advantageous versus disadvantageous strategies must be 
learnt over a series of trials (as in the mIGT), a lower number of trials is acceptable. 
 
Figure 5.1: Example trial screen from the Game of Dice task. Participants are asked to 
choose from the betting options on the left, at which point the result of the dice roll is 
revealed. Earnings/losses for that round are indicated at the top of the screen. Current 
monetary total is also displayed. 
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5.2.3.3 Stoplight task 
The Stoplight task developed by Chein et al. (2011) is a measure of risk taking in the 
absence of any discernible rules regarding the probability of positive or negative outcomes. 
The task itself comprises a simple driving simulation of a journey from the participant’s 
home to a party being hosted in the mountains. During the task, participants are informed 
that they are to reach their destination within five minutes and along the way must make 
decisions at each intersection as to whether they will stop at a set of traffic lights, or 
continue through the traffic lights and risk crashing with traffic. Continuing through the 
traffic lights without incident resulted in time being saved, whereas stopping at the traffic 
lights resulted in a slight delay. Should participants choose not to stop and become 
involved in an accident then the delay incurred here is greater than if they had chosen to 
stop. Critically, the timing of the traffic signals at each intersection, and the probability of 
crashing were varied randomly. As such, there are no rules that the participant can learn, 
either implicitly or explicitly, which will help them to take more successful risks. 
Participants engaged the brake by pressing the space key on a keyboard. The total time 
spent driving (in seconds), the time taken to engage the break (in milliseconds) and the 
number of risky and non-risky decisions made were recorded.  
5.2.4 Procedure 
Recruitment was conducted primarily through the use of online advertisements within the 
University and through word of mouth. Prior to arrival, participants were contacted to 
confirm that they did not meet any of the exclusion criteria. Testing was conducted in two 
labs across two campuses of the University. Before beginning the testing session, all 
participants were provided with written and verbal explanations of what would happen 
during the testing session and given assurances regarding confidentiality of participation. 
Finally, all participants gave full written consent. 
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Participants first completed the BDI, RRS, and ARQ, administered in a random 
order before completing the task battery. Tasks were administered in a random order to 
each participant. The order of tasks was determined prior to the experimental session. After 
completing the task battery, participants completed the BDI, RRS, and ARQ for a second 
time, again in a random order, before being debriefed and compensated for their time. 
All tasks were presented on a 15.6 inch monitor at 1920x1080 resolution, with a 
refresh rate of 60Hz, placed 57cm away from the participant. Participants’ head position 
was maintained with the use of a chin rest. 
5.2.5 Data analysis 
Descriptive statistics for each questionnaire measure are given in Table 5.1. All responses 
given to self-report measures at T1 and T2 were compared to validate the robustness of the 
self-report measures. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for the questionnaire variables under investigation 
 Mean S.D. 
BDI 9.80 8.65 
RRS 41.4 9.91 
RRS-R 9.52 3.41 
RRS-B 9.58 2.86 
ARQ 66.6 13.5 
Note: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-R = 
Reflection subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-B = Brooding subscale of the 
Ruminative Response Scale, ARQ = Analytical Rumination Questionnaire 
Scores on each questionnaire measure were correlated with outcome variables from 
each task. Percentage of good plays (e.g. how often a participant chose to play when 
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presented with a low-risk deck), percentage of bad plays (e.g. how often a participant 
chose to play when presented with a high risk deck), and net task score were computed for 
the mIGT, as described in Chapter Three, (pp. 52-53). For the GoDT, net task score was 
calculated by subtracting the number of risky decisions from the number of non-risky 
decisions. Furthermore, differences in the frequency of which different dice combinations 
were selected were investigated using a simple repeated measures ANOVA. To investigate 
potential interactions between high/low frequency of rumination (reflection or brooding) 
and the number of dice selected in the GoDT, multiple mixed model ANOVAs were 
computed. A median split procedure was conducted using reflection and brooding scores to 
create high and low frequency reflection groups, and high and low frequency brooding 
groups respectively. Median scores were calculated for reflection and brooding 
independently with participants assigned to high or low groups depending on whether their 
score fell above or below this value. Participants whose score fell on the median were 
excluded from the analysis. Finally, in order to assess differences in performance across all 
tasks directly, the number of good and bad decisions (i.e. non-risky and risky decisions 
respectively) were converted to percentages and initially subjected to repeated measures 
ANOVAs. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Comparison of T1 and T2 self-report measures 
Only comparisons for BDI scores reached significance, Z = -2.826, p = .005, such that 
scores at T2 (BDI: M = 9.16, S.D. = 8.49) were significantly lower than at T1 (BDI: M = 
10.44, S.D. = 9.05). All other comparisons returned non-significance, all p > .51. All 
subsequent analyses were conducted using an average score calculated from T1 and T2 
scores. However, due to the significant difference between T1 and T2 scores for the BDI, 
analyses using BDI scores were restricted to those collected at T1. 
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5.3.2 Modified Iowa gambling task 
5.3.2.1 Relationship between overall task measures and self-report measures 
Descriptive statistics for the mIGT are given in Table 5.2. No associations achieved 
significance (all n.s. > .079). 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for the task percentage variables calculated for the mIGT 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Percentage good 
plays 
 
79.1 
 
14.5 
 
50 – 100 
Percentage bad 
plays 
 
70.1 
 
17.4 
 
16.7 – 100 
 
Net task score 
 
9.1 
 
19.3 
 
-35.7 – 73.3 
 
5.3.3 Game of dice task 
5.3.3.1 Relationship between overall task measures and self-report measures 
Descriptive statistics for all GoDT variables are given in Table 5.3. Correlations conducted 
to test the relationship between each self-report measure and net GoDT score and final 
monetary total revealed only one significant relationship: ARQ scores were significantly 
negatively associated with final monetary total, rs(35)= -.408, p = .015. No other 
correlation achieved significance, all ps > .071.  
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for each of the GoDT outcome variables 
 Mean S.D. Range 
One Die Selected .57 1.21 0 – 5  
Two Dice Selected 2.52 2.33 0 – 8  
Three Dice Selected 4.86 2.83 0 – 12 
Four Dice Selected 4.05 3.22 0 – 12 
Risky Decisions Made 3.10 2.88 0 – 11  
Non-Risky Decisions Made 8.90 2.88 1 – 12 
Net Score 5.81 5.76 -10 – 12  
Total Money Won (£) 323.81 1924.40 -5400 – 3900  
 
5.3.3.2 Differences in relative risk selection 
A simple repeated measures ANOVA conducted to investigate differences between each 
betting option (e.g. one die, two dice etc.) revealed a significant effect of die number, 
F(1.986, 75.483) = 17.529, p < .001, η2 = .316, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. Significant 
differences were observed between the number of times one die was chosen and the 
number of times each of the other betting options was chosen, all ps < .001, such that the 
one die option was chosen significantly less frequently (M = .54, S.D. =.19)  than the two 
dice (M = 2.67, S.E. = 2.34), three dice (M = 4.59, S.E. =2.35), and four dice (M = .4.21, 
S.E. =3.19) options. Furthermore, two dice were selected significantly less often the three 
dice, p = .011.  The frequency of selection did not differ significantly between three and 
four dice options, p = 1. Furthermore, Initial analysis of the potential interactions between 
high/low rumination groups and the number of dice selected revealed no significant 
interactions across all grouping variables, all ps > .349. 
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5.3.4 Stoplight task 
5.3.4.1 Relationship between overall task measures and self-report measures 
Descriptive statistics for the Stoplight task are given in Table 5.4. As in the GoDT analysis, 
only ARQ scores were found to correlate with any outcome measure from the Stoplight 
task. Specifically, ARQ scores significantly negatively correlated with the average time 
taken to engage the brake following the presentation of a yellow light. rs(35)= -.476, p = 
.004, No other comparison achieved significance, all p > .09. 
 
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics for each of the Stoplight task variables 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Risky Decisions Made 7.33 2.87 2 – 15  
Non-Risky Decisions Made 10.78 3.02 2 – 17 
Successful Risky Decisions 3.95 1.78 1 – 9  
Unsuccessful Risky Decisions 3.17 1.40 0 – 6 
Brake Engagement Delay (ms) 1622.48 292.07 710 – 2167.68 
Total Task Time (secs) 274.57 10.52 245.12 – 289.57 
 
5.3.5 Cross task analysis 
In order to assess differences in performance across all tasks directly, the number of good 
and bad decisions (i.e. non-risky and risky decisions respectively) were converted to 
percentages and initially subjected to repeated measures ANOVAs.  Taking the percentage 
of good decisions made first, a significant main effect of task was observed, F(2, 74) = 
9.810, p < .001, η2 = .21. Pairwise comparisons indicate that in the Stoplight task, 
participants made significantly fewer good decisions (M = 59.23, S.D. = 17.14) than in the 
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GoDT (M = 72.59, S.D, = 23.96, p = .016) and mIGT (M = 78.19, S.D, = 14.58, p < .001). 
The percentage of good decision made did not differ between the GoDT and mIGT (p = 
.788). Repeating the same analysis using percentage of bad decisions made as the 
dependent variable returned a significant main effect of task F(2, 74) = 51.753, p < .001, η2 
= .583. Pairwise comparisons indicate that participants made significantly fewer bad 
decisions in the GoDT (M = 27.41, S.D. = 23.96) than in the Stoplight task (M = 40.78, 
S.D. = 17.14, p =.016) and the mIGT (M = 68.35, S.D. = 17.48, p < .001). Similarly, 
participants made significantly fewer bad decisions in the Stoplight task as compared to the 
mIGT (p < .001). 
Multiple mixed model ANOVAs were then computed to investigate potential group 
interactions with differences in the types of decision made across the tasks. Across all 
analyses for both percentage of good and percentage of bad decisions made, no significant 
model was computed, all ps > .207. 
5.4 Interim Discussion 
The present study sought to further clarify the role of rumination and its sub-components in 
decision making when faced with conditions of risk. Moreover, following the work 
presented in Chapter Three, three tasks were used in which the available information 
regarding whether the outcome may or may not be favourably varied, thereby allowing for 
the investigation of whether rumination’s involvement in the decision-making process 
differs as a function of information availability. 
First, no significant associations were observed between any measure of rumination 
and performance on the modified Iowa gambling task (mIGT), nor were there group 
differences in play and pass patterns between the decks, irrespective of whether they are 
considered ‘good’ or ‘bad’, unlike the results presented in Chapter Three using the same 
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task. This contradiction cannot be explained by differences between the two samples, as 
pooling the relevant data from the present study and that detailed in Chapter Three 
revealed no differences between the samples in age, gender distribution, or on any of the 
shared self-report measures, and as such, demographic differences between the samples are 
unlikely to account for the disparity.  
Gender differences in rumination may provide a potential explanation for the 
inconsistency between the results presented here and those reported previously. Although 
there were no differences between men and women in each self-report measure, there are 
nuances in the data that may indicate a moderating effect of gender and as such, further 
analyses were carried out in order to account for the effect of gender.  
5.5 Post-hoc gender analysis 
In order to investigate the potential effect of gender, the mIGT data were submitted to 
multiple two-way ANOVAs. Examining percentage of bad plays revealed a marginally 
non-significant interaction between gender and low/high rumination group membership (as 
calculated by conducting median splits on overall RRS scores), F(1, 34) = 3.891, p = .057, 
η2 = .103. Investigation of this interaction revealed a significant effect in men only, t(9) = 
3.602, p = .006, such that those men who engage more frequently in rumination made 
fewer bad decisions (M = 52.05%, S.D. = 13.04%) than those who do not frequently 
engage in rumination (M = 73.59%, S.D. = 6.28%). 
For net IGT performance, analysis revealed a marginally non-significant interaction 
between gender and brooding group, F(1, 30) = 3.701, p = .063, η2 = .11. Investigating this 
interaction revealed no significant differences however, all ps > .106. 
Finally examining potential interactions between deck play frequencies, high/low 
group membership, and gender using mixed model ANOVA revealed a significant three-
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way interaction between deck, low/high RRS group membership, and gender, F(3, 102) = 
2.715, p = .049, η2 = .074. Further investigation revealed a significant interaction between 
gender and deck play frequencies in high frequency ruminators only, F(3, 48) = 3.595, p = 
.02, η2 = .183. A significant difference was observed between high frequency male 
ruminators and high frequency female ruminators in the frequency of which they took 
cards from deck B (one of the bad decks, see Chapter Two), t(16) = 3.933, p = .001. 
Specifically, men took significantly fewer cards from deck B (M = 47.93%, S.D. = 
14.24%) than women (M = 78.04%, S.D. = 14.65%). 
5.6 General Discussion 
Statistically, a reduction in power is necessarily observed with the inclusion of an 
additional factor and as such, the following conclusions are speculative. Post-hoc analyses 
revealed a marginally non-significant interaction between gender and low/high RRS group 
membership when examining the percentage of bad plays made. Exploring this interaction 
revealed that men with more frequent ruminations showed a reduction in the percentage of 
bad plays made compared to men with less frequent ruminations. Conversely, women with 
more frequent ruminations showed an increase in the percentage of bad plays made 
compared to women with less frequent ruminations, however, this comparison did not 
achieve significance. Similarly, for the net mIGT score, more frequent brooding-type 
ruminations resulted in an increase in net performance in men, whereas for women these 
resulted in a decrease in net performance. Results from the mixed model ANOVAs 
examining each deck corroborated these findings, suggesting that increasing the frequency 
of rumination (potentially driven by brooding-type ruminations) may be beneficial for men 
but detrimental to women. There is now an extensive literature documenting gender 
differences in the presentation of depression and depressive symptoms, such that females 
generally suffer more frequently from depression and present more symptoms than men 
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(Akhtar-Danesh & Landeen, 2007; Kessler, Mcgonagle, Swartz, Blazer, & Nelson, 1993; 
Kessler et al., 1994, 2003; Weissman, Bland, Joyce, Wells, & Wittchen, 1993). As noted, a 
number of studies have linked depression and rumination, many of which have also 
detailed gender differences in the presentation of rumination which mirror those observed 
in depression (Johnson & Whisman, 2013; Jose & Brown, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1999; Strauss, Muday, McNall, & Wong, 1997). In the context of the mIGT, good and bad 
plays may be conceptualised as non-risky and risky decisions respectively. Thus, the 
gender specific effects of rumination and their implications for adaptive theory may be 
interpreted with regard to the risk-taking literature and may offer an explanation for the 
inconsistency between the results presented here and those reported previously. 
There now exists a wealth of studies indicating that generally men take more risks 
than women (see Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999 & Cross, Copping, & Campbell, 2011 
for meta-analyses) which may be in part due to differences in punishment sensitivity 
(Moeller & Robinson, 2009) or reward sensitivity (Li, Huang, Lin, & Sun, 2007).  To date, 
only one study to our knowledge has been conducted to investigate the relationship 
between punishment and reward sensitivity, and rumination (Whitmer, Frank, & Gotlib, 
2012); the results of this study suggested that ruminative states increase reward sensitivity 
while simultaneously decreasing punishment sensitivity. Although Whitmer et al. (2012) 
were also interested in the concurrent effects of major depression, and as such also studied 
patient populations, their findings are partially corroborated and extended by the results of 
the present study. Specifically, decreases in punishment sensitivity in tandem with 
increases in reward sensitivity may explain the pattern of behaviour exhibited by female 
participants who experience more frequent ruminations. This explanation, however, cannot 
account for the pattern of results observed for male participants. By contrast, male 
participants who frequently ruminate show a marked decrease in the number of risky 
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decisions made which would suggest that punishment sensitivity increases and reward 
sensitivity decreases in male participants. Without further data, however, this remains 
speculative. 
Initial analysis of the game of dice task (GoDT) revealed a significant negative 
association between analytical rumination scores and participants’ final monetary total 
indicating that the more frequent analytical-type ruminators tended to lose more money 
during the game. Analytical ruminations, as described by Barbic et al. (2014), consist of a 
focus on the problem at hand, potential solutions, and a cost-benefit analysis of these 
potential solutions. As such, one would anticipate that individuals who frequently engage 
in analytical ruminations to outperform their low frequency counterparts in tasks requiring 
an element of cost-benefit analysis such as the GoDT where one can explicitly calculate 
the risks of each betting option. As noted, rumination may increase sensitivity to reward 
while decreasing sensitivity to punishment (Whitmer et al., 2012) and so while analytical 
rumination may improve cost-benefit analyses, it is possible that these analyses are 
conducted on biased information. Specifically, if an individual’s sensitivity to punishment 
is diminished, then the perceived risk of the decision is also reduced and as such may 
facilitate riskier decision making.  
Within the Stoplight task, one significant association emerged from the initial 
analysis such that the more frequent analytical-type ruminators had correspondingly 
shorter delays in engaging the brake of the car following the presentation of a yellow light. 
Furthermore, the median split analysis revealed a significant difference in brake 
application times between high and low frequency analytical ruminators, such that high 
frequency analytical ruminators were faster to apply the brake. Thus, once high frequency 
analytical ruminators had decided on a non-risky course of action they were faster at 
implementing their decision. The rapid nature at which a response is initiated may be 
116 
 
interpreted as a form of confidence, such that analytical ruminators are more confident in 
their decisions and so do not hesitate to implement them. To date several studies have 
linked elevated levels of rumination with indecision and decreased levels of confidence 
(Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; van Randenborgh, de Jong-Meyer, & 
Huffmeier, 2010; Ward, Lyubomirsky, Sousa, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003); however these 
studies have examined rumination related to dysphoria which is characterised as 
maladaptive rather than adaptive. More recently, Kingston, Watkins, and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(2014) demonstrated that relative to depressive rumination, engaging in concrete-thinking 
(that is, how to deal with a problem, rather than why a problem exists) resulted in greater 
confidence and assertiveness. Although concrete thinking is not explicitly described as a 
form of rumination, it shares many similarities with analytical-type ruminations, in that it 
is solution-focussed and takes account of all the details of a given scenario, presumably to 
undergo predictive processing.  
Predictive processing models refer to the process by which we are able to simulate 
reality in order to prepare for potential future events (Bendixen, SanMiguel, & Schröger, 
2012). Consequently, it is thought to play a key role in problem solving, as one may 
simulate the potential outcomes of any given solution to a problem and assess which 
outcome is most favourable to the individual. Early iterations of these models concerned 
with perception suggest that incoming sensory information is subject to top-down 
processing and combined with previous knowledge in order to make predictions about the 
world (Friston, 2005, 2009). More recently, Clark (2015) has suggested that such 
predictive processing is more radical than conservative; that is, the individual is more 
action-oriented in their predictions in order to reduce future prediction error by 
assimilating the consequences of their actions with previously held knowledge. Assuming 
concrete thinking and analytical rumination to be somewhat analogous, analytical 
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rumination may improve problem solving and decision making by not only focussing 
resources on solution generation but also by improving an individual’s confidence in their 
solutions, thereby increasing the likelihood of implementation. Following implementation, 
the individual may then process the outcomes of their solution in order to improve future 
predictive processing by confirming the effectiveness of the solution, or by preventing the 
recurrence of ineffective solutions. As such, ruminative processing may then become more 
efficient in the face of similar problems, either by being able to call upon a known 
effective solution or by being able to ignore previously ineffective solutions and dedicate 
cognitive resources more effectively to solution generation. To date, there has been no 
investigation of the link between predictive processing and rumination, however, and so 
this remains speculative. 
Although rumination is not explicitly discussed by Nettle (2009), the observations 
involving brooding, presented here and previously (see Chapter Three) compliment the 
theoretical model of the adaptiveness of low mood. Given the strong association between 
low mood and brooding, we suggest based on the present data that brooding may be the 
mechanism through which low mood may be considered adaptive in the model. As 
discussed previously, the model argues that as mood changes from normal to low levels, 
the number of risks taken diminishes as a function of the potential emotional costs of 
failure. Within the present data, transitioning from low levels of brooding to high levels 
resulted in a significant reduction in the number of risks taken in each task. Thus, it is 
possible that a reduction in the level of mood may facilitate increased frequency of 
brooding-type ruminations culminating in risk-averse behaviours. Unfortunately, however, 
the present data may only partially be applied to the model due to the absence of a 
depression group, and as such, it is impossible to tell whether increasing brooding to levels 
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such as those seen in patients, for example, would result in a reversion to risk-prone 
behaviours as predicted by the model. 
Finally, the cross task analysis revealed no significant differences between groups 
(i.e. low/high brooding, reflection etc.) in overall task performance in the mIGT, GoDT 
and Stoplight task, suggesting that any observed effects of rumination in each task are 
associated with risk in general and are not modulated by risk information availability. To 
the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to investigate differences in risky decision 
making between tasks where information regarding risk must either be learnt implicitly, is 
given explicitly, or is completely absent. When examining the percentage of good 
decisions made, participants made fewer good decisions in the Stoplight task (where 
information on the probability of a positive or negative outcome is completely absent) than 
in both the GoDT and mIGT which did not differ from each other, which suggests that 
even when information is not explicitly given regarding the risks, participants are still able 
to use this information to their advantage as opposed to making potentially random 
decisions. By contrast, when examining the percentage of bad decisions, participants made 
the fewest in the GoDT, followed by the Stoplight task and finally the mIGT. At first, this 
may appear to contradict the apparent effect of information availability observed with good 
decisions; however, as the mIGT requires implicit learning, it is necessary to make a 
number of bad decisions in order to determine which decks are ‘good’ decks to take cards 
from. Critically, rumination or low mood did not interact with any of these measures, 
suggesting that the effects of rumination and low mood do not vary with the availability of 
information regarding risk. Moreover, this also suggests that these effects are not domain 
specific and may represent a more general adaptive mechanism. 
The present study was subject to a number of limitations, however. Notably, BDI 
scores significantly differed from pre- to post-testing, such that scores were lower at post-
119 
 
test (indicating improvements in mood) than at pre-test, suggesting that state, rather than 
trait level low mood was being assessed. Whether state and trait low mood affect problem 
solving differentially is currently unknown, and as such it is difficult to determine in the 
present study whether the beneficial effects may be attributable to either state or trait 
mood. In both Chapters Three and Four, mood did not differ between pre- and post-testing 
and the results presented here support the effects reported in those studies, thus the 
differences between state and trait low mood, with respect to problem solving, may be 
negligible. Conversely, the effects of state and trait rumination remain largely unknown, 
and so further studies are required to systematically document potential differences 
between them. A second limitation pertains to the sample collected, specifically the gender 
imbalance. As discussed, there is a disparity in the presentation of depression and 
rumination, such that women more frequently experience depression and rumination than 
men; however, to our knowledge, no study to date has indicated that rumination may affect 
men and women differently. Though the present study provides an indication that 
rumination may have gender-specific effects, the relatively small number of men in the 
current sample makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions. As such, it is important for 
future studies to pursue this potential difference using adequate gender sampling, as this 
may have important clinical ramifications for patients and potential treatment plans. 
Critically, if rumination does indeed affect men and women differently, then it cannot be 
assumed that any treatment designed to alleviate distressing ruminations can be applied 
universally. 
One final consideration pertains to the relationship between performance on a 
laboratory-based gambling task and performance on a real-world gambling task, and 
whether performance in one is necessarily analogous to the other. Indeed, in laboratory-
based tasks, participants may potentially react to risk-based tasks differently as the 
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consequences of failed risk-taking are not as serious as in real-world gambling tasks, where 
a participant may potentially lose money. As such, behaviour in the laboratory could 
reflect a more relaxed approach to risk on behalf of the participant if they believe there are 
no tenable consequences to failure (Tierney & Hart, 2016). Studies that have incentivised 
performance by implying that a participant’s performance on a given gambling task (for 
example, the IGT) is linked to their compensation have found improved decision-making 
in these participants (Oswald et al., 2015; Vadhan, Hart, Haney, van Gorp, & Foltin, 2009). 
Future replications of this study should investigate the role of incentivising performance in 
order to determine its impact, and whether potential effects are dependent the prospect of 
incentive. 
5.7 Conclusion 
It has become increasingly clear that rumination’s involvement in risky decision making is 
still poorly understood; however the present study has provided evidence to suggest that 
again, contrary to the position of the wider literature, brooding rumination may indeed 
have a potential beneficial effect in regulating risky decisions. Furthermore, brooding 
rumination may down-regulate risky decisions in men, but up-regulate risky decisions in 
women. Why brooding rumination may affect men and women differentially is unclear 
from an adaptionist perspective, and as such requires further investigation to ensure this 
difference is a true difference; however, based on the present data, it appears the beneficial 
effects of rumination in risky decision making are not domain specific and does not differ 
based on the availability of risk information. 
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Chapter Six: An experimental investigation into the effects of mood induction on state 
rumination and problem solving ability 
6.1 Introduction 
It is now clear that rumination’s relationship with problem solving is increasingly complex, 
and as Chapters Three, Four, and Five have shown, rumination is not unilaterally negative 
for problem solving ability, or for executive functioning. One remaining question, 
however, pertains to potential differences in the effects exerted by state versus trait 
rumination. As noted in Chapter Five, the inconsistencies between the observations 
reported there and in Chapter Three may be attributed to this, although at present, there is 
limited evidence examining this issue. Until now, the studies detailed in this thesis have 
been concerned with trait rumination, that is, the propensity for an individual ruminate 
following a stressor. State rumination, on the other hand, is the act of ruminating itself in 
response to a stressor (Key, Campbell, Bacon, & Gerin, 2008). As such, it is possible at 
any time for low trait ruminators to have high levels of state rumination and similarly, high 
trait ruminators may have low levels of state rumination.  
More broadly the issue of state versus trait rumination has begun to receive a 
greater focus in recent years. LeMoult, Arditte, D’Avanzato, and Joormann (2013), for 
example, investigated the association between state rumination and emotional stress 
reactivity, finding that state rumination was uniquely related to difficulties in recovering 
from emotionally stressful events as compared to trait rumination. Additionally, state and 
not trait rumination predicted difficulty in disengaging from negative stimuli in dysphoric 
individuals. Similarly, Lewis, Taubitz, Duke, Steuer, and Larson (2015) found that state 
rumination was uniquely associated with elaborative processing (that is, enhanced and 
sustained processing) of negative material (e.g. negative-valence images) with trait 
rumination demonstrating no such relationship. These examples, along with a growing 
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number of other studies (e.g. Ciarocco, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2010; Key, Campbell, Bacon, 
& Gerin, 2008; Sanders & Lam, 2010) have begun to demonstrate differential effects of, 
and interactions between, state and trait rumination.  
The majority of studies to date have largely employed trait measures of rumination 
designed to identify an individual’s propensity to engage in rumination in a given situation; 
however one’s propensity to engage in rumination does not necessarily indicate their 
current levels of rumination, nor does heightened levels of trait rumination necessarily 
indicate that one’s state levels of rumination would be of a similar intensity. Indeed, as 
Moberly and Watkins (2008) note, measures such as the Response Styles Questionnaire 
(RSQ), commonly used to assess trait rumination, have been shown to vary in their test-
retest reliability, with correlation values ranging from above .6 (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994) to as low as .36 (Kasch, Klein, & Lara, 2001), 
and it may, therefore, be difficult to determine whether it is trait or state rumination that is 
being measured, thereby reducing the ability to attribute effects to either accurately. A 
further criticism relates to the retrospective nature of such measures, such that participants 
are sometimes asked to recall their ruminative experiences from weeks prior to testing 
which may be subject to biases or recall error. It is clear, therefore, that in order not only to 
delineate the individual contributions of state and trait rumination but also to clarify 
previous research involving measurement of rumination more generally, studies must 
endeavour to investigate rumination as a more dynamic construct. Moreover, to our 
knowledge, no study to date has explicitly investigated to what extent state rumination may 
depend on trait rumination. 
One potential method for investigating state rumination pertains to induction 
techniques designed to promote ruminative states in participants. Induction has seen 
widespread use in the affective literature as a means for dynamically altering a 
123 
 
participant’s mood, with a number of robust and reliable techniques available (e.g. Picture 
presentation: Bauer, Jordan, Soares, & Meyer, 2015; Farach, Treat, & Jungé, 2014; 
autobiographical scripts: Liotti, Mayberg, McGinnis, Brannan, & Jerabek, 2002; Nixon, 
Liddle, Nixon, & Liotti, 2013; sad memory focus: Prossin et al., 2015); however, 
rumination induction techniques are still in an emergent state. Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow (1993) originally investigated the effects of inducing a ruminative state versus a 
distracted state on levels of reported depression in moderately depressed and non-
depressed participants. For the rumination induction, participants were asked to focus on 
the meanings and causes of their current negative mood for eight minutes, whereas for the 
distraction induction participants were asked to focus on a number of statements that were 
not personally relevant. Although increases in depressed mood were observed for 
moderately depressed individuals only, it is difficult to determine whether increases in 
rumination were observed in never depressed individuals in the absence of any observable 
mood effects due to levels of rumination not being quantifiably measured. Thus, it is 
critical to ensure that induction techniques have had the desired effect by measuring 
rumination immediately following the induction of a given mood. Additionally, what is 
also unknown is how effective induction techniques may be in the face of varying levels of 
trait rumination. 
As noted, the literature examining the interaction between state rumination and 
problem solving ability is sparse with only one study to our knowledge having investigated 
this potential relationship. Watkins and Baracaia (2002) investigated whether inducing a 
ruminative state in never depressed, currently depressed, and recovered depressed 
participants would negatively impact social problem solving ability. Using a state 
induction procedure similar to Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993), depressed 
participants induced to ruminate were found to produce fewer solutions to the presented 
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problems and these solutions were rated as less effective compared to those generated by 
never depressed participants. Additionally, recovered depressed participants exhibited the 
same pattern of results as currently depressed participants. Thus it would appear that 
inducing a ruminative state may be detrimental to problem solving in those who are 
currently, or have been, depressed. However, like Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993), 
the levels of rumination experienced by participants post-induction were not measured, and 
so it is difficult to determine the precise effects of rumination at different levels, or whether 
different depressive states elicit different frequencies of rumination. Furthermore, without 
these measurements, there is no way of determining whether such an induction procedure 
promotes reflection or brooding differentially. As such, it is difficult to interpret the results 
of Watkins and Baracaia fully with respect to the adaptive rumination framework.  
As rumination induction procedures are still not well established and little is known 
about these procedures with regard to how they may influence rumination’s sub-
components (i.e. do they favour reflective or brooding components), the present study 
attempts to induce state rumination were conducted using an alternative mood induction. 
This is because the rumination hypothesis (Andrews & Thomson, 2009) predicts that 
rumination aids problem solving ability and that rumination is facilitated by low levels of 
mood, and so, by inducing a low mood state, it is thought that a ruminative state will also 
be induced; however, the type of ruminative state induced is unknown beforehand. Unlike 
previous studies where induced rumination may interact with pre-existing low mood and 
affect problem solving, the present study allows for the examination of the causal pathway 
predicted by the analytical rumination hypothesis by investigating within a population of 
healthy, never depressed participants. Thus, the present study aimed to investigate whether 
mood induction may provide a viable technique for the induction of state rumination. 
Moreover, by measuring rumination explicitly, we may begin to address the gap the in 
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literature with respect to whether induction techniques favour reflection, brooding, or both, 
and whether this may depend on baseline levels of mood. Subsequent to this, should mood 
induction prove a viable method, the effects of state rumination on problem solving ability 
will be investigated. In doing so, we may contrast the results here with those reported in 
previous chapters based on the examination of trait rumination. Due to the limited 
available evidence, no specific hypotheses were made with regard to the effect of state 
rumination on problem solving. 
6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the student body of Durham University. All participants 
reported no personal history of psychological or neurological disorder and indicated that 
they had not been taking any medications in the past six months that may affect the central 
nervous system. Three participants were removed from the analysis owing to BDI scores 
falling three standard deviations away from the mean. The final sample comprised 12 
males and 28 females, with a mean age of 21.08 years (S.D.: 2.67 years).  Participants were 
reimbursed with either course credit or a £5 voucher for an online retailer. The study 
protocol was approved by the Durham University Department of Psychology Ethics 
Committee. 
6.2.2 Trait Measures 
6.2.2.1 Beck depression inventory (BDI) 
The 20-item BDI reported acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α: .905). 
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6.2.2.2 Ruminative response scale (RRS) 
The full RRS reported an acceptable internal consistency at (Cronbach’s α: .869). Internal 
consistency for the reflection subscale was also acceptable (Cronbach’s α: .793); however, 
the brooding subscale reported poorer internal consistency (Cronbach’s α: .556). 
6.2.2.3 Analytical rumination questionnaire (ARQ) 
The internal consistency of the ARQ was acceptable (Cronbach’s α: .924). 
6.2.3 State Measures 
In order to assess state levels of rumination, the RRS and ARQ were modified to instruct 
participants to complete the measures with regard to how they were thinking about the 
statements at that moment. The state versions of the RRS and ARQ were administered pre- 
and post-mood induction and both reported acceptable internal consistencies at pre- (RRS: 
Cronbach’s α: .952; ARQ: Cronbach’s α: .965) and post-mood induction (RRS: 
Cronbach’s α: .949; ARQ: Cronbach’s α: .96). Brooding and reflection sub-scales also 
reported acceptable internal consistencies at pre- (Brooding: Cronbach’s α: .806; 
Reflection: Cronbach’s α: .893) and post-induction (Brooding: Cronbach’s α: .788; 
Reflection: Cronbach’s α: .905). 
In order to assess state mood, the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was also administered at pre- and post-induction. The 
PANAS consists of two 10-item scales designed to assess positive (PA) and negative affect 
(NA). Participants are required to rate the extent to which they have experienced an 
emotion within a given time frame on a 5-point scale, ranging from 1 (Slightly or not at 
all) to 5 (Very much). Both scales have a maximum score of 50 respectively. High PA 
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scores indicate that participants are experiencing high levels of positive mood, whereas 
high NA levels indicate that participants are experiencing highly negative mood. Reported 
internal consistencies were acceptable at both time points (Cronbach’s α: .896 & .81, pre- 
and post- respectively). 
6.2.4 Mood Induction 
Negative mood was induced using a procedure similar to that described in study two of 
Pickett, Gardner, and Knowles (2004). As the present study was not concerned with 
differences between types of negative affect, only that negative affect was induced, only 
one type of negative induction was employed. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two induction groups: negative or neutral. In the neutral induction condition, 
participants were asked to recall and write down in as much detail as possible their journey 
to the testing session that day for between five and eight minutes. In the negative induction 
condition, participants were asked to recall and write down in as much detail as possible a 
memory in which they felt an intense sadness, for between five and eight minutes. 
There are a number of ethical concerns with regard to the induction of a transient 
negative mood state. For instance, care should be taken not to include participants with a 
history of mental health disorder, as the stress and anxiety which may be induced along 
with the sad mood may persist or be more resistant to modification. As such, all 
participants were screened for pre-existing mental health conditions prior to taking part in 
the study and were excluded if they reported a pre-existing mental health condition. 
Furthermore, participants were encouraged to bring materials with them (either music or 
videos) which they use to improve their mood when they experience low mood in their 
daily lives. Following completion of the study, participants used these materials until they 
had returned to pre-induction levels of mood. As in previous studies, all participants were 
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provided with contact information for services both within the university and from external 
organisations who provide support for individuals experiencing emotional distress. 
6.2.5 Tasks 
6.2.5.1 Modified Iowa gambling task (mIGT) 
The mIGT, as described by Cauffman et al. (2010), was administered. Please see Chapter 
Three (pp. 52-53), for a full description of the task and calculation of outcome measures. 
6.2.5.2 Modified prisoner’s dilemma procedure (mPDP) 
The mPDP as described in Chapter Three was administered. Please see pages 51 and 52 for 
a full task description. 
6.2.6 Procedure 
Recruitment was conducted primarily through the use of online advertisements within the 
University and through word of mouth. Prior to arrival, participants were contacted to 
confirm that they did not meet any of the exclusion criteria. Testing was conducted in two 
labs across two campuses of the University. Before beginning the testing session, all 
participants were provided with written and verbal explanations of what would happen 
during the testing session and given assurances regarding confidentiality of participation. 
Finally, all participants gave full written consent. 
Participants first completed the BDI and trait versions of the RRS and ARQ, all 
administered in a random order. Participants then completed state versions of the RRS and 
ARQ, in addition to the PANAS in order to measure baseline levels of rumination and 
mood. State measures were also administered in a random order. Following completion of 
the initial state measures, participants then completed the induction procedure. Participants 
were then asked to complete a second set of the state measures to assess whether the 
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induction procedure worked as anticipated. Finally, participants completed the mIGT and 
mPDP in a random order before being debriefed and compensated for their time. 
6.2.6 Data analysis 
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 6.1. Neutral and negative mood-induction groups 
were compared at baseline to determine whether there were any differences in mood and 
rumination prior to the induction procedure. Pre- and post-induction mood and rumination 
scores were compared within and between both groups to ensure the induction procedure 
had the desired effect, and that any observed changes in mood and rumination between 
groups were qualitatively different. Both groups were then compared on each outcome 
measure for the mPDP and the mIGT. Finally, in order to assess the direct and indirect 
effects of low mood on ability in the mPDP and mIGT, mediation models were computed 
using state reflection, brooding, and ARQ scores as mediators, state mood as an 
independent variable, task outcome as a dependent variable. For further details on the 
calculation of mediation models, please see Chapter Three (p. 56). Unless otherwise stated, 
all post-hoc analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni-Holm 
method (Holm, 1979). Moreover, results from the following analyses should be interpreted 
with caution given the relatively small sample size. 
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics for each trait measure under investigation for both neutral 
and negative mood induction groups 
 Neutral induction group  Negative induction group 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
BDI 4.13 4.12  10.11 8.64 
RRS 37.75 8.19  38.78 10.23 
RRS-R 9.88 4.29  8.00 2.18 
RRS-B 8.00 1.85  8.56 2.46 
ARQ 64.00 18.11  69.44 14.90 
Note: BDI = Beck Depression Inventory, RRS = Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-R = 
Reflection subscale of the Ruminative Response Scale, RRS-B = Brooding subscale of the 
Ruminative Response Scale, ARQ = Analytical Rumination Questionnaire 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Demographic data 
Both neutral and negative mood-induction groups differed significantly in baseline levels 
of depression, U(15) = 15.5, p = .047, such that the negative induction group had 
significantly higher BDI scores (M = 10.11) than the neutral induction group (M = 4.13) at 
baseline. No significant differences were observed in either baseline levels of overall trait 
rumination (as measured by the RRS), reflective, brooding, or analytical rumination, all ps 
> .29. 
6.3.2 Mood induction validation 
Given the significant difference in baseline levels of depressed mood, BDI scores were 
used as a covariate when assessing the effectiveness of the mood induction and all 
subsequent analyses.  
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Unadjusted descriptive statistics for all state measures pre- and post-induction are 
given in Table 6.2. Mixed-model ANCOVA on the scores from the PA scale of the 
PANAS revealed no significant main effects of induction group (negative or neutral), time 
point (pre- and post-induction scores), nor was there a significant interaction between the 
two, all ps > .264. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for each state measure under investigation for both 
neutral and negative mood induction groups pre- and post-induction procedure 
 Neutral induction group  Negative induction group 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
PA T1 31.63 8.23  25.33 6.40 
PA T2 30.13 11.81  19.00 7.65 
NA T1 13.75 3.33  17.44 8.28 
NA T2 10.88 .99  20.56 7.42 
RRS T1 32.5 10.27  36.11 16.83 
RRS T2 29.13 6.33  42.89 17.27 
RRS-R T1 9.13 4.22  7.22 3.90 
RRS-R T2 8.5 4.18  8.56 4.67 
RRS-B T1 7.13 2.70  7.67 3.39 
RRS-B T2 6.00 1.31  8.56 3.84 
ARQ T1 54.75 20.71  52.33 26.19 
ARQ T2 56.00 23.25  62.67 18.24 
Note: T1 = Pre-induction, T2 = Post-induction, PA = Positive Affect scale of the Positive 
Affect and Negative Affect Schedule, NA = Negative Affect scale of the Positive Affect and 
Negative Affect Schedule. 
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For NA scale scores, there was a significant interaction between induction group 
(negative or neutral) and time point (pre- and post-induction scores) after controlling for 
baseline BDI scores, F(1,14) = 25.31, p < .001, η2 = .644. Paired samples t-tests revealed 
that in the neutral mood-induction group, state negative affect decreased significantly from 
pre-induction (M = 16.08) to post-induction (M = 12.72),  t(7) = 3.37, p = .012. In the 
negative mood-induction group, negative affect scores increased significantly from pre-
induction (M = 15.37) to post-induction (M= 18.92), t(8) = -3.18, p = .013. Moreover, the 
negative mood-induction group also demonstrated a significant decrease in positive affect 
from pre- (M = 25.33) to post-induction (M = 19), t(8) = 4.15, p = .003. 
6.3.2.1 Induction effects on rumination 
In order to investigate whether the mood induction procedure affected state rumination 
levels, pre- and post-induction levels of rumination were compared within and between 
each group.  
For RRS scores, a significant interaction between group and time point was 
observed, F(1,14) = 25.65, p < .001, η2 = .596, such that state RRS scores significantly 
increased in the negative mood-induction group between pre- (M = 36.11) and post-
induction (M = 42.89), t(8) = -6.448, p < .001. State RRS scores did not differ significantly 
in the neutral mood-induction group, p = .103. Comparing neutral and negative mood-
induction groups on pre- and post-induction RRS scores revealed significant differences in 
post-induction RRS scores, t(10.34) = -2.23, p = .049, such that the negative mood-
induction group had significantly higher levels of rumination (M = 42.89) than the neutral 
mood-induction group (M = 29.13); however this comparison did not survive correction. 
For reflection sub-scale scores, a significant interaction between group and time 
point was observed, F(1,14) = 10.84, p = .005, η2 = .436, such that levels of reflective 
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rumination increased significantly between pre- (M = 7.22) and post-induction (M = 8.56) 
in the negative mood-induction group only, t(8) = -3.58, p = .007. Comparing neutral and 
negative mood-induction groups on pre- and post-induction reflection scores revealed no 
significant differences between the groups, all ps > .349. 
For brooding sub-scale scores, a significant interaction between group and time 
point was observed, F(1,14) = 4.8, p = .046, η2 = .255; however no post-hoc test returned 
significance, all ps > .09. Comparing neutral and negative mood-induction groups on pre- 
and post-induction brooding scores revealed no significant differences between the groups, 
all ps > .09. 
For ARQ scores, a significant interaction between group and time point was 
observed, F(1,14) = 8.53,  p = .011, η2 = .379; however a significant interaction between 
time point and the covariate BDI, F(1,14) = 6.61, p = .022, η2 = .321, suggesting that the 
regression slopes for pre- and post-induction ARQ scores vary with the level of pre-
existing low mood, as measured by the BDI. Comparing neutral and negative mood-
induction groups on pre- and post-induction ARQ scores revealed no significant 
differences between the groups, all ps > .518. 
6.3.3 mPDP analysis 
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 6.3. Comparing negative and neutral mood-
induction groups on each mPDP outcome measure revealed no significant differences 
between either group, all ps > .623 
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Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics for each mPDP outcome variable for both neutral and 
negative mood induction groups 
 Neutral induction  Negative induction 
 Mean S.D. Range  Mean S.D. Range 
Individual score 156.00 19.30 130 - 188  163.78 26.50 120 - 216 
Opponent score -31.00 167.10 -260 - 260  89.33 198.84 -160 - 340 
Task score 187.00 174.50 -130 - 400  74.44 199.91 -160 - 314 
 
6.3.4 mIGT analysis 
Descriptive statistics for overall task measures and for individual decks are given in Tables 
6.4 and 6.5 respectively. First, independent samples t-tests conducted to examine the 
overall task outcomes (as described in Chapter Three, pp. 52-53), revealed no significant 
differences between neutral and negative mood-induction groups, all ps > .543. 
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Table 6.4: Descriptive statistics for task percentage variables calculated for the mIGT for 
both neutral and negative mood induction groups 
 Neutral induction  Negative induction 
 Mean S.D. Range  Mean S.D. Range 
Percentage good 
plays 
 
84.70 
 
13.87 
 
55.56 - 96.55 
  
88.27 
 
9.59 
 
74.6 - 100 
Percentage bad 
plays 
 
60.84 
 
11.38 
 
36.96 - 74.14 
  
64.61 
 
19.16 
 
28.57 - 87.27 
 
Net task score 
 
23.86 
 
16.88 
 
-9.52 – 44.12 
  
23.65 
 
24.86 
 
-6.10 – 71.43 
 
Next, differences in play and pass patterns between each deck were examined as a 
function of group membership using mixed model ANCOVA. A significant group by deck 
interaction emerged, F(3, 42) = 2.93, p = .044, η2 = .379. Post-hoc analyses using one-way 
ANCOVA revealed a significant difference between the neutral and negative mood-
induction groups in the frequency of which participants took cards from deck A 
(considered one of the ‘bad’, net loss decks), F(3, 42) = 6.86, p = .02, η2 = .329, such that 
those in the negative mood-induction group took cards significantly more often (M = 
66.84%) than those in the neutral mood-induction group (M = 51.19%). However, the 
covariate term also returned significance, F(3, 42) = 8.94, p = .01, η2 = .39, again 
suggesting the regression slopes for the frequency at which participants took cards from 
deck A differs at different levels of BDI score. 
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Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for play and pass percentages of each deck from the mIGT 
for both neutral and negative mood induction groups 
 Neutral induction  Negative induction 
 Mean S.D.  Mean S.D. 
Deck A Play 74.61  
21.73 
 62.32  
25.38 
Deck A Pass 25.39  37.68 
Deck B Play 94.86  
6.59 
 91.30  
9.90 
Deck B Pass 5.14  8.70 
Deck C Play 51.19  
24.08 
 66.84  
28.35 
Deck C Pass 48.81  33.16 
Deck D Play 73.28  
30.02 
 85.09  
13.72 
Deck D Pass 26.72  14.91 
Note: Standard deviations are given for play and pass pairs for each deck 
6.3.5 Mediation Analysis 
Mediation analysis revealed only one significant mediation model for mPDP 
scores. State reflection, brooding, and ARQ scores did not significantly predict mPDP task 
scores (all ps > .148). Moreover, no significant indirect effects were observed through any 
mediating variable; however a significant direct effect of state negative mood was 
observed, β = 14.81, p = .016, suggesting that increased state negative mood positively 
predicts ability in the mPDP. 
6.4 Discussion 
The present study details a preliminary investigation into the effects of mood induction on 
state rumination, and subsequently the effects on ability in two previously used tasks using 
different problem solving styles. Moreover, the present study sought to determine whether 
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using mood induction exerts different effects on state reflection, brooding, and analytical 
rumination. Initial results suggest that mood induction may indeed be an effective means of 
inducing changes in state levels of rumination and that these changes may be driven by 
alterations in state frequency of reflection. Although preliminary, the available data may 
also give insights into how these changes in levels of rumination impact decision making 
in the mPDP and the mIGT, though given the small sample these conclusions should be 
treated as speculative. 
As reported in Chapter Three, levels of reflective rumination were positively 
associated with the participant’s individual score when playing the game (that is, the 
number of points the participants actively awarded themselves) which may be a result of 
reflective ruminations function of focussing an individual’s thought processes on the self. 
Thus, this focus on the self may be reflected in making decisions that benefit the 
individual, thereby resulting in higher individual scores. In the present study, participants 
who underwent negative mood induction did have greater individual scores, although they 
did not differ significantly from the neutral mood-induction group. Though power is a 
primary concern when dealing with small sample sizes, one potential explanation for the 
absence of a significant difference may be due to an absence of differences in reflective 
rumination. Indeed, the negative mood-induction group did show a significant increase in 
reflective rumination indicating that the mood induction was successful in facilitating 
reflective rumination; however the neutral mood-induction group did not differ in levels of 
state reflective rumination from the negative mood-induction group following the 
induction procedure, suggesting that although reflective rumination was induced, it was not 
enough to significantly differ from the neutral mood-induction group. Thus, if reflective 
rumination has exerted similar effects in both groups, then it follows that the two groups 
would not differ in their independent scores. 
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Regarding the results for the mPDP task, the lack of a significant difference in 
opponent scores (that is, the score which the participant has determined for the computer) 
between the neutral and negative mood-induction groups may be indicative of an absence 
of anxious ruminations in the negative mood-induction group or elevated levels of anxious 
ruminations in the neutral mood-induction group, given that frequency of anxious 
ruminations has been associated with lower opponent scores previously (see Chapter 
Three). In the present sample, the latter explanation appears unlikely as the neutral mood-
induction group experienced a significant decrease in negative affect, in addition to 
experiencing no significant changes in any rumination measure. Thus it is possible that the 
negative mood-induction group’s ruminations did not contain an anxious component. 
Anxious-type ruminations are still poorly understood and at present, it is difficult to 
conceptualise how they may be incorporated in to the adaptive framework without further 
study. That anxious ruminations were not measured, and that participants were not directed 
to the type of memory they recalled, only that they encompassed sadness, makes it difficult 
to draw firm conclusions regarding this result. 
Regarding the mIGT, a significant group interaction emerged which conflicts with 
previous findings. Examining the individual decks for play and pass patterns, participants 
who underwent negative mood induction took cards from deck A more frequently than the 
neutral mood-induction group. As detailed in Chapter Three (pp. 52-53), deck A is 
conceptualised as a bad deck due to the net loss accrued by continually taking cards over 
the course of ten trials. Based on our previous findings we would expect individuals with 
elevated levels of rumination to take fewer risks, and therefore take cards less frequently 
from a bad deck. Indeed, even though deck A pays out 50% of the time, which is frequent 
enough to make the deck appear to be a good option, it also penalises 50% of the time and 
so for individuals who may have heightened punishment sensitivity, it is reasonable to 
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predict that they would on average take cards less frequently; however this is not the case. 
One explanation lies in the potential interaction between state rumination and trait 
measures of mood and rumination. The significant covariate interaction indicated that the 
effects were not uniform across baseline levels of mood, and as such, the effect of state 
rumination may have varied also depending on baseline mood. Indeed, it is possible that 
the beneficial effects of induced rumination may only occur in those who already have low 
levels of mood to begin with, and that those who have normal levels of mood remain 
unaffected. Thus, if a large enough portion of the sample began below this low mood 
threshold, then it stands to reason that rumination may not be able to exert its potential 
benefits in spite of being induced. To our knowledge no study to date as examined how the 
effects of state rumination may depend on trait mood, and unfortunately the present sample 
is too small to be able to draw any conclusions based on the available data. In order to fully 
address this, a replication of the present study utilising a priori groups based on baseline 
mood, organised into ‘normal’, ‘low’ and ‘extreme’ groups, could be conducted. 
Consequently, one may observe the effect of induced rumination as a function of baseline 
mood. 
The results from the mediation analysis indicated that no mediation effects 
occurred, with only a significant main effect of state negative mood on mPDP scores being 
observed, such that as state negative mood scores increased (i.e. state mood worsened) so 
too did scores on the mPDP task. The absence of mediation effects would appear to run 
contrary the predictions made by the analytical rumination hypothesis; however, as noted, 
with the mPDP anxious ruminations may play a more prominent role than other types of 
rumination in problem solving tasks which involve a form of social component (i.e. 
interacting with an opponent). In the absence of these measurements, this is difficult to 
determine. A second explanation pertains to the differential involvement of state and trait 
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rumination depending on the task used. Indeed, the absence of mediation effects in the 
present study contrasts with those reported in Chapter Three; however it is important to 
note that the present study used state measures whereas the study reported in Chapter 
Three used only trait measures. As such, it is possible that trait rumination may act as a 
mediator, as opposed to state rumination. This could be due to trait rumination being 
measured as the propensity to ruminate following a stressor, as opposed to the frequency of 
rumination at that point. This may more be more appropriate as the mPDP mimics social-
type interactions and from a problem solving perspective, may be viewed as a more 
chronic type of problem. Thus, the propensity to ruminate over time may be more related 
to such problems than any state measurement. 
To the author’s knowledge these preliminary findings are the first to give an 
indication that mood induction techniques may be a suitable method for manipulating state 
frequency of rumination, and as such, may offer a viable alternative for investigating the 
effects of state rumination in the absence of reliable rumination induction procedures. It is 
important, however, to note the limitations of this method and steps should be taken to 
improve or modify the procedure. First, while changes in rumination were observed, these 
changes were not specific to any one type of rumination and were more general in nature. 
Indeed, where one may be interested in the general effects of an increase in rumination 
then this is of no concern; however, in the face of growing evidence that rumination’s sub-
components may exert differential effcts (e.g. Arditte & Joormann, 2011; Hasegawa et al., 
2016; Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006; Whiteman & Mangels, 2016; see also Chapter 
Three), it is critical that induction techniques become more targeted in order to evaluate 
each component’s individual effect. With respect to the present method, the instructions 
given to participants asked for no specific type of memory other than one in which the 
recalled a feeling of intense sadness, and as such, participants could recall memories of 
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variable thematic content. Blagov and Singer (2004), for example, found that levels of 
distress experienced by participants recalling a self-defined memory varied as a function of 
thematic content. Moreover, within negatively valenced memories, distress varied 
depending on the content of the memory. As such, if levels of distress vary as a function of 
thematic content, it is possible that rumination may also vary, not only in frequency but 
also in type. For example, memories which may involve an element of threat may induce 
more anxious-type ruminations, whereas memories involving loss may induce more 
brooding-type ruminations. Thus, future studies employing a similar methodology should 
experiment with the specificity of the instructions regarding the type of memory which is 
recalled and how this may affect the frequency of different types of rumination. 
One potential problem with the present study pertains to the measures used to 
assess state rumination. To the author’s knowledge, there are currently no validated state 
measures of rumination, nor have there been efforts to develop one, and so previous 
investigations into state rumination have relied predominantly on the effectiveness of their 
induction techniques without measurement. The measures used here were modifications of 
established quesitonnaires, where instructions, both written and verbal, emphasised the 
importance of answering the questions with respect to the here and now, as opposed to in 
general. One criticism may be, therefore, that in spite of the altered instructions 
participants may still have answered the state measures in a similar manner to the trait 
measures. This is particularly critical if trait measures did not differ from state measures 
taken post-induction for those in the negative mood-induction group, as it is then difficult 
to be sure that the induction has worked, and indeed whether we are acrtually measuring 
state as opposed to trait rumination. This would then not only shed doubt upon the validity 
of the state measures but also that of the trait measures. Specifically, trait measures are 
thought of as relatively stable, and so, if the state measures are not different from the trait 
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versions and differences are observed in these measure pre- and post-induction, the validity 
of the trait measure is also called into question. Post-hoc analyses comparing trait scores 
with with state scores revealed mixed results, with some differences observed between 
state and trait measures for neutral mood-induction group participants only. As one of the 
groups demonstrated a difference between state and trait measures where the other did not, 
there remains the possibility that the instructions were interpreted differently by one group, 
resulting in the absence of a difference. Specifically in this scenario, if the group 
completed both sets of measures as if they were both trait or both state then it follows that 
no differences would be observed in the scores. Equally, there may exist a high correlation 
between state and trait rumination and so observing a difference between state and trait 
rumination may be unlikely if a particular group has a propensity to frequently engage in 
rumination to begin with. However, in such a group, it follows that one may be unlikely to 
observe differences in state rumination pre- and post-induction if they are already likely to 
be engaging in rumination based on their trait scores. This latter explanation seems 
unlikely, as significant increases in rumination were observed in the negative mood-
induction group. Moreover, the two mood-induction groups did not differ in baseline levels 
of rumination, allowing for the attribution of the increase to the induction technique. Such 
an observation necessarily requires caution in interpreting the other results reported here, 
but more importantly highlights the need for better measures of state rumination so we may 
dlineate the effects of state and trait rumination should they exist. 
6.5 Conclusion 
The present study provides preliminary evidence that the recall of autobiographical 
memories can be used as an effective means of inducing changes in state rumination. The 
data from the current study suggests that state rumination may have an impact on problem 
solving ability which contrasts but also complements previous observations using trait 
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measures. Indeed, it would appear that entering a low mood state assists with problem 
solving; however, this seems to be a generalised process, as the induced low mood had no 
relation to the tasks with regards to content. Moreover, mediation analyses suggest that the 
causal pathway proposed by the analytical rumination hypothesis may be dependent on 
whether state or trait rumination is examined. While the conclusions made here should be 
treated with an element of caution given the small sample size, it is becoming more evident 
that rumination should be treated as a dynamic and malleable construct and future studies 
should strive not only to include this view of rumination but also to develop better means 
for inducing and measuring state rumination. 
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Chapter Seven: General Discussion 
The initial aim of this thesis was to investigate whether rumination may be associated with 
improvements in problem solving ability, and investigate the relative contributions of 
reflection and brooding to the process, thereby providing evidence that rumination should 
be viewed as a continuum which exhibits differential effects as one moves from healthy to 
clinical presentations. Critically, it may be the relative balance of reflection and brooding 
which characterises whether rumination is an adaptive function or not. In trying to achieve 
this aim, it was hoped that such evidence may encourage the development of new research 
questions which do not approach rumination as a universally maladaptive construct, but 
rather as a potentially functional mechanism. 
Results from the initial study (Chapter Three) suggest that rumination and low mood 
may have functional benefits at non-clinical levels in social-style and risk-reward problem 
solving tasks, a conclusion that conflicts with previously held accounts of rumination being 
detrimental. Initial results also indicated that there were no associations between rumination 
and abstract problem solving, as measured with the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices 
(RAPM), suggesting that the potential functional mechanism of rumination may be domain-
specific, requiring problem solving scenarios similar to those encountered in the 
evolutionary past. Nevertheless, a recent study examining rumination and performance on 
the RAPM did in fact observe an inverted U-shaped relationship between trait rumination 
and performance on the RAPM (Hubbard et al., 2015), such that when trait rumination was 
low or high, performance on the RAPM was much better as compared to medium levels of 
trait rumination. This suggests that trait rumination may be somewhat conducive to general 
problem solving. While these findings may initially seem contrary, they are not necessarily 
incompatible. Indeed, while evolutionarily relevant stimuli have been shown to elicit clearer 
effects (e.g. Jackson & Calvillo, 2013; New, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2007), this does not 
145 
 
preclude the ability to observe effects in non-evolutionarily relevant tasks or stimuli; 
suggesting that evolutionarily relevant tasks may increase the likelihood of observing an 
effect. For example, Simpson et al. (2015) found that infant macaques were highly adept at 
discriminating adult macaque faces despite having little to no experience with adult 
macaques. As adult conspecifics pose a potential threat to infant macaques, it is more 
important for them to be able to discriminate between adults in order to recognise potential 
threats. Moreover, infants were better able to discriminate adult faces as compared to other 
infant macaque faces and human infant faces, and this effect was larger than the 
discrimination between macaque and human infant faces. This is critical as other infant 
macaques and human infants pose no threat; however infant macaques were better able to 
discriminate other infant macaques from human infants. As such, this suggests that 
macaques are still able to discriminate non-evolutionarily relevant stimuli, yet the effects are 
larger for evolutionarily relevant stimuli. With respect to the RAPM data, the absence of any 
observable effects suggests that the effect of rumination on general problem solving is 
smaller than that observed for other tasks, and therefore may require larger samples to detect, 
as evidenced by Hubbard et al. (2015).  
A further aim of this thesis was to better understand the ruminative sub-components 
of reflection and brooding (Joormann et al., 2006; Treynor et al., 2003; Whitmer & Gotlib, 
2011) and how they may be integrated into the adaptive framework proposed by the 
analytical rumination hypothesis. Originally conceived as adaptive and maladaptive 
respectively, it was initially hypothesised that reflection would exhibit positive 
associations with problem solving ability, whereas brooding would exhibit negative 
associations with problem solving ability. While reflection conformed to our predictions, 
brooding was found to be positively associated with risk-reward problem solving in a 
unique manner, such that individuals who more frequently engaged in brooding-type 
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rumination were less likely to take cards from a disadvantageous deck in the modified 
Iowa gambling task in which it was not clear that this was a disadvantageous deck. As 
such, this suggests that brooding may not be entirely maladaptive and may, in fact, elevate 
punishment sensitivity such that brooders were better able to recognise the 
disadvantageous deck. Critically, this is to our knowledge the first demonstration of 
brooding as a potentially adaptive force, conflicting with previous reports describing 
brooding as destructive (e.g. Chan, Miranda, & Surrence, 2009; Koval, Kuppens, Allen, & 
Sheeber, 2012; Polanco-Roman, Jurska, Quiñones, & Miranda, 2015).  
As discussed in Chapter Four, brooding may functionally alter an individual’s 
punishment and reward sensitivity, thereby altering their decision-making and subsequent 
problem solving. More recent evidence has begun to emerge which supports this 
explanation and suggests that this phenomenon is not limited to risk-reward scenarios. For 
example, Hasegawa et al. (2016) investigated the relationship between trait reflection, 
brooding, and social problem solving ability as measured by the Means-Ends Problem 
Solving test (MEPS), reporting that brooding was associated with cognitive and 
behavioural responses that attempt to avoid negative consequences. Much like the aversion 
to the bad decks in the mIGT, attempts to avoid negative consequences in the MEPS may 
be interpreted as the result of elevated punishment sensitivity. Similarly, rejection concerns 
and submissive interpersonal style have been associated with elevated brooding levels 
(Pearson, Watkins, Mullan, & Moberly, 2010), where submissive behaviours indicate an 
effort to avoid social reprisal from peers. Moreover, examples from the clinical literature 
have linked elevated levels of brooding with avoidant personality disorder (van Rijsbergen, 
Kok, Elgersma, Hollon, & Bockting, 2015), a disorder characterised by fears of rejection, 
criticism, and disapproval (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), which may be 
considered forms of social punishment, and thus brooding in this pathological context may 
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underpin these fears as a result of abnormal punishment sensitivity. Taken together, these 
observations support the idea of brooding as a risk aversion mechanism that becomes 
dysfunctional at extreme levels. The precise functional mechanism, however, remains 
unknown, such that individuals who engage more frequently in brooding-type rumination 
may either be more sensitive to actual risks, and thus, more accurate at identifying them; or 
may be more likely to overinterpret risk, such that they identify situations as risky 
irrespective of their objective risk levels. 
The apparent role of brooding as a risk aversion mechanism has important 
implications for current adaptive theory. As Andrews and Thomson (2009) argue, 
rumination may be an adaptive mechanism to assist in solving complex problems 
encountered in our environment. Ancestrally, environments were subject to frequent 
changes, and thus, once safe behaviours may no longer be safe and may incur significant 
fitness costs. Therefore, in such scenarios, one must re-evaluate their behaviours with 
respect to the new environment. In the analytical rumination account, low mood serves 
both as an involuntary brake in order to discourage action in the new environment, and as a 
mechanism for the reallocation of cognitive resources for the purposes of rumination and 
subsequent problem solving. Expanding on this model, it is argued that the two ruminative 
sub-components subserve these two proposed mechanisms. The reflective sub-component 
is already largely considered to be adaptive in some respect (e.g. Hasegawa et al., 2016; 
Joormann et al., 2006; Treynor et al., 2003; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2011) and may well be 
related to problem solving, either by enhancing an individual’s ability to problem solve or 
by encouraging an individual to actively engage with a given problem. Thus, in the 
analytical rumination account, reflection may comprise the mechanism by which cognitive 
resources are reallocated. Similarly, brooding has been largely characterised as 
maladaptive (e.g Joormann et al., 2006; Koval et al., 2012; Moberly & Watkins, 2008; 
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Treynor et al., 2003; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2011; Willem, Bijttebier, Claes, & Raes, 2011); 
however, in the face of evidence that brooding may serve a risk aversion function, within 
the analytical rumination framework brooding may be a likely candidate for the supposed 
brake mechanism. Indeed, when considering the evolutionary environment as proposed by 
the analytical rumination hypothesis, taking action in a frequently changing environment 
represents a risky behaviour as one does not know if a previously safe behaviour is viable 
in the new environment. As such, elevated brooding may promote risk aversion, resulting 
initially in inaction; however, as cognitive resources are reallocated via reflective 
rumination, analysis of the new environment with a view to determining which behaviours 
are safe and which are not takes place. Once this has been determined, low mood alleviates 
as rumination is no longer required, and the individual begins to engage once more with 
the environment. 
In conceptualising reflection and brooding as mechanisms through which risky 
behaviours are discouraged and safer behaviours encouraged, dysfunctional brooding may 
offer a potential explanation for the persistence of depressive symptoms, particularly if one 
considers the implementation of a developed solution as a risk, given that the effectiveness 
of said solution is unknown. Thus, problem solving may be impaired in depressed 
individuals due to an unwillingness to implement any solution they may develop as a result 
of altered reward and punishment sensitivity. A multitude of studies have documented 
diminished problem solving ability in depression patients (e.g. Gotlib & Asarnow, 1979; 
Heppner, Baumgardner, & Jackson, 1985; Marx, Williams, & Claridge, 1992; Nezu, 1985, 
1986), while other studies report associations between elevated levels of brooding and 
severity of depressive symptoms (Armey et al., 2009; Burwell & Shirk, 2007; Koval et al., 
2012; Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Olatunji, Naragon-Gainey, & Wolitzky-Taylor, 2013) 
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and elevated levels of brooding in patients compared to healthy controls (Hamilton et al., 
2011; Joormann et al., 2006; Lo, Ho, & Hollon, 2008).  
As noted, there are two potential mechanisms through which brooding may be 
functional: either by elevating risk sensitivity or by making individuals more risk averse 
generally. However, these two mechanisms may represent two points on a continuum, such 
that at lower levels of brooding individuals may be more sensitive to risks while their 
responses to non-risky scenarios remain unaffected. However, as the frequency of 
brooding increases, so too does risk sensitivity, eventually resulting in a more general risk 
aversion as individuals become hypersensitive to risk. Consequently, such a mechanism 
may maintain depressive symptoms s a result of extreme hypersensitivity leading to an 
interpretation bias, such that individuals begin to interpret non-risky scenarios as risky and 
therefore cease to engage with the triggering problem as they begin to view relatively safe 
behaviours as risky. 
At present, there is little in the way of direct investigations into the association 
between brooding and risk aversion, with the majority of studies instead examining risk 
aversion in relation to depression. The available evidence, however, suggests that 
depressed individuals have altered risk and reward processing. Murphy et al. (2001), for 
example, used a decision-making task in which participants were required to wager points 
on whether a yellow token was hidden amongst either a group of red boxes or blue boxes, 
the number of which varied on each trial. Thus, participants could theoretically make safer 
bets by selecting the group that was greater in number on a given trial. While healthy 
controls made more optimal decisions, depressed patients exhibited a general risk aversion, 
demonstrated by a reluctance to wager more points even when the odds of success were in 
their favour. Similarly, Forbes, Shaw, and Dahl (2007) found that adolescents who had 
recently experienced a depressive episode or went on to experience a depressive episode 
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demonstrated similar difficulties in recognising low-risk high-reward scenarios, as do 
young adults with a family history of depression (Mannie, Williams, Browning, & Cowen, 
2015). Finally, there is some evidence that experimentally induced tryptophan (the 
biochemical precursor to serotonin) depletion is also associated with similar alterations to 
the processing of relative risks and rewards (Rogers et al., 2003), which may give some 
indication of a potential neurochemical mechanism; however, to date there has been no 
investigation into links between levels of brooding and either tryptophan or serotonin 
levels. 
Much like the available risk aversion research, few studies have expressly 
investigated the links between brooding (and rumination more generally) and interpretation 
biases, and as such only indirect conclusions can be made based on the depression 
literature. It is also important to note that in depression, the balance of reflection and 
brooding may be altered as compared to non-clinical populations; however, the findings in 
this thesis may still help with interpreting the depression literature. In line with the risk 
aversion literature, depression symptoms and severity have been inversely associated with 
positive association biases (Orchard, Pass, & Reynolds, 2016) and positively associated 
with negative interpretation bias (Lee, Mathews, Shergill, & Yiend, 2016), which suggests 
that as symptom severity increases, the interpretation of neutral or ambiguous scenarios as 
positive decreases, and as such, these scenarios are increasingly interpreted as negative. 
Thus, as noted with respect to risk taking, individuals who are faced with situations in 
which the outcome are uncertain may interpret these negatively and thus refrain from 
engaging with the situation. To the author’s knowledge, there have been only two studies 
that have investigated the relationship between rumination and interpretation bias. Schick, 
Wessa, Vollmayr, Kuehner, and Kanske (2013) found that reflection, not brooding, was 
negatively associated with positive interpretation biases such that those who engaged more 
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frequently in reflective rumination interpreted ambiguous stimuli more negatively, in a 
clinically healthy sample. This would appear to conflict with the idea that brooding is 
primarily responsible for negative interpretation bias, although the authors comment that 
within their sample there was minimal variance in brooding scores, thereby limiting the 
ability to detect any correlations between brooding and interpretation biases. Conversely, 
Hertel, Mor, Ferrari, Hunt and Agrawal (2014) found more frequent brooding ruminators 
were faster to interpret ambiguous scenarios negatively compared to individuals who do 
not frequently engage in brooding rumination, suggesting that brooding does indeed play a 
role in negative interpretation bias. The authors, however, offer no explanation as to why 
brooders may be faster in this regard. 
The evidence presented in this thesis, in conjunction with that reported in the wider 
literature, would suggest that brooding does indeed have some form of adaptive function; 
however, it is also apparent that brooding is destructive when dysfunctional. As suggested 
in Chapter Three, it is possible that in healthy populations brooding is regulated by 
reflective processes, such that as long as reflective rumination remains dominant, the 
negative effects of brooding are mitigated. Thus, once reflection breaks down and becomes 
subordinate, brooding becomes dominant and subsequently dysfunctional, resulting in 
more destructive ruminations associated with more severe depressive episodes due to 
brooding ruminations being more abstract and less goal oriented. Indeed, reports from the 
clinical literature indicate that levels of reflective rumination are generally diminished 
relative to brooding in depression patients (Joormann et al., 2006; Pearson et al., 2010; 
Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, & van Os, 2008) and in previously depressed individuals 
with a history of suicidal ideation (Crane, Barnhofer, & Williams, 2007). Additionally, 
elevated levels of reflection have been found to predict recovery from depressive episodes 
(Arditte & Joormann, 2011). As evidenced, reflection has been associated with problem 
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solving, and so problem solving deficits as a result of diminished reflection might present 
another mechanism through which depressive episodes are maintained, in tandem with the 
effects of dysfunctional brooding. Specifically, where brooding inhibits action, individuals 
with diminished reflection may struggle to develop effective solutions to problems they 
may face. As a result of being unable to develop potentially viable solutions, individuals 
are unable to overcome their risk aversion and thus remain in a depressed state. Therefore, 
depressed individuals may only have problems with developing solutions rather than 
executing them. To date, only one study has examined the relationship between depression 
and solution execution and generation independently. Fossati, Ergis, and Allilaire (2001) 
found that depression patients had no deficits in concept execution (that is, the ability to 
enact a solution which is independent of developing a solution for themselves), but rather 
deficits emerged when asked to generate solutions independently, supporting the notion of 
a specific deficit in solution generation. Critically, however, reflection was not measured 
and thus it is difficult to be certain in any conclusions regarding reflection, depression, and 
solution generation based on these findings. 
At the cognitive level, it would appear that rumination is associated differentially 
with various aspects of executive function, and these observations may offer some insight 
as to how rumination may benefit problem solving from a cognitive perspective. First, the 
frequency of reflective ruminations is positively associated with working memory 
capacity, such that more frequent reflective ruminations were associated with greater 
working memory capacity (Chapter Four). Originally, working memory has been theorised 
to be involved in problem solving (Baddeley & Logie, 1999), a proposal that has since 
been evidenced in adults (Just, Carpenter, & Hemphill, 1996; Lv, 2015) and children 
(Swanson & Beebe-Frankenberger, 2004), such that working memory capacity predicts 
problem solving ability. Thus, if both reflection and working memory capacity have been 
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shown to be associated with problem solving ability, it reasonable to assume that working 
memory capacity may provide a cognitive mechanism through which reflection can affect 
problem solving ability; a prediction the data from Chapter Four conforms to. 
More recently, greater working memory capacity has been associated with 
improvements in global executive functioning (McCabe et al., 2010). McCabe et al. 
suggest that working memory may itself be subserved by an executive attention 
mechanism responsible for goal maintenance, allowing for the dedication of other 
executive functions (for example, working memory) to the active goal. As discussed in 
Chapter Four, brooding and analytical rumination were found to be negatively associated 
with reaction times on certain trials in, respectively, the Posner attention task and in the 
stop signal reaction time task, although accuracy was not affected, and that these results 
may be explained by the action inhibition account. Integrating these findings with both 
executive attention and problem solving accounts suggest that in a problem solving 
context, frequent ruminators may be better able to remain goal oriented (i.e. solving a 
particular problem). With individuals who are more goal oriented, there may be a trade off 
in speed versus accuracy of response, such that these individuals will sacrifice rapid 
responses for the sake of ensuring accurate responses, particularly in difficult or 
ambiguous situations. From an adaptive perspective, this indicates where outcomes are 
uncertain or the consequences of failure severe, ruminators delay engaging a solution until 
they are confident that their solution is likely to succeed. 
One final consideration pertains to the effects of state and trait rumination and their 
potential overlap from an adaptionist perspective. As evidenced in Chapter Six, there were 
potentially differential effects of state rumination compared to the effects of trait 
rumination evidenced in previous chapters, which may be indicative of rumination’s 
involvement in problem solving based on the short- versus long-term nature of the problem 
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at hand. Specifically, state rumination may be involved in short-term problems whereas 
trait rumination may be more involved in long-term problem solving. As observed in 
Chapter Three, trait rumination was associated with ability in the Prisoner’s dilemma task, 
an analogue for social problem solving, whereas in Chapter Six state rumination was not 
associated with ability in this task. This observation indicates that state rumination may not 
be associated with the ability to solve problems that are more long-term in nature. Indeed, 
human social interactions often occur over multiple encounters with multiple individuals 
over a period of time, particularly when forming social bonds (Humphrey, 1976; Trivers, 
1971). Thus, when social problems occur, one must not only solve the problem at hand, but 
also must be aware of how others in the social group may respond in future. Moreover, 
solving a given social problem may be more prolonged due to these distal effects within 
social groups, and so one’s propensity to ruminate over time may be more related to 
solving such problems. Conversely, state rumination may exhibit stronger associations 
with short-term problems as one must engage in rumination on the given problem more 
immediately. Unlike social problems, short-term problems, such as evaluating and 
mitigating risks associated with resource gathering, have a more immediate impact upon an 
individual and may rely on an individual’s ability to effectively engage in rumination 
quickly and purposefully. 
Beyond the need to replicate the findings presented here and continue to investigate 
the potential beneficial effects of rumination, one final consideration for future work 
concerns metacognitive beliefs about ruminative processes. Metacognition refers broadly 
to an individual’s knowledge of their own knowledge and cognitive processes (Koriat, 
2007), or “thinking about thinking” (Flavell, 1979; Soderstrom, Davalos, & Vazquez, 
2011), and is thought to capture a self-reflective component. To date, there exists an 
extensive literature documenting the effects of metacognition on memory, demonstrating 
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how dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs on the processes learning and memory can result 
in poorer recall and engagement in inferior learning strategies (e.g. Karpicke, 2009; 
Karpicke, Butler, & Roediger, 2009), and how metacognitive interventions can improve 
learning (e.g. Kramarski & Mevarech, 2003; Schmidt & Ford, 2003). Moreover, the role of 
metacognition has been implicated in pathological disorders such as substance abuse 
(Spada, Moneta, & Wells, 2007; Spada & Wells, 2005), paranoia (Morrison et al., 2005; 
Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011), and obsessive compulsive disorder (Moritz, Peters, 
Larøi, & Lincoln, 2010; Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2009). From these examples alone, it is 
apparent that metacognitive beliefs can impact on behaviour, but also an individual’s 
reaction to certain cognitive phenomenon. For example, an individual’s metacognitive 
belief about voice-hearing determines whether they find their experiences distressing (and 
subsequently symptomatic), or not, and subsequently non-indicative of disorder (Brett, 
Johns, Peters, & McGuire, 2009). Thus, the effects of certain cognitive phenomenon may 
vary dependent on the metacognitive beliefs of the individual. 
The metacognitive literature surrounding rumination, much like the majority of the 
larger rumination literature, has predominantly concerned itself with the examination of 
metacognitive attitudes in depression patients. Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz and Van 
Os (2010), for example, found currently depressed individuals receiving treatment 
typically endorsed ruminative thought styles, believing that the process was helpful, but 
subsequently worry that they cannot control the process. Similarly, Papageorgiou and 
Wells (2009) found depression patients were more likely to endorse positive metacognitive 
beliefs as compared to healthy controls. Moreover, Papageorgiou and Wells present a 
potential causal model for the manifestation and perseveration of rumination, suggesting 
that initially, patients believe rumination to be a helpful coping strategy in response to a 
stressor, but soon develop negative appraisals of rumination viewing it as uncontrollable 
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and detrimental. As a result of believing rumination to be uncontrollable, these patients are 
unable to attenuate their ruminative response, which may then become maladaptive or 
distressing, thereby perpetuating the depressive episode. 
Although the evidence suggests that metacognition may play a role in the 
manifestation of pathological rumination, there has been a relative lack of investigation 
into metacognition and levels of rumination in non-clinical populations. Moreover, of 
those that have conducted such investigations, few if any have made distinctions between 
potentially adaptive and maladaptive forms of rumination. Thus it is difficult to determine 
whether positive and negative metacognitive beliefs promote different types of rumination 
differentially, or whether they may promote rumination generally. Perhaps more critically, 
without such studies, potential moderating effects of metacognitive beliefs on rumination 
and subsequent behaviour remain unknown. To date, only one study has examined 
individuals’ metacognitive beliefs toward reflection and brooding with respect to levels of 
depressed mood. Gooding, Taylor, and Tarrier (2012) asked participants to self-report the 
frequency at which they engaged in reflective and brooding type ruminations along with 
their levels of depressed mood. Moreover, they also asked participants to rate how 
effective they felt these ruminative strategies were in response to depressed mood, finding 
that individuals who endorsed reflective type rumination were more likely to engage in 
reflective rumination during depressed moods. Finally, individuals who engaged more 
frequently in reflective rumination and endorsed reflection as an effective strategy were 
found to predict lower levels of depression as compared to those who engaged in reflective 
rumination but did not endorse this as an effective strategy. This would suggest that 
changing an individual’s metacognitive beliefs may have a demonstrable impact on 
depressed mood. It is threfore possible that metacognitive beliefs may also impact the 
effectiveness of reflection and brooding in problem solving contexts, such that individuals 
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who reflect more and endorse this strategy may experience greater benefits than those who 
do not endorse these beliefs. Indeed, it is possible that the beneficial effects of rumination 
are dependent on the individual endorsing rumination as a strategy, and future work should 
seek to address this gap in the literature. 
7.1 Conclusion 
What is clear is that rumination can no longer be considered a unitary concept. Moreover, 
the work presented in this thesis indicates that reflection and brooding have distinct effects 
on behaviour and that these effects do not follow the pattern one would expect based on the 
available literature. This is of particular importance for brooding, which has largely been 
considered maladaptive; however, the evidence presented here challenges this 
preconception and invites a reimagining of what may be considered adaptive and 
maladaptive. More broadly, this thesis has addressed a systematic gap in the literature by 
investigating the effects of rumination and its sub-components in a healthy population but 
has also provided a basis for future studies to identify methods for the manipulation of 
rumination in vitro. Indeed, by showing that rumination is susceptible to state 
manipulation, it is possible that in disorders where rumination has been identified as a key 
factor (e.g. depression), state frequency of rumination may be manipulated in order to 
assist in treatment.  
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